Parallel worlds
Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo

Parallel worlds

Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo

Marc Sommers
Peter Buckland

UNESCO

International Institute for Educational Planning

The choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this book and the opinions expressed therein are not necessarily those of UNESCO-IIEP and do not commit the Organization.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO-IIEP and the World Bank concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Contents

List of abbreviations

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DES	Department of Education and Science
DESK	Developing the Education System in Kosovo
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FRYOM	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
FSDEK	Finnish Support for the Development of Education in Kosovo
GMP	Gross Material Product
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IAC	Interim Administrative Council
IBE	International Bureau for Education
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JCCE	Joint Civil Commission on Education
JIAS	Joint Interim Administrative Structure
KEC	Kosovo Education Centre
KEDP	Kosovo Educator Development Programme
KFOR	Kosovo Forces (collective name for NATO forces in Kosovo)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KTC	Kosovo Transitional Council
LASH	League of Albanian Educators
LBD	United Democratic Front
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
MED	Municipal Education Director
MEP	Ministry Empowerment Project

MEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MREB	Mitrovica Regional Education Board
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDK	Kosovo Democratic Party
PIO	Principal Education Officer
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
PS	Permanent Secretary
SEO	Senior Education Officer
SRSG	Special Representative for the Secretary General
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VET	Vocational Education and Training

Acknowledgements

Series preface

UNESCO is increasingly requested to provide an educational response in emergency and reconstruction settings. The organization is in the process of developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide prompt and relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specific training for education policy-makers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the eleven objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. It stresses the importance of meeting "… the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict". The *Dakar Framework for Action* (World Education Forum, 2000: 9) calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries, have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated by the actions of NGOs and United Nations agencies.

Moreover, the field of educational planning in emergencies and reconstruction is still young. It has to be organized into a manageable discipline, through further documentation and analysis, before training programmes can be designed. Accumulated institutional memories and knowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education in emergencies, are in danger of being lost due both to the dispersion and disappearance of documents, and to high staff turnover in both national and international contexts. Most of the expertise is still in the heads of practitioners and needs to be collected, since memories fade fast. Diverse experiences of educational reconstruction must now be more thoroughly documented and analyzed before they disappear.

This task includes the publication in this series of seven country-specific analyses being conducted on the planning and management of education in emergencies and reconstruction. They concern the efforts currently being made to restore and transform education systems in

countries as diverse as Burundi, Kosovo, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Timor-Leste. They have been initiated and sponsored by IIEP, in close collaboration with the Division of Educational Policies and Strategies in UNESCO Headquarters. This particular volume on Kosovo, *Parallel worlds*, has been researched and written in partnership with the World Bank Human Development Network-Education.

The objectives of the case studies are:

- to contribute to the process of developing knowledge in the discipline of education in emergencies;
- to provide focused input for future IIEP training programmes targeting government officials and others in education in emergencies;
- to identify and collect dispersed documentation on the management of education in the seven countries; and to capture some of the undocumented memories of practitioners;
- to analyze response in seven very different situations to educational provision in times of crisis;
- to increase dissemination of information and analysis on education in emergencies.

IIEP's larger programme on education in emergencies and reconstruction involves not only these case studies, but also a series of global, thematic, policy-related studies. In addition, IIEP is producing a handbook for education authority officials and the agencies assisting them, and developing training materials for a similar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest but significant contribution to the discipline of education in emergencies and reconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processes applied in this crucial field.

Gudmund Hernes
Director, IIEP

Executive summary

The objective of this case study is to identify lessons that might be learned from the planning and management of education in Kosovo from June 1999 until the present, focusing on social and political issues.

Perceptions and perspectives: four guiding assumptions

In examining education in Kosovo within a contested and politically charged environment, four general assumptions have been employed to guide the analysis.

First, **perceptions of what has taken place in the education sector matter at least as much as the reality**. What also matters, is how different groups view and respond to changes in their education system. Different perspectives of the education system, both between and among Albanians, Serbs and international educationalists working in Kosovo, are a featured component of the descriptions in this case study.

A second, related assumption involves educationalists at different levels of the education system in Kosovo. It concerns the **reforms introduced at the education 'centre' in the capital which look entirely different at municipal or school levels**. Revealing these perspectives constitutes an important component of the case study's narrative and analysis.

Third, there is an attempt to illuminate any common points between groups that surface in the course of analysis. **When differences between groups take centre stage, as they so often have in Kosovo, issues which they share in common tend to be overlooked.** Here, light is shed on any significant issues that link the viewpoints of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, or, indeed, the views of internationals with either or both indigenous groups.

Finally, **the context of educational reconstruction and change was exceedingly significant**. Repression, resistance, rebellion, and eventually open conflict engulfed the population of Kosovo for at least a decade before NATO's bombing campaign in 1999. United Nations officials

arriving during the initial reconstruction months following the entrance of NATO forces into Kosovo in June 1999 attempted to support the establishment of a new education system. At the same time, they co-operated with Albanian and Serbian education officials who were re-starting and managing schools on their own, using the networks, resources and institutions that had sustained the separate systems throughout the previous decade.

The approach taken in this case study regarding education in Kosovo incorporates descriptions and analyses of key technical issues, while investigating the processes and impact as viewed by different education system members. The case study should thus be considered complementary to other reports and articles that have already been produced about education in Kosovo (e.g., Crighton *et al.*, 2001; Davies, 1999; Paci *et al.,* 2001; Pupovci *et al.*, 2001).

Coverage

As the above assumptions suggest, this case study will take a careful look at issues of ownership and change from a variety of viewpoints. A specific set of themes will be investigated:

i.   the influence and relevance of history, tradition, and politics on post-war education work;

ii.   the tension between the need to resume schooling using existing resources, institutions and curricula, and the urge to reform and modernize the education system to avoid reproducing the shortcomings of the past;

iii.   the ambiguity regarding authority when an outside entity, in this case, UNMIK, assumes the leadership role in education, moves boldly to institute reforms, and then hands over the education system control to local officials, in this case, Kosovars;

iv.   the gap between the policies, plans and strategies developed at the central level and their impact on change at the school and community level.

v.   the way the above four themes are manifested in:
  –   school and system governance, including decentralization and information management;
  –   educational access, particularly those issues relating to tensions between educational exclusion and inclusion, ethnicity, gender, and disabled children;
  –   the policies and processes of curriculum development and reform;
  –   the concerns, needs and development of Kosovo's teacher corps and, to a lesser extent, its school directors.

Foreword

Since education remains at or near the centre of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, telling the story of education in post-war Kosovo is bound to attract controversy. More controversy surrounds education issues in Kosovo, in fact, than any other post-conflict situation either of the authors has ever encountered. Nonetheless, controversy is not the intention of the authors. On the contrary, the focus is, as accurately as is possible, and relying on the tools of social science research, to explain how and why the education system unfolded as it has since the end of the NATO bombing campaign in June 1999.

All researchers enter a subject area with a set of experiences and perspectives that help direct and focus their work, and this case study is no exception. Prior experience of the two authors early in the post-war period in Kosovo represents both an important asset in support of this effort and a perspective from which the education system can be described.

Marc Sommers arrived in Kosovo late in July 1999, as the first field researcher of a team that investigated NATO's role in humanitarian action in Kosovo.[1] While examining the education sector was not central to his work, it formed a component of his field research and analysis. Peter Buckland's experience with education in Kosovo was much more direct. Arriving on the heels of NATO's advance in mid-June 1999 on secondment from UNICEF, he was among a handful of United Nations officials tasked with re-starting the education system in Kosovo. Until the end of July, while the UNMIK[2] interim administration was being established, he was the only United Nations official in UNMIK responsible for education. He returned in September and October to work as part of the small United Nations education team established in UNMIK.

---

1   The subsequent monograph that surfaced from this work was entitled *NATO and humanitarian action in the Kosovo crisis* by Larry Minear, Ted Van Baarda and Marc Sommers (Providence: Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown University, Occasional Paper No. 36, 2000).
2   UNMIK: The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. For details of its establishment and functioning, see *Chapter 1*, below.

Map of Kosovo, May 2000

Prologue: Forging a new path

In the land of Kosovo, conflict begins with the name itself. For the majority Albanians, their homeland is called Kosova, while for the minority Serbs, it is known as Kosovo and Metohija. An Albanian from Kosova is called a Kosovar, while a Serb is a Kosovac. On the maps produced by KFOR (Kosovo Forces, the collective name for the NATO forces stationed there), diplomacy and compromise are sought: each town in Kosovo has two names: one in Albanian, another in Serbian. Kosovo's capital is listed both as Prishtinë (Albanian) and Priština (Serbian). Not all of the town names match so closely, however. On some maps, for example, the town of Leposavic (Serbian) is listed not as Leposaviq, the Albanian equivalent, but as 'Albanik', which translates as 'Albanian'. Located in the far north of Kosovo and close to Serbian borders on three sides, Leposavic / Leposaviq / Albanik has historically been an area of Serbian settlement. The politics surrounding 'Albanik' is only one example of the multitude of ways that conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo continues after the war has passed.[3]

A word on terminology

Since basic terminology in Kosovo is so contested, a word on decisions made for this case study is necessary.[4] The authors will refer to the territory where the case study takes place as Kosovo, and not Kosova, Kosovo and Metohija, or Kosovo/a, simply because 'Kosovo' is the most common and widely used term in English. Likewise, the conventional English language spelling for all place names in Kosovo will be used here as well. Similarly, the people of Kosovo will be referred to as 'Kosovars' because it is the most commonly accepted word used to describe Kosovo's residents. At the same time, explicit reference to Kosovo's Serbs will be made by applying the term 'Kosovac' Serbs, while Kosovo's Albanians will be called 'Kosovar' Albanians, in recognition of the appropriate terminology in Serbian and Albanian, respectively. Using these place names should not be interpreted, in any way, as a display of favouritism for any side involved in Kosovo's conflicted political situation.

---

3   One Kosovar related how Serbs had carried out a similar renaming effort when the Serbs took over the town of Gornje Vakuf in Bosnia. Even though the city was mostly non-Serb, he said, the town was renamed 'Serbobran', or 'Serb defended'.

4   The need to clarify this issue led Tim Judah to open his Author's Note for *Kosovo: War and revenge* with, "Don't look for biases in place names. There are none" (2000: xi).

Education remains one of the chief settings where tensions and conflicts among and between Albanians and Serbs play themselves out. Although NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo (and Serbia) ended in June 1999, education policies and practices in Kosovo are still heavily influenced by the heated, corrosive, and unresolved political stalemate that Albanians and Serbs are locked into and the United Nations seeks to defuse. The charged situation, forever on the precipice of violence, inspired the early waves of international educationists tasked with reconstructing Kosovo's education system to move forward slowly and cautiously. This approach changed, however, when Michael Daxner became the Principal International Officer (PIO) of the Department of Education and Science for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in April 2000. Across the next two critical post-war years (until June 2002), Daxner led a movement towards rapid educational reform which continues to influence Kosovo's education system.

During the period when Michael Daxner served as PIO, the United Nations' task of restarting education in Kosovo was staked out as nothing less than reinvention. Little from Kosovo's educational heritage was considered worthy of mere alteration. Dramatic reform, even renewal, became the order of the day. Daxner inspired an impressive level of donor funding for education in Kosovo, obtained, in his own view and that of others, a near-free hand from United Nations' superiors to assert his vision on to the education system, recruited a largely hand-picked team of international educationists, and assigned established international agencies core tasks within the education system. Veteran Serbian and especially Albanian education leaders, meanwhile, rested on the back burner, often supportive of educational changes but increasingly aware of their own marginalization from the process.

Daxner's approach to reform contained a level of vigour and frankness that became a kind of trademark. It was clearly present in his farewell speech, delivered to an OECD-sponsored conference in Pristina, on 9 June 2002. One observer interviewed characterized it as "a blistering indictment of the deficiencies of Kosovo education" which blasted the system's "methodological backwardness, fixation on using education to maintain ethnic identity, ingrained sexism, rampant corruption, and the belief that paying lip service to 'European standards' would somehow bring them to pass in Kosovo." The observer also noted that Daxner "lashed into" international donors for decreasing funding for Kosovo education at the moment when investments called for reinforcement.

Change did not come quietly to Kosovo's education system; perhaps it was not possible. Certainly restarting an education system in a situation that, immediately after the war, lacked a government, a police force, and often such basic necessities as a heated room and a telephone, is exceedingly difficult to carry out. Initiating ambitious reforms at the same time is even more difficult. Moreover, it is not unusual for international educationists to arrive in countries emerging from war and destruction with the idea that post-war situations provide compelling opportunities for starting education systems afresh. Much of the past, after all, appears to have been wiped out. The end of war seems to be an excellent time to set outdated policies and practices aside and modernize the education sector. While the presence of sitting governments tends to leave such ideas largely unrealized, the uncommon role of the United Nations in Kosovo set the stage for bold reforms to be swiftly enacted. For unlike nearly all other post-war situations, the United Nations in Kosovo did not have to contend with any government in Kosovo: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 had already tasked the United Nations to become it, albeit in the form of an interim, impermanent administration.

The United Nations' near-unprecedented power and freedom to act in post-war Kosovo thus facilitated the emergence of a compelling experiment in post-war education reform. Its bold vision for education, together with its turn away from Kosovo's educational past, took place in a land that had been torn apart by conflict between armed forces and neighbours alike, and where education lay at the centre of the struggle. The rebellion of Kosovar Albanians against the rule and policies of the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Milosevic prior to NATO's aerial incursion revolved partly around the 'parallel system' for education that they constructed, and which UNMIK's Department of Education and Science effectively sidelined. The United Nation's dramatic reforms also took place while Kosovac Serbs largely recoiled from any educational alterations if they were not first approved by the Ministry of Education in Belgrade, on the basis that Kosovo remained, formally, part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Infused by this explosive mixture of tension and change, the story of education that unfolds in the following pages examines, in part, both a daring United Nations attempt simultaneously to manage educational reconstruction and reform on a grand scale, and how the experiment has been received and adapted by the people of Kosovo.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The objective of this case study is to identify lessons that might be learned from the management of education in Kosovo from June 1999 until the present. The research focuses on social and political issues related to educational planning and management. It will employ a series of themes and ask a number of questions to develop a road map through an intricate and remarkable journey. The authors are cognizant of the fact that a single document such as this monograph cannot detail all aspects of a dramatic education story taking place in the first three and a half years following a war. They will not attempt to do this. At the same time, this case study will sketch some broad outlines of educational planning and management in post-war Kosovo and highlight prominent and particularly revealing issues that surfaced over the course of field research.

Perceptions and perspectives: four guiding assumptions

In examining education in Kosovo within a contested and politically charged environment, four general assumptions are employed to help guide the analysis. First, *perceptions of what has taken place in the education sector matter at least as much as the reality*. Intentions, goals, and stated objectives, in other words, form only a portion of the puzzle. What also matters, particularly in light of the high degree of emotion connected to Kosovar education issues, is how different groups view and respond to changes in their education system. Different perspectives of the education system, both between and among Albanians, Serbs and international educationists working in Kosovo, will be a featured component of the descriptions that follow.

A second, related assumption involves not ethnic adversaries and international experts, but educationists at different levels of the education system in Kosovo. In many cases, *reforms introduced at the education 'centre' in the capital look entirely different at municipal or school levels*. The research team devoted considerable effort in understanding the viewpoints of education officials at different levels of the system, and

revealing these perspectives constitutes an important component of the case study's narrative and analysis.

Third, there is an attempt to illuminate any commonalities between groups that surface in the course of analysis. *When differences between groups take centre stage, as they so often have in Kosovo, issues which they share in common tend to be overlooked.* Here, light is shed on any significant issues that link the viewpoints of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, or, indeed, the views of internationals with either or both indigenous groups. Similarly, if common viewpoints surface that link officials from different levels of the system (school, municipal, and the institutional 'centre'), they are also described. Such commonly held views, where they exist, can become significant in the longer term, when efforts to develop a core consensus among educationists in Kosovo become increasingly important.

Finally, interviews with education professionals in Kosovo made clear that *the context of educational reconstruction and change was exceedingly significant*. Repression, resistance, rebellion, and eventually open conflict engulfed the population of Kosovo for at least a decade before NATO's bombing campaign in 1999. Some in Kosovo would argue that this process extended back decades if not centuries. United Nations officials arriving during the initial reconstruction months following the entrance of NATO forces into Kosovo in June 1999 attempted to support the establishment of a new education system while, at the same time, co-operating with Albanian and Serbian education officials who were re-starting and managing schools on their own, using the networks, resources and institutions that had sustained the separate systems throughout the previous decade. Beginning with this confused and uncertain period, the tension between tradition and change in education surfaced. It has never subsided.

The approach contained in this case study of education in Kosovo does not provide a detailed technical account of educational planning and management in post-war Kosovo. Instead, it incorporates descriptions and analyses of key technical issues with an investigation of process and impact from the perspective of different education-system members. The case study should thus be considered complementary to other reports and articles that have already been produced about education in Kosovo (see, for example, Crighton *et al*., 2001; Davies, 1999; Paci *et al*., 2001; Pupovci *et al*., 2001).

Coverage

As the above discussions about core assumptions suggest, this case study will take a careful look at issues of ownership and change from a variety of viewpoints. With this in mind, a specific set of themes will be investigated:

- The influence and relevance of history, tradition, and politics on post-war education work.
- The tension between the burning need to resume schooling using existing resources, institutions and curricula, and the urge to significantly reform and modernize the education system to avoid reproducing the shortcomings of the past.
- The pervasive ambiguity regarding authority when an outside entity, in this case UNMIK, assumes the leadership role in education, moves boldly to institute reforms, and then hands over the education-system controls to local officials, in this case Kosovars.
- The gap between the policies, plans and strategies developed at the central level and their impact on change at the school and community level.
- The way these four themes are manifested in:
  - school and system governance, including decentralization and information management;
  - educational access, particularly those issues relating to tensions between educational exclusion and inclusion, ethnicity, gender, and disabled children;
  - the policies and processes of curriculum development and reform;
  - the concerns, needs and development of Kosovo's teacher corps and, to a lesser extent, its school directors.

Methodology and approach: context, policy and practice

The research process was generally divided into two parts. Marc Sommers focused on the context and practice of education, while Peter Buckland focused on the evolution of education policy.

As the primary researcher and case-study writer, Marc Sommers was in Kosovo from 7 September until 3 October 2002. He served as a consultant for UNESCO-IIEP. Peter Buckland, a Senior Education

Specialist for the World Bank, was in Kosovo 11-20 September 2002, dividing time between research for this case study and helping to develop an education project with colleagues from the World Bank. Hasnije Ilazi, a staff member of the Department of Philosophy-Sociology at the University of Pristina, and a Programme Officer for the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation, contributed field research and analysis, joining the team in mid-September.

Sommers carried out field research in Pristina, Gjakova, the area north of Mitrovica, Gjilan, and Ferezaj. The purpose was to develop a general framework of central research concerns and case-study themes, and investigate various experiences and perspectives of formal education in Kosovo that have emerged since June 1999. In addition, Sommers researched the social and political context of education in Kosovo since 1989, the development of the 'parallel system' by Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s in particular. He also researched key aspects of how education had been practised in Kosovo since the end of NATO's bombing campaign in June 1999. Perspectives on reform, education for Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, gender and access, and the process of handover were particular concerns. Hasnije Ilazi carried out field research and contributed analysis of field interviews with municipal and school-level officials in the Prizren Region. The field research questions that Sommers and Ms Ilazi used to guide field interviews at municipal and school levels are listed in *Appendix I*. Sommers' findings and analysis are featured in *Chapters 2* and *4*. He was also the lead writer for all chapters except *Chapter 3*, which Peter Buckland wrote, and the conclusion, *Chapter 5*, which the authors jointly wrote.

Peter Buckland's research concentrated on the change in transitional mechanisms at the centre of the education system, and the way such changes impacted policies, access, curriculum and teachers in particular. His research question guides can be found in *Appendix II*. Buckland's findings and analysis are featured in *Chapter 3*. It should be noted that some key education issues, such as the Grade 9 curriculum reform and implementation and teacher salaries, are mentioned in separate chapters, albeit in ways that are intended as complementary.

The field research questions were largely qualitative, and were developed in three stages. First, initial question sets arose from discussions between Marc Sommers, Peter Buckland, and Christopher Talbot of UNESCO-IIEP before the field research period began in Kosovo. Second,

the preliminary questions, which sought to identify the primary research issues that would be investigated, were used in initial interviews with education officials in Pristina. They were revised over time as significant research issues surfaced that would become central research concerns, such as relations between education officials at different system levels ('centre', municipal, and school). This revision process was guided by a series of consultative discussions between the researchers (Sommers, Buckland and Ilazi) and among those attending informal meetings of advisers to the research process. These small, participatory gatherings contained experienced education professionals (international as well as Kosovar) who had expressed an interest in contributing their ideas to the development of the research process. It is only after these activities were undertaken that the development of research questions entered the third stage: drawing up the research question guides listed in *Appendices I* and *II* that were used for field research conducted in schools, with municipal officials, as well as for all remaining interviews with organization, UNMIK and Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) officials. Even after these question guides were developed, however, consultative discussions among the researchers and with participants in the advisory research gatherings continued. There, initial findings were shared, research questions continued to be refined and sharpened, and information and issue gaps were identified that the researchers would attempt to address as the field research period drew to a close.

The case study analysis is largely based on findings arising from interviews representing a diversity of experiences and perspectives. Highest priority was reserved for first-hand interviews with those who have been actively engaged in developing Kosovo's education system since June 1999 – indeed, recording the actual voices of those wrestling with education in post-war Kosovo constituted the overwhelming priority of the research endeavour. Accordingly, interviews were carried out with officials from UNMIK and MEST officials based in Pristina, university faculty in Pristina and Mitrovica, relevant agencies headquartered in Kosovo (such as the Kosovo Education Centre, the Community Development Fund and the Kosovar Educator Development Project), and international organizations involved in education work in Kosovo (such as Catholic Relief Services, the European Centre for Minority Issues, the European Union, GTZ, International Rescue Committee, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank).

School administration officials and teachers were interviewed at nine primary schools and four secondary schools. Students were also interviewed at many of these schools. International and Kosovar officials working in five municipal and five regional offices were also interviewed. With the exception of a handful of prominent and public figures, the names of those interviewed will not be listed in this case study, in an effort to preserve the confidentiality of the interviews and the anonymity of those interviewed. This was determined as particularly important for all Kosovars who were interviewed, given Kosovo's legacy of conflict over education and an ongoing atmosphere of contention and often-fevered debate on educational and related political concerns.

Where possible, the interviews carried out by Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland were conducted in English. Translators were carefully selected for all other interviews. Consultative discussions took place with international education and Kosovar officials (Serbian as well as Albanian) regarding the identification of potential translators. Interviews with candidates were conducted during the first week of fieldwork in Pristina. References were checked. The translators that were hired all had extensive experience and proved capable both in language translation and performing field activities in a professional manner, including when sensitive issues or traumatic memories surfaced. Ms Ilazi conducted all field interviews in Albanian.

Throughout the field research period, prominent or unusual issues emerging from interviews were cross-checked during subsequent interviews. Through this process, significant findings surfaced, such as, to name three examples, the gender dimensions of medical high-school enrolment, the nature and impact of decentralization, and the symbolism and significance of teacher salaries. The emergence of key themes over the course of field research helped shape the illumination of particular narrative and analytical themes that, together with the assumptions, research questions and coverage issues described earlier in this chapter, informed the write-up process.

To supplement and cross-check field research findings, an extensive literature search was carried out. Relevant and particularly noteworthy documentary sources were sought on the Internet, through library searches, and with the kind assistance of officials in Kosovo and elsewhere who contributed a wealth of literature from a variety of organizations. Central texts on Kosovo and Kosovo education were identified, and are referred

to across the subsequent chapters of this case study. The sources that have been identified and used are listed in the references and supplementary bibliography sections, located near the end of this text.

Reconstructing an education system in a situation where education lay at the heart of conflict should never be described as easy. The authors concluded their field research with a heightened appreciation of how difficult, complex, and even dangerous the mission of rebuilding education in Kosovo has proven to be. Passion, dedication, and sheer hard work were clearly evident among those involved in providing education for the children and youth of Kosovo. Regardless of the differences and conflicts that surfaced between educationists from various groups, a high degree of commitment and effort was one thing that officials from all groups generally shared. This appreciation of hard work in the face of difficult challenges is implicit in the authors' assessment of the education experience in Kosovo.

Constraints

Education in Kosovo since the end of the NATO war is a dramatic, compelling, provocative and significant story. It is also both complex and conflicted, and the process of extracting lessons learned from such a challenging context forced the authors to make some difficult decisions. This case study is not intended to be comprehensive. The diversity of experiences and the breadth of action in education in Kosovo simply prevent this. Not all education concerns, in addition, have been equally covered. Research constraints, particularly time limitations in the field, forced the research team to focus its energies on a specific set of issues that surfaced as critically important. The issue of education for minority populations, for example, focused on the largest and, by far, the most politically significant group, the Serbs. Similarly, the study focuses on education issues pertaining to primary school more than any other school level, including the conflicts and controversies surrounding the University of Pristina and the university in the Serb-dominated area of Mitrovica, which is variously referred to as the University of Pristina in Exile, North Kosovo University, and the University of Mitrovica (UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Field Office, 2002: 2). Again, the decision was made both for reasons of demographics and potency: primary schools are the focus of this study because they contain the overwhelming majority of Kosovar students and

teachers, and are the focal point for much of the education system's attention.

The need to make such decisions is unfortunate yet essential, and should not, in any way, be construed as the particular preferences of the authors. Rather, they should be seen as the results of a research team, bound by limitations, having to make difficult choices.

Chapter 2

A social history of education in conflict in Kosovo

More than four years beyond NATO's campaign in Kosovo in 1999 may be enough time to forget the extraordinarily high degree of attention that the territory of Kosovo received on the world stage for several months. NATO member countries had been trailing the activities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Serbian nationalist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, since the early 1990s, bickering privately and sometimes publicly over how to properly respond to the gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia and the tremendous violence and displacement left in its wake. The Milosevic government's revocation of the autonomy of two provinces, Vojvovdina and Kosovo, in 1989, proved "a key moment in a series of events leading to demands for independence from other republics, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually Kosovo" (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 34). One by one, republics fell like dominoes, although never without a struggle: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, until only Serbia and Montenegro were left. Kosovo followed.

Tragedy, torment, loss, and severe human rights abuses are enmeshed in this story. Bosnia's terrible conflict has been called a genocide. It has also been cited as the place where the term 'ethnic cleansing' came into being, coined by Serb authorities to describe "the mass expulsions of ethnic Muslims from towns in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992" (US Department of State, 1999: 5). It was actually more than simply genocide: war and mass expulsions mixed with genocidal acts to transform a formerly multi-ethnic republic into a landmine-infested maze of bitterly divided, atomized ethnic enclaves. Bosnia's violent demise is only part of a larger picture of profound disruption and misfortune in the former Yugoslavia: the displacement and loss to Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, Albanians, Macedonians, Kosovars and others is a mammoth, shared tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of civilians in the region have been killed or displaced by an array of military and paramilitary groups. The wounds of such wars remain, not least in the numbers of forcibly displaced. To this

day, Yugoslavia hosts Europe's largest contingent of forced migrants: 400,000 refugees and 277,000 internally displaced persons (US Committee for Refugees, 2002: 1). Thousands more forced migrants populate nearby countries as well.

Kosovo, NATO and the United Nations: a thumbnail sketch

Antecedents to the conflict in Kosovo began to emerge after Kosovo became a self-governing province within the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia in 1974. Ethnic Albanians, who demographically represented the overwhelming majority of Kosovars, soon established a considerable degree of autonomy within Kosovo. The social and political changes wrought in the aftermath of 1974 in Kosovo alarmed many Serbs, but particularly members of the small Serb minority in Kosovo. By the late 1980s, Kosovac Serb protests expanded, and with Milosevic's rise to power in Yugoslavia, they finally received the attention they had sought. In 1989, Milosevic abolished Kosovo's autonomy and purged the civil service of most Albanian workers. Serbian control over Kosovo returned, harassment and detentions followed, and a decade of repression, resistance and rebellion in Kosovo commenced. The Albanian response was initially peaceful, as they established an entire government, education and healthcare system that paralleled the official system. But violence increasingly entered the Albanian resistance movement in the second half of the 1990s, particularly after the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 failed to recognize the plight of Kosovar Albanians. Soon thereafter, the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA, was born. Violent reprisals between Serbian military police and troops and KLA rebels gradually expanded, and civilians on both sides were displaced or killed. The KLA grew to control a third of Kosovo by July 1998, but its victory was short-lived: it was followed by a massive Serbian military response beginning in mid-1998. War, in the minds of most Kosovars, was now fully underway. Villages were razed, perhaps 200,000 civilians were displaced, and the KLA retreated into the mountains along the Kosovo-Albanian border (Ignatieff, 2000: 12-14; Fromkin, 1999: 159-160).

As the battle continued into 1999, tiny Kosovo, containing perhaps two million people, gradually attracted increasing international attention. The January 1999 massacre by Serb police of 45 Albanians in Racak, a village near Kosovo's capital, Pristina, pushed NATO allies closer towards their eventual air war. As Ignatieff (2000: 60) noted, "Without Racak, air-strikes would never have happened". By March, Milosevic had rejected the peace plan for Kosovo proposed at Rambouillet, and on 24 March, NATO's bombing campaign over

Kosovo and Serbia – Operation Allied Force – began. Massive infrastructural damage caused by 78 days of extensive bombing ensued (Lambeth, 2001: xiii). During the war, Serbian and Albanian civilians were killed. In addition, as many as a million Kosovar Albanians either fled or were forced out of Kosovo, mostly into neighbouring Macedonia and Albania. It has also been estimated that perhaps half a million Kosovars were internally displaced during 1998-99, and 10,000 people were killed (Paci *et al*., 2001: 2), nearly all of whom were Albanian.

By 9 June 1999, NATO's bombing campaign ended, Serbian troops pulled out of Kosovo, and NATO troops and United Nations and international NGO officials entered. Military sectors were swiftly created for NATO troops, now called Kosovo Forces (KFOR): there were areas of responsibility for American, Italian, French, Dutch, British, and, in an act of historic significance, German forces. A parcel was also reserved for the Russian military. Meanwhile, dozens of NGOs swarmed over Kosovo to provide various forms of humanitarian assistance. The war was over; the post-war era had begun.

When the Serbian troops vacated Kosovo, they left a power vacuum. The United Nations sought to fill it, and quickly. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 established on 10 June 1999 – the day after the NATO war ended – a functioning interim civil administration run by the United Nations. Regulation No. 1/1999 followed on 25 July, awarding the United Nations and the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) 'enormous' powers (Yannis, 2001: 18). Although administering state functions was not a new experience for the United Nations[5], never before had the United Nations received "such a broad mandate to assume full responsibility for the administration of a territory".[6] The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was born[7], and in short order four 'pillars' were created: "civil administration (led by the UN), humanitarian (led by UNHCR), institution building (led by

---

5 Yannis (2001: 18) notes that the United Nations assumed "administrative functions within a state" in a number of other places, including Trieste (1947), Jerusalem (1950), West Irian (1962), Congo (1960-64), Namibia (1989-1990), Cambodia (1992-93), El Salvador (1991-1995), and Croatia-Eastern Slavonia (1996-98).

6 A few months later, the United Nations assumed similar responsibilities in East Timor (Chopra, 2000).

7 It is also known as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Yannis, 2001: 11).

the OSCE), and reconstruction (led by the European Union)" (Minear *et al.*, 2000: 7). On 28 October, 2000, "the first-ever free and fair municipal elections in Kosovo" were held (Yannis, 2001: 12), bringing Ibrahim Rugova, the former leader of the Albanian parallel system in the 1990s, back into power. But as during the parallel system era, Rugova's influence was somewhat limited, this time by the authority of Kosovo's SRSG and the United Nations administration. As Yaroslav Trofimov (2003: A1) notes, "virtually all power in [Kosovo] continues to reside with the thousands of United Nations administrators who arrived in 1999 to restore order and promote self-rule."

While Kosovo lies at or near the core of the break up of Yugoslavia, and education lies at the centre of Kosovo's conflict, disputes over the history of Kosovo frequently form the grit that slows or even halts the wheels of movement. Kosovo's history is hardly an easy subject to discuss, because for every Albanian thrust there is a Serbian parry, and vice versa. Albanians and Serbs dispute the significance or validity of central episodes in their shared history. Battles, repressions, slaughters, resistance, and heroism all have their place in real and mythic history, and for both groups, the interpretation of history is what matters: interviews with Albanians and Serbs alike included repeated references to the need for researchers to tell an 'objective' story, which usually meant ensuring that 'their' side of the story would be properly represented.

The idea of being overlooked, ignored or aggrieved are feelings that were broadly shared by Serbians and Albanians interviewed in Kosovo. For some Albanians, this similarity seemed difficult to imagine, given the recent years of repression under Serbian-dominated rule. Similarly, however, Serbs felt that their views had been overlooked since the end of the NATO bombing campaign. In word and in action, Kosovac Serbs interviewed for this case study made clear their realization that they had lost out to the Kosovar Albanians. The new reality was very hard to accept. As one Kosovac Serb educator observed, "Our roles have been switched. Albanians have become the same as us before [the NATO campaign]." Adding tinder to the fire, the educator then suggested, "Or worse." In the view of this educator, but, as will be explained later, disputed by others, the similarity extended to education as well. "Our parallel system of education," he explained, "is just like theirs before [the NATO campaign]."

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background for the study of education in post-war Kosovo. In deference to traditions emerging from debates over education and, indeed, social life in Kosovo, the chapter will look at its history until 1989, a date which, because of a famous speech delivered by Slobodan Milosevic in June of that year, marks when Kosovo became the flashpoint for Yugoslavia's dissolution. Next, the period between 1989 and the start of NATO's 1999 bombing campaign will be examined. This section features the struggle taking place in Kosovo over education, most particularly the rise of what became known as the parallel system. The third section will examine some of the initial impacts of NATO's and the United Nations' arrival into Kosovo following the official cessation of hostilities between NATO countries and the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Milosevic on 9 June 1999. The chapter will end by reviewing the current social, political and educational situation in Kosovo.

History in conflict

In retrospect, that Kosovo became a centre of conflict can scarcely be a surprise. Kosovo is the homeland of a burgeoning Albanian population and the mythic heartland of Serbian history and 'Heavenly Serbia', even though most Serbs do not live there. It bears the burden of hosting ethnic adversaries whose ideas of a political resolution to their differences appear to be irreconcilable. As Noel Malcolm notes, "all parties can agree that the issue of Kosovo is, quite simply, the most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans" (1998: xxvii). Although this statement was made before the NATO bombing campaign of 1999, it appears to be as true today.

Much of the quarrel over politics and education is tied to disputed interpretations of Kosovo's social history. The issue of history, indeed, was a constant theme in interviews conducted with Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, although they tended to emphasize different aspects of the historical record. Many Serbs, for example, referred to the epic first battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, where the nature of their defeat to the Turks created a spiritual victory. They also related, in a number of ways, how they had been overwhelmed by Albanians in recent years. The Serbian account of the years leading up to the 1999 NATO bombing differs from Albanian accounts, and, it turns out, from much (though not all) of the literature that has been reviewed in preparation for writing this case study. Albanians, on the other hand, tended to emphasize their struggle against repression in recent years. Stories depicting the resilience and significance

of the parallel system of education that they developed, and the trials that they endured during the 1990s, were common. References to older history were less frequent.

Remembrances of the past with Albanians and Serbs were infused with links to the ongoing political dispute over Kosovo's future. While some Serbs insisted that Kosovo should still be ruled by Yugoslavia, since Serbs everywhere claimed historic roots in Kosovo, a more dominant theme addressed the right of Kosovac Serbs to remain in Kosovo on their own terms. Albanians, on the other hand, generally considered Kosovo's future already resolved. It was independent, or nearly so, and Albanians were in the majority. Any attachment to the government in Belgrade was unthinkable. Their accounts of personal and political history focused on issues such as human rights abuses in the recent past, their right to control their destiny and the destiny of Kosovo, and how the education system should be reformed.

Despite such fundamental differences, a number of shared themes surfaced in Albanian and Serb accounts of history. Both expressed a strong sense of being misunderstood victims. There was also a shared tension between recollections of days when Albanians and Serbs coexisted, and stated examples of successful coexistence in the present, while, at the same time, a conviction that the opposing group could never, ever, be trusted. Members of both sides also deeply believed that UNMIK was clearly and unmistakably favouring the other side.

Understanding the outlines of these accounts are useful because they help explain Serbian and Albanian perspectives of education. The Albanians' parallel system of education was the centrepiece of their resistance to the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, while the Serbs' attachment to the education system based in Belgrade was complicated but essential. For both groups, history, identity, and education were deeply intertwined. An understanding of the roots of historical interpretations is thus important, because it underlies many of the subsequent disputes over issues related to education. What follows is an account not of the specifics of Albanian and Serbian views of history, but a brief rendering of history and myth through the use of three significant dates, one from the distant past, the other two much more recent.

1389

The monument at Kosovo Polje is now a desolate place. The cherished site for Serbs is usually empty of visitors, with only a guard of Norwegian KFOR soldiers nearby, their lookout surrounded by piles of sandbags. The monument was bombed soon after KFOR's arrival, destroying the stairs in the entryway. The view at the top, high above the surrounding fields where Ottoman Turks and Serbs faced off more than six centuries ago, is now dominated by a tall smokestack from the power station across the highway, belching billows of thick smoke.

The Norwegian sentries have a copy of the texts, translated into English, of the dedication at the monument's base and the description of the battle at the top. The dedication contains a curse for disloyal Serbs: "Those who are Serbian and have a Serbian heart and do not come to battle for Kosovo will not have children, either male or female, crops or wine. They will be damned until they die." The battle description ends with "The battle [of 1389] remains a mystery, with nobody knowing the true winner."

Serbian heroism and a sense of being misunderstood are both rooted at this site. Although the Serbs were subjugated by the Turks following this battle, a Serbian educator noted that "The Turks' aim was to conquer all of Europe, and because of the Serbs, they failed. They only reached Vienna, but then retreated." The educator's account aligns with those gathered from other Serbians, which includes the following argument: even though the Serbs were defeated and their king slain at Kosovo Polje, they managed to kill the Ottoman Sultan during the battle, weaken the Turks, and save much of Europe from Turkish domination. As a result, he explained, "The Serbs remained as moral winners." Western Europeans, he continued, have failed to realize that Serbs died at Kosovo Polje in defence of European civilization. "They want to accept us as Europeans" now, the educator insisted, "while we've been in Europe longer than they have!"

The heroism of Serbian defenders of Kosovo's soil is literally remembered in the mythology surrounding a particular flower that is native to the area. "According to the myth," a Serbian teacher explained, "the flower that grows on Kosovo Polje lives on human blood [of the slain Serbian martyrs], so it can't grow anywhere else." Albanians changed the

name of Kosovo to Kosova, she added, "to avoid the fact that it's a holy Serbian land." Kosovo is indeed "dotted with around a thousand Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries" (Pavković, 2001: 4). Serbians refer to it as Kosovo (meaning 'blackbirds') and Metohija (referring to "the land of [Eastern Orthodox] monasteries"), which may be referred to as 'Kosmet' (Pavković, 2001: 3). Serbian educators explained that Metohija represented church-owned land in the south-western corner of what is now Kosovo. The implication was that Albanians had stolen land owned by their church.

Albanians, of course, have their own rendition of history. In their view, Kosova was "never a 'Metohija' ... because the Serbs had always been a hostile enemy occupier of the Albanian land" (Pavković, 2001: 4). Kosova, in fact, "is the land of Albanians from time immemorial," dating back to the ancient Illyrians, who, it is asserted, were the original inhabitants of Kosova. This version of history and myth directly confronts Serbian claims to Kosovo through its reference to an earlier period of history. The direct link between modern Albanians and ancient Illyrians "was taught in Albanian as well as Kosovo Albanian schools" (Pavković, 2001: 8).

What is marred by mythology is the fact that, through most of Kosovo's history, Albanians and Serbs coexisted. Crnobrnja (1999: 13) notes that "The Serbs and Albanians lived together in Kosovo for over a millennium. The Albanians were there first, but the Serbs were first in establishing a mediaeval kingdom which included Kosovo." The emphasis of the Albanians on original settlement and Serbs glorifying a kingdom's battle with the Turks both have roots in the historical record. At the same time, the shared experience of being dominated by others is normally not emphasized in Albanian and Serb recollections of history. Crnobrnja also observes that "For most of the millennium ... both the Serbs and Albanians were subjects of outside imperial powers: first Byzantium, later the Ottoman Empire" (1999: 13-14). Perhaps the most famous Albanian hero in history was Skanderbeg, who kept up "his resistance to Ottoman forces for an extraordinary twenty-five years, until his death in 1468" (Malcolm, 1998: 88). In reality, both the Serb warriors in the first Battle of Kosovo and Skanderbeg a few decades later fought against the same Turkish occupiers. But resistance against foreign occupiers is not the purpose of these mythologies. Serb and Albanian myths compete against each other, since the two contain "myths of national liberation" as well as "myths of the recovery of the same 'lost' land" (Pavković, 2001: 9). Violence between

Serbians and Albanians in the twentieth century, when "a seesaw of mutual oppression occurred" (Crnobrnja, 1999: 13-14), has only helped blanket evidence of historic coexistence and shared victimization.

Ultimately, the battle over history is, in the view of Tim Judah, "not really about the past, but about the future," because "he who holds the past holds the future" (2000: 2). This would explain why Serbs in 1999 destroyed, bulldozed, and planted trees on the site of the house in Prizren "where meetings in 1878 had given birth to modern Albanian nationalism," and why, shortly after NATO entered Kosovo a few weeks later, Albanians commenced destruction of sacred Serbian religious sites and statues of glorified Serbian kings. "In Kosovo, history is war by other means" (Judah, 2000: 1-2), and this battle of ideas rages on, not least in competing school curricula.

1974

The events of 1974 in Yugoslavia significantly impacted education in Kosovo. The new Yugoslav constitution that emerged that year was a political watershed, and it set the stage for the strife, fears, violence, and aspirations that all began to gather momentum in subsequent decades. The 1974 Constitution "provided each republic and province in Yugoslavia with theoretical statehood" (Bellamy, 2001: 106). Kosovo and Vojvodina were declared autonomous provinces. Like Yugoslav republics, Kosovo and Vojvodina had their own administrations, assemblies, judiciaries, national banks, and police forces. Unlike republics, they were both members of Serbia as well as federal Yugoslav institutions. Autonomous provinces did not have the right to secede from Yugoslavia (as did republics), and Albanians in Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina were considered nationalities rather than nations, apparently because each group "had a homeland elsewhere" (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 36). A 'national pecking order' was thus formally established: nations (such as Serbia and Croatia) were situated ahead of nationalities (such as Albanians and Hungarians), which were both ahead of national minorities (such as Roma and Jews). The stage was now set for a dramatic expansion of Kosovar Albanian political expression and authority.

At the same time, the die was cast for tensions between Serbs and Albanians to explode yet again. Although the 1974 Constitution "attempted to resolve the Yugoslav 'national question' and end [the] cycle of violence"

in Kosovo (Bellamy, 2001: 106), reflecting on autonomous Kosovo's relationship to the Serbian Republic is useful. Serbia effectively lost most of its control over both the northern reaches of the republic (Vojvodina) as well as most of the south (Kosovo). Both Vojvodina and Kosovo remained part of the Republic of Serbia, but they now owned a significant degree of independence from Serbian control. On the map, Kosovo was still a part of Serbia, but in reality, Kosovo after the 1974 reforms "became a Yugoslav republic in all but name," unleashing "years of rising [Albanian] expectations" for increased political control which included, in some quarters, independence or union with Albania (Judah, 2000: 38). Albanians in Kosovo even had "the right to fly their national flag" (Bellamy, 2001: 107), and 'Metohija' "was dropped from Kosovo's official name (Clark, 2000: 39). Bellamy summed up the significance of the 1974 Constitution in the following way: "While for the Albanian leaders 1974 represented a step on the road to a republic, for the Serbs it amounted to nothing less than a betrayal by Tito" (2001: 108). One sees in the 1974 Constitution a situation presaging today's political challenges: the majority Albanians owning local political dominance while the minority Serbians insist on Belgrade's titular control over Kosovo.

The centrepiece of the Kosovar Albanians' 'cultural and national renaissance' lay in education. The University of Pristina, established in 1970, became "the pride of autonomous Kosovo" (Bellamy, 2001: 40-41). Perhaps more significant, however, was the fact that "all school pupils were entitled to receive an education in 'the mother language', be it Albanian, Serbo-Croat or Turkish" (Bellamy, 2001: 107). In addition, the normalization of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, which had been established in 1971, enabled Kosovar Albanian educators to begin using Albanian textbooks and education ideas in developing their own curricula.[8]

1981

Following the death of Yugoslavia's founder and dictator, Marshal Tito, in 1980, tensions within Kosovo began to increase. The student protests that began at the University of Pristina in March 1981 (which were allegedly sparked by a student's discovery of "a cockroach in his

---

8   Clark states that "teachers and textbooks" from Albania "were essential in the expansion of Kosovo education" (2000: 40).

soup") eventually "shocked Yugoslavia to the core" (Clark, 2000: 41-43). Albanian student protests expanded, became violent, and were met with a strong response from Serbian police from Belgrade. The riots eventually spread across Kosovo, and Amnesty International claimed that over 300 Albanians (in addition to at least two policemen) were killed. Ethnic boundaries in Kosovo, which "were always stronger than in other parts of Yugoslavia", now fuelled even more fear, suspicion and separation between Albanians and Serbs. The riots and severe government response in 1981 marked the beginning of what Kosovar Albanians "consider an 18-year terror". It also sparked an increase in the emigration of members of the Kosovac Serb community. Judah notes that after 1981 "many Serbs did indeed feel a pressure to leave Kosovo" (2000: 43).

Education as resistance: the parallel system

The parallel system of education established by Kosovar Albanian educationists in the early 1990s marks the beginning of a number of significant and highly influential developments that have helped shape the planning and management of education in Kosovo since that time. The parallel education system constituted the centrepiece both of Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian government dominance and repression as well as making education among Albanians an explicitly political endeavour. Separation from the mainstream education system in Kosovo connected Kosovar Albanian students, teachers, and school administrators to political resistance and cultural identification. It tore away any vestiges of perceived commonalities between education for Serbian and Albanian children. It inspired a grassroots movement towards decentralizing the education system, connecting responsibility for education directly to school directors, teachers, parents, and the greater Albanian community. The decentralized funding networks in support of education reached across borders, directly linking Albanians living and working elsewhere with parents to support education regardless of the cost. Sacrifice for education was heroized, and respect for teachers surged, as they were forced to live on in-kind donations and eventually meagre salaries provided by their sea of Albanian supporters. The parallel system of education stimulated a reform of Kosovar Albanian curricula whose imprint remains to this day.

Perhaps more than anything else, the parallel system of education stands as a symbolic source of Kosovar Albanian pride in their resilience

and self-reliance. As Clark noted, "The struggle for education became a central symbol for the Albanians of Kosovo [and] the proudest achievement of the parallel system" developed in response to repressive Serbian government measures (2000: 96). Finally, and significantly, the period of the parallel system became the primary marker in the process of separating Albanian education from its Serbian counterpart. During this period, education for exclusion became a rock-hard reality, making subsequent United Nations efforts to broker and promote inclusion through education a formidable challenge.

Before turning to the details of the parallel system, a review of the chronology of change in education in Kosovo between 1989 and 1999 is useful. The process that began early in 1989 amounted to an effort to establish, or re-establish, the 'Serbianization of Kosovo', led by Yugoslavia's new leader in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic (Bellamy, 2001: 114), to counteract the 'Albanization' of Kosovo that Serbians had perceived. Milosevic staked his political career on this effort. In his speech on 28 June 1989 at Kosovo Polje before a large number of Serbs[9], on the six-hundredth anniversary of the battle of 1389, Milosevic famously suggested that "we are again engaged in battles and are facing battles; they are not armed battles but such things cannot be excluded" (cited in Sell, 2002: 89). This speech took place after the Belgrade authorities had already suspended the autonomy of the Kosovo Provincial Government. In March 1990, the government in Belgrade announced the ironically titled 'Programme for the Attainment of Peace, Freedom and Prosperity in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo', followed in July by the 'Law on the Activities of Organs of the Republic in Exceptional Circumstances'. Together, these 'Temporary Measures' established Serbian as the only official language[10], suspended the Provincial Parliament and Municipal Assemblies and led to the removal of almost all Albanians from the public service.[11]

---

9   The number is, of course, disputed. Ignatieff, states that 250,000 'supporters' of Milosevic were present (2000: 240), while Sell estimated the 'throng' at "over a million from all over Serbia" (2002: 88).

10   A casualty of the wars in the former Yugoslavian state was the change in name of its primary language, the language of Serbo-Croatian, or Serbo-Croat, to either 'Serbian' in Serb-held areas, or 'Croatian' in Croat-held areas.

11   In the perspective of Albanian teachers and officials they were 'sacked'; the accounts given by Serb officials describe it as 'voluntary resignation'. However it is couched, the end effect is the same – as a result of the Temporary Measures, the majority of Albanian teachers and officials were excluded from the public service.

As part of these measures, all classes where Albanian was the language of instruction were closed. Albanian and Serbian students were to be completely separated. They would either no longer attend school at the same time, or Albanians would have to find somewhere else to go to school. A single 'Serb-oriented' curriculum was introduced and teachers who refused to teach it were "deemed to have resigned" (Alva *et al.*, 2002: 7). At the University of Pristina, "[Albanian] lecturers who were not dismissed were instructed to lecture only in Serbian and the numbers of Kosovar Albanians at the University were drastically reduced to only a token level by the end of 1991" (Bellamy, 2001: 114). "Finally," Clark states, "at the start of the 1991-92 school year, the authorities moved to exclude Albanians from all schools in Kosovo" (2000: 97). In some cases, "schools were even surrounded by tanks to prevent the pupils from attending" (Bellamy, 2001: 114). Educational segregation also forced non-Serb minorities to choose whether to join the parallel system structure with Albanians (many Turks did this), or remain in schools with a Serbian curriculum (a choice many Slav Muslims opted for). Roma communities "tended to align themselves with whichever nationality was dominant" (Clark, 2000: 98). Throughout all this change, segregation and determined political action, the "official Serbian position" remained steadfast: that "Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and we will not let it go" (Nedeva, 1998: 109).

Milosevic's battle over Kosovo had begun, much of it taking place in the field of education. The 'parallel education system' became a leading component of the wider parallel administration, which emerged as a direct response to Belgrade's 'Temporary Measures'. Indeed, what is often overlooked in accounts of the period is the emergence of an Albanian political structure that offered legitimacy for the parallel system: in July 1990 the Albanian-dominated Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared the independence of Kosovo, followed in September by a new constitution ('Kacanik's Constitution'), in 1991 by a Referendum for Independence and in 1992 by the election of a provisional government led by Ibrahim Rugova. While this political structure was declared illegal by the Serb authorities, received no official international recognition, and operated in exile for much of the period, its existence offered significant political legitimacy for the officials and teachers in the parallel system.

Albanian classes often shifted locations to avoid disruption, although eventually "their whereabouts became something of a public secret" (Clark, 2000: 99). Indeed, the harassment that Albanians regularly refer to took place in a situation that Judah described as "both dull and bizarre," where "police repression was constant, but Rugova drove around Pristina in a presidential Audi" (2000: 73). One international official noted how "the Serbs let the parallel system exist – they intimidated people, but didn't destroy the system." It is in this context that Serb and Albanian perspectives can both be seen as accurate. Some parallel education schools, particularly at the primary level, continued to take place in the same schools as before. "Since elementary education is compulsory," one Serb school director explained, "the Albanians could use the school in the afternoon shift." Another surprising aspect of the parallel situation was that some Albanians working as support personnel (as janitors and secretaries) continued to receive their salaries from Belgrade, long after Albanian teachers and school directors had been fired. At the same time, many Albanians interviewed told first-hand stories of police intimidation and violence carried out against them. "Sometimes the police would come, take our papers and threaten us," an Albanian school director recalled. "Sometimes they destroyed things." A university lecturer described a faculty meeting where "policemen arrived in riot gear and beat all of us." Afterwards, the lecturer continued, "My son bragged at his school that I was beaten by the Serb police and survived." In descriptions from both sides, the theme of fear, both in personal and ideological terms, is constant: Albanian fears of threats and violence from Serbian authorities, and Serbian fears of strong resistance by the Albanians, which they interpreted, correctly, as part of a political movement for detachment from Serbian control.

A look into the nature and management of parallel education reveals a system in which repression and politics created a number of significant outcomes. Creating a parallel education system had to have financial support, and three sources were established: remittances from abroad, community money and in-kind donations, and "informal tax revenues collected and managed at the municipality level" (World Bank, 2001: 32). Several former officials interviewed said that the tax amounted to 3 per cent of an Albanian's income, and it was paid from those living abroad as well. The resulting effect was that the parallel system "operated essentially as a large NGO, outside government funding or control" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 14).

One estimate suggested that the parallel system's annual budget was "at least [USD] $45 million, although only half of that actually got distributed" (Davies, 1999: 4). Despite such difficulties and irregularities, the parallel system nonetheless had, in 1995, 386,511 Albanian students in their pre-schools, primary schools, secondary schools, handicapped schools and university. Even in an atmosphere of intensified repression and conflict in Kosovo, just before the onset of NATO's 1999 air war, 267,000 Kosovar Albanians attended parallel schools. It is an impressive achievement.

School and municipal directors in the parallel system were issued with official stamps inscribed 'Republic of Kosova', a sign of the enhanced responsibility and authority that school and municipal-level administrators gained. At the same time, it is important to note that the curriculum retained the same structure and textbooks for many subjects, and Serb and Albanian educators consider them to be essentially the same, in addition to the teaching methodology. Some subjects were never changed, and are still not in conflict. Both Albanian and Serb teachers, for example, shared identical comments that "mathematics is mathematics" and "physics is physics." Their conversations about similarities also implied that the teaching of such subjects was identical. One Serb school director even commented that, "the subjects in all countries are the same as here."

But in Kosovo, similarities were not emphasized. Differences were. Even so, it was not entirely clear, through interviews, precisely which subjects were altered within the new Albanian curriculum. Textbooks for the parallel system were based on the pre-1989 curriculum in Kosovo in the Albanian language, but beginning early in the 1990s, other influences surfaced. An underground textbook-production operation (after the former one had been closed) produced new textbooks and smuggled others into Kosovo from Albania (Clark, 2000: 99). But such reforms were applied only to a handful of subjects. A Serb educator explained that the differences were present for four subjects: "sociology from our [that is, Serb] point of view, history, the Serbian language, and philosophy." A former Albanian school director offered a slightly different set: history, classes in Albanian, and geography. Another Albanian school director noted that textbooks for "music and history changed a lot."

Regardless of the specific subjects that were changed (and the changes may not have been uniform across Kosovo), Albanian and Serb music and literature classes were frequently mentioned as important

subjects in conflict, as they contained songs, poetry and prose connected to nationalistic ideas. History classes were also frequently mentioned, as they emphasized different aspects of the shared historical record while, at least in some cases, containing interpretations that asserted the right of one side to occupy and even dominate Kosovo. In general, there were strong signs that education in Kosovo was used to "inculcate a collective ethos" (Clark, 2000: 104) for Albanians and Serbians, respectively. When Davies (1999: 5) notes that "The curriculum of the parallel system was inevitably one to promote Albanian nationalism", the same could no doubt be said for the Serbian curriculum's connection to Serbian nationalism as well. It thus can hardly be surprising, given this strong and emphatic movement towards ethnic separation through education in the 1990s, that education promoting inclusion – a stated United Nations goal for Kosovo – is encountering such difficulty.

During the years of the parallel system, "there was virtually no teacher training" (Poptodorova, 2001: 7). The situation would not allow it. Teaching methods that featured "pupils learning by rote rather than by enquiry" (Clark, 2000: 104), were practised in schools across Yugoslavia. However, it appears that the reduced length of school periods (from the customary 45 minutes to as little as a half hour) during the parallel education system exacerbated the tendency for teachers to lecture and students to take notes. Covering a 45-minute school lesson with only 30 minutes, an Albanian school director recalled, meant that "a schoolteacher could only rush through" his lesson. "He couldn't repeat things," the director continued, "or allow students to ask questions." The practice of teaching under the difficult conditions of the parallel system, in other words, appears to have made an already authoritarian teaching style even more authoritarian.

Albanian educationists interviewed for this case study tended to open with a statement about the significance of the parallel system of education. Many of their Serbian counterparts mentioned the significance of the conflict over education in the 1990s as well. On the other hand, few international education professionals interviewed in Kosovo, none of whom were present during the parallel system era, mentioned it without prompting. Some internationals had a high regard for the parallel system and recognized its influence on current education activities. But a few, some of whom were highly placed and influential in UNMIK's education structure, did not. "The parallel system didn't have any educational basis," one such

official said. "It was nothing." "It's not an accomplishment," said another, adding that the parallel system was "not in itself good."

This attitude helped explain why former parallel education officials were essentially bypassed by UNMIK, beginning in 2000, on the assumption that there was little in the parallel system to build on. The central criticism levelled against it addressed the low quality of education, something that Alva *et al*. (2002: 21) suggest was unavoidable: "the last decade of ethnic tension has ... claimed a substantial toll on the educational outcomes of the Albanian Kosovars". Daxner (2000: 5) notes how "reports indicate that there was very little change, modernization or innovation". Low-quality education during the parallel system was also a weakness to which many Albanian educators readily admitted. But, they insisted, maintaining quality was not possible: the purpose was to keep schools going, and thus prevent increases in illiteracy. As one former Albanian head teacher remarked, "despite [the parallel system's] imperfections, the students learned something." The journalist Baton Haxhiu added that without the parallel education system, "there would have been increased emigration, political extremism and widespread criminality" (in Clark, 2000: 105). Another high-ranking Albanian official, interviewed for this study, wondered, "Without the parallel system, where would Kosova be today?" In the end, the parallel system was not simply about education, but politics as well. Crighton *et al*. observed, "Politically, the 'parallel' system had (and still has) tremendous symbolic power" (2001: 8). A Kosovar Albanian school director, in addition, noted how "Teaching the parallel system expressed rebellion to the Serbs."

Enter the outsiders

The period leading up to NATO's bombing campaign saw intensified conflict begin in some areas of Kosovo as early as 1997. The international media reported atrocities and 'ethnic cleansing' taking place in Kosovo in late 1998 and early 1999. In educational terms this was a tumultuous period, with widespread disruption of schooling and massive destruction of physical facilities. When the NATO bombing began on 24 March 1999, the situation grew much worse. The Serbian authorities carried out "what had become known as Operation Horseshoe – a decisive semicircular sweep around Kosovo designed to achieve a solution to [the] 'Kosovo problem,'" effectively removing "an 'internal' human rights problem" by "exporting

an entire nation to [its] impoverished neighbours" (Ignatieff, 2000: 48, 78). While NATO's bombers flew more than 33,000 sorties with about 1,000 airplanes overhead, dropping about 14,000 bombs and missiles on Kosovo and Serbia in the process, perhaps one million Kosovar Albanians were forced out of Kosovo (Fromkin, 1999: 2-3). Most of them went to Albania and Macedonia. Some Serbs who were interviewed denied that the movement of Albanians from Kosovo constituted a massive deportation. "The Albanians organized the mass exodus to gain international sympathy," one insisted. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of foreign observers, together with Kosovar Albanians interviewed, considered the Albanians' exodus a carefully planned 'ethnic cleansing' operation.

Not everyone fled. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians never left Kosovo; many of them were displaced but stayed within Kosovo's borders. Some urban residents did not move. "Ninety per cent of people in breadlines in Pristina during the war were Albanians," one Serb recounted. Another Pristina resident, however, recalled that "The Albanians who stayed in Pristina were too terrified to leave their homes. But everyone wanted to leave, that's for sure." What is important to note in these descriptions is that everyone was afraid. Again, Kosovars interviewed made it clear that fear was something that they felt at one time or another over the course of the 1990s. For some areas and communities, such sentiments may have been near constant.

Over the course of this turmoil, the experience of war differed according to location and ethnicity. Those interviewed in the west, for example, considered the period of war to be much longer than in other parts of Kosovo. Battles, attacks, aggressive military manoeuvres of many kinds took place across most of 1998 and into 1999. Some areas may have defined the outset of war even earlier. For others, the sense of warfare, or the coming of war, was shorter: perhaps beginning late in 1998, or even early 1999. But for all Kosovars, what took place was indisputably a war. For NATO and the United Nations, however, the perspective was much less clear. Some categorized NATO's bombing period in 1999 as a war, or perhaps an 'air war'. Others insisted it was not a war at all, but merely a bombing campaign.

Regardless, throughout this NATO military effort, control over education was so fragmented that describing it as a 'system' would be stretching the term. The provision of 'catch-up classes' for children who

had missed several months or more of schooling was an early preoccupation of many refugees in Albania and Macedonia, and considerable international support was mobilized to assist them.[12] In addition, during this period, even larger numbers of children were displaced within Kosovo, and there is little information available on the extent of educational access during this period. The refugee crisis came to a very rapid conclusion when the vast majority of Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo within weeks of the end of the NATO war/bombing campaign in June 1999.

During the weeks following the end of the war, while hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees returned to their homes in Kosovo and tens of thousands of Serbian and other minorities began to flee, the makings of an education system began to take hold. Three tendencies that were to prove influential in this process will be reviewed here.

Chaos

After NATO's bombings ended, 45,000 NATO troops entered Kosovo while Serbian soldiers, policemen, and paramilitaries retreated into Serbia. A vacuum of authority and security existed. While the United Nations and international NGOs began to organize humanitarian activities, NATO leaders split over the level of their contribution to such work. As a result, while "many NATO contingents were eager to be identified with assistance activities," others were not. Before a university audience, one NATO public information officer insisted that "We don't make people love each other," adding that that was "the task of the United Nations and the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]" (Minear *et al.*: 2000: 58-59). A humanitarian official interviewed in 1999 believed that Kosovo had "possibly the highest density of foreign aid workers" in the world, and a UNHCR official stated, in August 1999, that there were 168 NGOs in Kosovo at that time.[13]

---

12 The provision of education to refugees from Kosovo in Albania, Macedonia, countries of Western Europe and other places such as Australia, Canada and the USA, is beyond the scope of this case study. It has been documented briefly in Sinclair (2001: 39-44).

13 These interviews were originally conducted for research for *NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis*, by Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda, and Marc Sommers. Humanitarianism and War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI: 2000, Occasional Paper #36). Marc Sommers gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by his co-authors to this earlier study to use interview data here.

In the midst of this chaos, when the roles of various international actors were still being worked out, a number of actions were taking place at the same time. Some of the critical issues relating to education will be mentioned here. First, while the United Nations officials were beginning to set up an education authority in Pristina, in one and then two almost-bare offices in downtown Pristina, Serbian and Albanian education officials re-started schools. The Albanians' parallel system in particular proved unusually resilient and portable in this regard. Parallel-system schools that were created in refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia shifted and began again in their communities of origin following their return. Serbian educators in the early days still occupied many of the offices and schools they had used during and before the war with NATO.

A second issue was the shift in NATO and United Nations protection work. Before and during the NATO bombings, both inside Kosovo and in refugee camps, international actors were chiefly concerned with protecting and aiding Albanians victimized by repression and aggression from Serbian police, military and paramilitary forces. As a veteran United Nations official recalled, "During the war, Milosevic and the Serbs were seen as criminals." But immediately after NATO's entrance into Kosovo, even while an NGO official in Kosovo observed how "Albanians saw NATO as heroes," the protection priorities of NATO and the United Nations reversed course. Now, a United Nations official elaborated, "The United Nations saw themselves as protecting people *from* Albanians. They realized that if they left, the Albanians would slaughter minorities." Tim Judah (2000: 286) supported this view: "Just as the policy-makers underestimated the Serb will to expel or encourage the flight of as much of the Kosovar population as possible [during the NATO air war], they now underestimated the unrelenting thirst for revenge amongst the Albanians returning home."

But were all Serbs involved in supporting the Belgrade-led repression? Similarly, were all Albanians active in or supportive of the forced expulsion of Serbians from Kosovo immediately after their return from refugee camps? A large proportion of Serbs and Albanians interviewed for this report vehemently denied these commonly suspected realities. Accounts of particular cases of forced expulsion, of course, cannot suggest that every Serb and every Albanian had direct or even indirect roles in running their ethnic adversaries out of Kosovo. What is clear in the assessments above, however, is that generalizations were common about the behaviour of Serbs before and during the NATO bombing and Albanians afterwards.

The inability to differentiate accurately between members within each group who were and were not involved in active and often violent ethnic antagonism damaged relations between the incoming international professionals and their counterparts from Kosovo. In the view of some veteran observers, what emerged was a lasting suspicion of the Albanian majority by members of the international community ("Albanians were treated as guilty until proven innocent," one commented), while the need to protect Serbs and other minorities emerged as a core UNMIK and KFOR responsibility. At the same time, the fact that NATO had defeated the Serbian government in Kosovo fuelled suspicion among Serbs regarding UNMIK's and KFOR's intentions. The tense triangle involving internationals, Albanians and Serbs was set into place.

Third, Kosovo was inundated with donor funding. Aid agencies flooded into Kosovo, competing for "funding, territory, and human resources" (Mattich, 2001: 8). NATO's and the United Nation's entrance was a media event, a sensational story, and it often seemed that every NGO and Western donor government wanted a part of the action. One Kosovar Albanian hired early by UNMIK called the arrival of NGOs from a wide array of countries an 'invasion'. Aid agencies experienced "an incredible pressure to act and be seen as 'doing something,'" which became "an impediment to pursuing participatory strategies" (Mattich, 2001: 33). A related factor was the urgency to rebuild the thousands of houses, schools, and hospitals that had been destroyed during or before NATO's campaign, before the cold winter months arrived. One aid official, who has worked in Kosovo since the summer of 1999, observed that one result was that "NGOs built with no community input." This applied to those previously involved with the parallel system of education. "During the parallel-system years," the official continued, "the Albanians did everything themselves." But in this early post-war stage, "the expectation that the NGOs would do everything meant that Albanians could step back and let them do it." In the view of this official, and those of many Albanian educators interviewed, the opportunity to access the parallel system's potential to mobilize communities in co-ordination with international agents was lost, a precursor to what eventually surfaced as the distancing of parallel education officials from education decision-making. At the same time, there were some reports of good working relations between international agencies and Kosovar community members during this period.

In addition, in villages where outside agencies were not present, Kosovar communities organized themselves to clean up and repair their schools.

Setting the tone: salaries

In the weeks following the entrance of NATO and UNMIK, the issue of salary equity emerged as a vexing problem. Out of necessity, United Nations agencies and NATO personnel hired Kosovars who could speak English as translators, drivers, secretaries and maintenance people "at huge salaries," one international official observed. The salaries were considered 'United Nations rates', but there was also a local market to consider: many contended that the shortage of people with knowledge in English, together with competition from international news operations entering in Kosovo (such as CNN), helped drive up rates for a finite number of Kosovars. The salaries of bilingual translators and secretaries, in particular, soared – a translator could be paid up to US $1,500 per month beginning in June 1999 (although the salaries were reportedly halved about a year later). As a result, a United Nations driver or secretary might receive several times the salary of a teacher, school director, or even a high-ranking education official. "This outraged local Albanians," an international official recalled. Worse, it became "the dominant issue early on [following NATO's entry in June 1999], and it remains significant: even now [autumn 2002], the Minister of Education makes little more than his secretary." Many reported that the salary inequity problem kept personnel from public service and towards seeking work elsewhere, including as support personnel for NATO or UNMIK. One direct outcome for the education system was suggested by a Kosovar teacher: "Kosovars who know English could be teaching other Kosovars English, but instead they're working for UNMIK." Low salaries were frequently tied to low educational quality because, as one school director observed, "It's impossible to live on the salary UNMIK pays us." As a result, "Teachers are occupied with second jobs and often arrive in class unprepared to teach."

Paying educators, teachers in particular, becomes a vexing and controversial problem in most post-war situations. Thousands of teachers seek to be paid, and until a government and a tax collection system are re-started, the need to compensate teachers usually falls into the lap of donor governments and international agencies. In Kosovo, the responsibility quickly fell to UNMIK. There was the challenge of verifying the lists of teachers and school directors and then paying them. Teachers still do not

receive merit pay in Kosovo, and the levels of payment are, in the eyes of local educators, unfair and inadequate. This issue will be further examined in subsequent chapters.

The contentiousness of the salary issue was tied to a growing belief among Kosovars that some of the international staff, who had assumed considerable power and influence in the education system (and elsewhere), may not have been particularly qualified. This was a view shared by Albanian and Serb educators alike. As one Albanian education official observed,

> "I think the internationals are not the best selected people. In the beginning, locals liked and trusted them, whether they were stupid or clever. Later, some [internationals] made bad mistakes, and some had improper behaviour. So [Kosovars] started losing respect [for them]."

Many education officials from Kosovo, both Albanian and Serb, registered their astonishment at the apparent lack of knowledge with which some international officials arrived about Kosovo, Yugoslavia and the Balkans generally. Kosovars frequently recounted stories of being insulted by an international whom they considered either too young, too disrespectful, or simply uncaring. It may be the case that some of these stories of ill-qualified or ill-prepared officials arriving from other countries may have been either exaggerated, told over and again, or both. For some Kosovars, the insults were unforgivable. Over time, some Albanians appeared to join many Serbs in viewing UNMIK as an occupying government, and memories of past slights did not seem to wither over time.

Many Kosovars further suggested that some of the internationals in their midst were not especially dedicated. The researchers found little evidence of this, although two exceptions are instructive. A policeman from Western Europe explained that he worked in Kosovo mainly because it was 'lucrative', as he received double his salary from his home government in addition to US $75 a day from UNMIK. Another international official explained that "I'm here for the money." The official then described his financial arrangement: living on half of his living allowance in Kosovo (about US $1,000), which also covered vacations to foreign countries, while depositing the remaining half of his allowance,

together with all of his salary, into a home-country bank account. The living allowance alone was perhaps ten times the salary paid to many Kosovar colleagues in the education system, and roughly double what the Kosovar Minister of Education, Science and Technology was earning, the official explained. Indicative of Kosovar resentment of such salary inequities is the following comment from a Kosovar education official at the municipal level: international UNMIK officials working with him "make 16.6 times more salary than UNMIK local staff [which he was]." The official also noted how supervising Kosovar education personnel was unusually difficult because "they have full heads and empty pockets: the lowest salaries but the highest intelligence."

Promoting inequity was, of course, never UNMIK's intention. A certain salary scale is required to attract qualified international personnel to work in Kosovo. The inequities caused by the United Nations rate scales established early in the UNMIK era appeared to be unintentional as well. Nonetheless, the symbolism that salary inequities inspired, however unavoidable, created far-reaching effects on Kosovar perspectives of the dominant international presence in Kosovo. Indeed, the issue of people from Kosovo feeling insulted, disrespected and overlooked appears to be, in part, an outgrowth of the power relationships that surfaced between UNMIK professionals and international NGO officials on one hand, and education professionals from Kosovo on the other.

Categorizing participants

During interviews in Kosovo in September-October 2002, the authors learned about three primary groups that education professionals regularly referred to. The first two, Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, were often sandwiched together as one group: 'locals'. The creation of the term 'locals' appears to have surfaced early in the post-NATO war period as a way to account for Kosovo's unsettled status. Albanians, Serbs and other minorities could not be considered 'nationals,' since Kosovo is not a formally recognized nation.

The third group was also an awkward amalgamation: 'internationals', consisting of non-military personnel originating from other countries but working in Kosovo. This assemblage included United Nations workers from a wide variety of countries and officials of NGOs based outside Kosovo.

Beyond this initial distinction lay a series of caveats. Albanians and Serbs working for international agencies were still categorized as 'locals'. This was signified not only by their place of origin but, in most cases at least, by the markedly smaller salaries they received. A second caveat applied to international workers from nearby territories and countries, such as Albania, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia. Technically, these workers were 'internationals', yet their familiarity with, and often perceived involvement in, regional conflicts and rivalries landed them into a category of 'international' that might arouse suspicion among Albanians, Serbs, or internationals from other countries.

A third caveat to the 'internationals' group concerned how people with nationalities from developing countries were viewed. Kosovar Albanian and Kosovac Serb educators both issued strong and consistent questioning and even condemnation of the qualifications of internationals coming from what they considered as developing countries. Kosovo was in Europe, the criticisms all implied, and the level of education was naturally much higher than what existed in most of Asia, Africa and Latin America. If that is the case, the thinking went, what could European professionals in Kosovo have to gain from the advice of an international 'expert' from an apparently backward country? Some found the presence of internationals from developing countries arriving at their schools or offices armed with status and authority insulting. As one teacher observed, "We've gone a lot further than those countries." A school director put it diplomatically: "If an UNMIK official comes from an undeveloped country to tell us about education, people look at them in a different way." Beneath such comments was a feeling that the qualifications and expertise of local professionals were being disrespected and unrecognized. As one Kosovar teacher concluded, "UNMIK doesn't treat us like we're a part of Europe."

One group of internationals did not have any caveats attached to them: those from Western European and North American countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand. These were countries which Kosovars generally regarded as having modern and advanced education systems. Internationals from these locations tended to agree with this assessment. It was perhaps significant that most of the education leaders, both in UNMIK and in international agencies involved in education, were from these countries.

Finally, the symbolic difference between being a 'local' and an 'international' was potent. In development parlance, a local may be associated with grassroots or community-level workers. A 'national' tends to be considered above a 'local' both in terms of sophistication and power, while an 'international,' in many if not most development contexts, is regarded as sitting alone, at the top of the development hierarchy. A local may have been an unfortunate but necessary term to describe Kosovars who could not be considered nationals. But the implication of a 'local' resting far beneath an 'international' in terms of expertise and prestige was clear in professional circles in Kosovo.

Kosovo and education: outlining the current situation

Kosovo

Just as it is hotly debated whether the place itself should be called Kosova or Kosovo (and Metohija), a much larger debate surrounds what the area should be considered in political terms. To attempt to put a delicate, divisive and complicated issue simply, Albanians consider Kosova either already independent or nearly so, while Serbs insist that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244) of 10 June 1999 both reaffirmed "the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the territory of Kosovo" while "establishing an interim administration that would provide 'substantial autonomy and self-government' for the people of Kosovo" (Demekas *et al.*, 2002: 1). As a result of this delicately balanced resolution, both the Serbs and the Albanians got at least some of what they sought but it left them mutually dissatisfied: international law essentially supports the Serbs' assertion of Yugoslavia's provenance over Kosovo, while the international community's occupation of Kosovo essentially supports the Albanians' aim for self-rule. After three and a half years, the political positions dividing Serbs and Albanians over the status of Kosovo may have, if anything, hardened. Kosovo thus remains a hotly contested territory, occupied by KFOR (comprised primarily of NATO troops) under United Nations sanction for an undetermined period that is not intended to be permanent. UNSCR 1244, in short, is not a long-term solution.

Kosovo is impoverished. It "had always been the poorest region of Yugoslavia," and the gap only expanded over the course of modern

Yugoslavia's history. In 1952, Kosovo's Gross Material Product (GMP) per capita was only 44 per cent of the Yugoslav average. By 1980, this figure had fallen to 29 per cent, and then dwindled to 20 per cent by 1990. During this same period, unemployment soared, reaching 40 per cent by 1990, even while crime rates "were considerably lower in Kosovo than in the rest of Yugoslavia" (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 37-39).

Kosovo is also small and densely populated. At 10,887 sq. km, the territory is about a third the size of Belgium, or approximately the size of the State of Connecticut in the USA. The population is thought to be around 2.1 million people, making it the most densely populated territory of the Former Yugoslavia. The population is Europe's youngest: 61 per cent of all Kosovars are estimated to be under the age of 25 (European Training Foundation, 2001: 7). Not surprisingly, Kosovo has Europe's highest birth rate, 23.1 per 1,000, as well (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 5). It also has the highest infant mortality rate in Europe, at 27.8 per 1,000 live births.

Although the 1991 census of Kosovo listed Albanians at just over 82 per cent of the population and Serbs at just under 10 per cent, these proportions are no longer thought to be accurate. Even these figures are suspect, since "the Kosovo Albanians boycotted the most recent census in 1991" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 5). Given the displacement of Serbs and the rapid growth of the Albanian population, it is thought that the proportion of Albanians in the population has swelled to at least 90 per cent[14], while the Serbian proportion has dwindled to somewhere between less than 5 per cent (Lemay, 2000: 6) to 7 per cent (Crighton *et al.* 2001, among others).

Regardless, while the Serbian population is small and, given the continuing population surge in Albanian communities, the proportion of Serbs in Kosovo is likely to get even smaller over time, their political influence is significant, and may be growing. When interviews about education, almost inevitably, veered towards political issues, the influence of Serbs was difficult to ignore. Much of this had to do with Kosovo's unresolved political and constitutional situation, and the role that the Serbian government in Belgrade (the capital of the Federal Republic of

14 Trofimov, for example, states that Albanians constitute 90 per cent of the population (2003: A1), while *The Economist* has twice claimed that Kosovo is 95 per cent Albanian ("Reconstructing Kosovo", 2000: 31; "Answering the unanswerable", 2003: 32).

Yugoslavia) continues to play in Kosovo politics and education policy. Another reason is due to the fact that nearly all Kosovac Serbs living in the territory of Kosovo reside north of Mitrovica. The area is almost entirely Serbian, and the Belgrade government's presence there, as will be explained later, is dominant. A third reason arises from the responsibility of the United Nations to protect Kosovac Serbs, in addition to all other minority groups, and the subsequent level of effort that many United Nations professionals have invested in Serbian issues. In their view, this attention is essential. As a former United Nations official reflected during an interview, "if the UN hadn't moved quickly to protect the Serbs in Kosovo [following the end of the NATO bombing campaign], there wouldn't be any living there."

The remaining 3-5 per cent of the population in Kosovo is comprised of what has been popularly, if unfortunately, named 'others', as in 'other minorities'. This group is comprised of small populations of Roma, Ashkali Roma[15], Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Goranis, Turks, Egyptians, Croats, and other groupings.

Two frequently overlooked aspects of Kosovo's population composition are the increasing urbanization and the number and significance of Kosovars living abroad. Although precise estimates do not exist, education officials shared the rough estimate that Pristina had tripled in size since before the NATO campaign, from a small capital of perhaps 200,000 residents before the war to a population of about 650,000 in 2002. This figure cannot be confirmed, but Pristina's rapid post-war growth aligns with the rise of urbanization in other post-war contexts.

The influence of Kosovars living outside of Kosovo can scarcely be exaggerated. For Kosovac Serbs, the paramount issue is those who were forcibly displaced from Kosovo and have yet to return. Demekas *et al*. have observed that since the end of the NATO campaign in June 1999, "some 210,000 Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities were displaced and remain so to this day" (2002: 2). Other Kosovac Serbs, much fewer in number, have reportedly gone to Serbia in search of work. The difficulty of facilitating the return of forcibly exiled Serbians back to Kosovo is

---

15 An international education official in Pristina described the difference between Roma and Ashkali Roma in the following way. "Roma lived with Serbs [before the NATO war]. They speak their Romani language, the Serbian language and some Albanian. Ashkalia [or Ashkali Roma] have lived with Albanians since before the war. They speak Albanian and some Serbian, but not Romani."

suggested by the following news item. On 10 October 2002, "some 600 hostile ethnic Albanians attacked UN police and Italian peacekeepers with stones and molotov cocktails after they brought a group of 50 Serbs to the centre of Pec [also known as Pejë]," the capital of Kosovo's westernmost region and the centre of much of the worst violence in Kosovo prior to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, (UNHCR, 2002). The Pec/Pejë example may be an extreme case of violence arising from the return of Serbs, but it sheds light on the continued intensity and emotion involving Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo.

A much larger and more economically powerful population lives and works in many Western-European countries, although Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are known to host the largest contingents. This population is overwhelmingly Albanian. The remittances they send to relatives in Kosovo are high: an International Monetary Fund report estimates the annual 'private transfers' from this source to be between 375 and 425 million Euros (Demekas *et al.*, 2002: 7). To put the significance of these remittances from individual Kosovars into perspective, their contributions represent half of the combined total of "official transfers from official sources" (that is, all international donor funding) to Kosovo in 2001, which amounted to 800 million Euros (Demekas *et al.*, 2002: 6). Estimates for the economic contributions from expatriate, non-Kosovar internationals in Kosovo (such as those working for UNMIK and KFOR) are unknown, but the sheer demographic size of this generally very well-paid population suggest they are considerable. Junger (2002: 162) cites one estimate that "spending by international reconstruction groups," which does not include KFOR personnel, comprises 5 to 10 per cent of Kosovo's economy. As of 2002, there were up to 60,000 expatriates working in Kosovo: about 10,000 UNMIK staff, between 5,000 to 10,000 working for other agencies and organizations, and about 40,000 KFOR troops (Demekas *et al.*, 2002: 7).

The extraordinarily high level of remittances into Kosovo is no doubt directly related to the relative calm that currently exists there. While tensions and conflicts, mainly between Albanians and Serbs, remain, violent crime levels are surprisingly low, given evidence of the soaring unemployment levels, particularly among youths. Kosovo is a land dominated by unemployed youths: "between 65 and 75 per cent of the active population is without 'legal' employment" (Duhamel, 2001: 3). A European Training Foundation report confirms these figures, and adds that UNMIK's 2000 estimate was even higher: up to 80 per cent of the

working population (ETF, 2001: 13). Daxner estimates that "out of some 40,000 graduates from the [Kosovo] education system, a maximum of 50 per cent will ever get a chance to find employment in Kosovo" (2002: 16). These figures do not account for the fact that the 'parallel' economy, fuelled by remittances, has absorbed many workers. There is also the economic impact of organized crime from Serbia, Albania, even Bulgaria, in addition to that which originates within the borders of Kosovo itself. As Junger (2002: 117) observes, "Kosovo was, and still is, the perfect place to base a criminal network – chaotic, violent, and ringed by porous borders". Drugs and the trafficking of women are serious and persistent problems, in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans. Dealing with high unemployment in Kosovo has a precedent in recent history: "The introduction of Belgrade's sanctions in 1989 [in Kosovo], including the dismissal of 145,000 Albanian employees from state enterprises and administration [including teachers and other education officials] accentuated an already grim employment picture".

Education

Like education sectors elsewhere, post-war education in Kosovo has deficiencies as well as strengths. Among its strengths has been the collection of statistics. As of April 2002, there were 307,517 primary-school students studying in Kosovo (Kosovo. MEST, 2002: 5). Of these, 91.7 per cent of the pupils were Albanian (281,993), 5.4 per cent Serbian, 1.0 per cent Bosniak, with the remainder being members of other small minority groups. A total of 46.8 per cent of all primary students were girls. Enrolment for pre-primary schooling remains small – 21,427 students in total – while the drop-off in enrolment between primary and secondary-school students, and girls within that proportion, are both significant. There were 93,502 secondary-school students in Kosovo (again, as of April 2002), 43.7 per cent of whom were girls. The high drop-out rates between primary and secondary school are particularly serious for girls, ethnic minorities and children in rural areas. Less than 56 per cent of Kosovar Albanian girls and 40 per cent of Roma, Turkish and Muslim Slav girls attend secondary school (UNICEF, 2002: 33). UNICEF also notes that "The high cost of education, concerns for security, and preferences for boys' education in some communities contribute to high drop-out rates" (2002: 33). A significant proportion of drop-outs from school entered employment early. In fact, of all Kosovars registering for work in 2000, 82 per cent were less than 18 years old (ETF, 2001: 13).

Going to school in Kosovo costs money: "nearly all households who had children enrolled in the last academic year... paid considerable out-of-pocket contribution to school expenses" (Paci *et al.*, 2001: 41). Nonetheless, the high value placed on education in Kosovo is suggested by a UNICEF household survey (2002: 33), which found that net rates of primary-school enrolment are somewhere between 91 per cent and 97 per cent. The high secondary-school drop-out rates also suggest that the costs of education placed significant economic stress on many families in Kosovo. Indeed, the private costs for education were very likely the "main barrier to access" into school (UNICEF, 2002: 42). Paci *et al.* confirm evidence of "higher enrolment rates among better-off children" across the formal education spectrum (2001: 39).

For children with special needs, the enrolment statistics are alarming. Only 518 children with special needs in Kosovo were in specialized schools in April 2002, or about 0.1 per cent of the total number of pupils in Kosovo (423,284) (Kosovo. MEST, 2002: 5).

The Ministry states that there are 27,780 school employees in Kosovo, 22,527 of whom are teachers. Of all teachers, 86.4 per cent are Albanian, while 10.4 per cent are Serbian (Kosovo. MEST, 2002: 9). Of enrolled children, 5.4 per cent are Serbian. The significantly higher proportion of Serbian teachers to Serbian students, when compared to those in Albanian classrooms, is evidenced in student-teacher ratios. While a survey found the Kosovo-wide student-teacher ratio in primary schools to be 20:1 (Pupovci *et al.* 2001: 32), estimates obtained during interviews with education officials in Kosovo suggested that student-teacher ratios ranged from 9:1 to 12:1 in Serbian classrooms and 22:1 in Albanian classrooms. Sometimes Albanian classrooms have 30 students or more per classroom. The significance of these disparities are, of course, not lost on Albanian teachers, who note that Serbs are paid salaries far higher than their own. More on this contentious issue in *Chapter 4*.

University education in Kosovo is unsettled and highly contentious. Debates continue over recognition of a university in northern Mitrovica, which is dominated by former Serb faculty and administration members from the University of Pristina. This debate is tied to the fact that the university has been "one of the most highly politicized places in all of Kosovo" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 35). Crighton *et al.* also suggest that the university has been "at the very core of the political conflict and the self-

esteem of Albanian Kosovars," and add that "there are apocryphal accounts of discrimination against Serbs in university admission and employment". The status of the university in northern Mitrovica remains unresolved.

The range of problems and concerns involving higher education in Kosovo are numerous. Some of the central problems and concerns will be mentioned here. Salaries for faculty at the main campus in Pristina remain exceedingly low, with some working for little more than US $100 per month. In common with many countries in central and eastern Europe, the university system in Kosovo is very decentralized. The University of Pristina has fourteen faculties, six higher schools, and more than 19,000 students. Every faculty has its own entrance examinations (Andersson *et al.*, 2001: 33).[16] A World Bank report (2001: 33) describes a situation where the "dispersal of authority... has led to redundancy of programs, personnel, and facilities across faculties which diverts resources from improving the quality of teaching and learning." Crighton *et al.* (2001: 36) note that "modern methods of pedagogy (for teachers) and active study skills (for students) are badly needed.". And there is much discussion about the need to raise academic standards at the university "to bring them back to European levels". Reference is also often made to the "Bologna Framework" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 35) or the "Bologna Declaration" (Daxner, 2002: 8), which outlines what have come to be known in Kosovo education circles as 'European standards', which education in Kosovo, including the university level, must strive to meet. It is a call heard by others as well: a World Bank report (2001: 33) recommends that "authorities in Kosovo should make the university compatible with European standards in university governance and management". To this end, a movement towards establishing a 'Central Administration' at the University of Pristina is underway (Daxner 2002: 8) and the 'European standard' format of 3-5-8 (three years to attain a Bachelor's degree, five years for a Master's degree, and eight for a Doctorate) has been introduced. Other reforms are either being planned or implemented.

16 Dispute or disagreement can mark even what the university is called. While Andersson *et al.* call it the 'University of Pristina', Crighton *et al.* refer to it as the 'University of Prishtina'. Crighton *et al.* also state that there are seven higher schools (2001: 31), while Andersson *et al.* list six.

Chapter 3

Structuring a system: educational policy in Kosovo

The one and only full meeting of the Joint Civil Commission on Education (JCCE), held on 15 July 1999, lasted only 35 minutes. The dark-panelled boardroom in a building next door to the temporary UNMIK offices was one of the few that had survived successive waves of looting of public buildings in the closing days of the NATO Campaign. It had been hastily prepared for the meeting – table and leather-upholstered chairs dusted, a shattered window covered with plastic sheeting. At the head of the table, a nervous UNMIK education official chatted quietly with the UNMIK Head of Civil Affairs who was to preside over the meeting. Down one side of the table were seated four Kosovar Albanian education officials and their interpreter. At the far end of the table sat a Major from KFOR, armed and in full battle dress, with his lieutenant beside him. When the Serbian delegation entered the room and took up their places at the table the expression on the faces of the Kosovar-Albanian delegates changed from cautious smiles to cold anger.

A brief introductory statement, read by the UNMIK Head of Civil Affairs on behalf of the SRSG, stressed the need to work together to build a modern European and inclusive education system for all Kosovars. Then the Chair invited delegates to introduce themselves. The head of the delegation from the (Serbian) provincial education authority introduced himself and his delegation and gave an overview of the history of Serbian involvement in Kosovo, dating from the crucial battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, to the present circumstances where the remaining provincial officials and their families were holed up in the Provincial Administration Building, behind barbed wire, and under the protection of KFOR tanks and armed troops. He stressed that in terms of international law, Kosovo Metohija remained part of the Republic of Serbia and ultimately fell under the authority of the government in Belgrade, but he pledged his commitment, and that of the officials from the Provincial Administration, to work with UNMIK towards the resumption of schooling on a non-discriminatory and inclusive basis that respected the language and cultural rights of all citizens, especially minorities.[17]

---

17 Serbs, of course, are Kosovo's largest ethnic minority.

> The response of the official from the former parallel system was brief and impassioned. Invoking a prior request from UNMIK that participation in the meeting should be limited to officials who had been working in the education systems in Kosovo, and should not include politicians, he identified the head of the Serbian delegation as a deputy minister from Belgrade, and indicated that his delegation could not continue the meeting under these circumstances. One of his colleagues, struggling to control his anger, pointed out that the head of the Serbian delegation had himself presided over the dismissal of almost all Albanian officials and teachers in 1991, including every one of the members of his delegation. The meeting was hastily ended, and UNMIK undertook to continue discussions on a bilateral basis until agreement could be reached on how to proceed.

That meeting, attended in person by Peter Buckland, co-author of this study, offers a quick overview of some of the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction that this chapter explores. It illustrates the pervasive ambiguity about political authority. It points to the gulf between the formal authority that the United Nations officials represented, and the actual power of the officials of the two 'former' systems, in terms of their control over the existing schools, teachers and information. It illustrates the tension between reconstruction as building on, or breaking with, the past. Finally, the anecdote highlights some of the challenges of trying to negotiate technical solutions while key political issues remain unresolved.

This chapter offers a 'view from the centre'. It is written from the perspective of those – described loosely here as 'policy-makers', 'planners' and 'administrators' – who see themselves as responsible for tackling the extraordinarily difficult challenge of rapidly restoring educational provision while at the same time rebuilding the system responsible for its provision. This means that it focuses on the policies, plans, regulations and administrative procedures, which are the tools that policy-makers, planners and administrators use to shape and build an education system. Of course, analysis of official policies, plans, strategies and administrative structures presents a one-sided picture. The policy process, by which official decisions are reached on intended outcomes and by which resources are allocated to achieve them, is a critical, though not the only, element in system reconstruction. The extent to which, and the way in which, this process actually impacted on change and learning in schools and communities is

the other critical part of this study and it will be examined more closely in subsequent chapters.

A chronology of change

This section provides an overview of the process of how an outside entity, UNMIK, transferred and established legal and technical authority over education in Kosovo. It offers a backdrop, a chronological framework, against which to understand how the extraordinarily complex, varied and changing cast of interest groups engaged with the challenge of simultaneously providing schooling and reconstructing the education system responsible for its provision.

For the sake of convenience, this initial section is structured around four 'phases' that reflect significant developments in the transfer of formal authority. The first phase (June to December 1999) was dominated by a determined effort to ensure the resumption of learning for as many learners as possible in a context of explicit contestation regarding civil authority in the shattered province. The focus of education policy-makers and planners was on securing the necessary agreements and resources to ensure that it happened. It was followed by 22 months of 'Interim Administration'. A brief period of the 'Transitional Administration' bridged the gap from October 2001 to the founding of the Kosovo Assembly in December 2001 and the appointment of the Provisional Government in March 2002. The final phase covered by this study is the period of the Provisional Government, which began in March 2002 and extends until the time of this writing.

The concept of phases is offered with a clear understanding that the transition between the phases is not linked to a single day or event. For instance, the agreement on the establishment of a Joint Interim Administrative Structure was reached on 15 December 1999, but the JIAS Department of Education and Science was only 'operational' from 1 February 2000, and its governing Regulation 2000/11 only promulgated in March.

What follows is a brief description of the conditions regarding civil authority and the state of the education system in each of the phases. Thereafter the development and implementation of policy with regard to four key themes is traced through those four phases.

Phase One (June-December 1999): Who's in charge?

As the anecdote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, in July 1999 in Kosovo there was no unambiguous answer to the question, "Who's in charge?" UNMIK presented itself as the United Nations-authorized civil authority. The Serbian provincial authorities invoked international law to assert their authority, while the Albanians saw themselves operating in terms of laws passed by the 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Kosova'. Nor did the dynamics of authority and power settle quickly into a predictable and therefore 'manageable' pattern. Challenged with the responsibility of getting the children back to school within a matter of months, those who sought to begin rebuilding the system faced a bewildering array of authorities and legal frameworks. The process of education-system reconstruction was strongly influenced by the complex, uncertain and changing nature of civil authority.

Education systems operate in terms of officially assigned authority based in laws. The lack of clarity regarding legal frameworks was impressed on one of the authors, Peter Buckland, as early as 7 July 1999, during his brief tenure as the first (and, initially, the only) UNMIK education official, at a rather stormy meeting with the Director of Education of the (former) Provincial Administration. The meeting took place under a smiling portrait of Slobodan Milosevic in a smoke-filled conference room in the Provincial Administration Building protected by KFOR tanks and armed sentries. Opening the meeting, the Education Director referred to UNSCR 1244, and stressed the resolution's emphasis on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). He also made clear his view that, in terms of international law, Kosovo was a province of the Republic of Serbia within the authority of FRY and its civil administration. Accordingly, the education system was ultimately the responsibility of the Government of Serbia in Belgrade. He expressed a willingness to work with the United Nations along the lines spelled out in UNSCR 1244 as a 'temporary measure'.

The UNMIK response emphasized the UNSCR 1244 clause on interim administration and made it clear that UNMIK was now officially responsible for the provision of education in Kosovo. With a wry smile the Education Director asked "In terms of which education law does the UN propose to administer education? US Law? British law? Does the UN have an Education Act?" There was an awkward pause before the reply

came: "UNMIK is at an early stage in its development, but the conventional approach in these circumstances is that education is provided in terms of the law in operation prior to the conflict, except where it conflicts with UN principles and international human rights."

In late June and early July 1999, the only legal instrument that UNMIK officials had was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, passed on 10 June 1999, the same day that the NATO bombing campaign had come to an end. It reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ...," and provided for an "interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." For the first six weeks of its operation in Kosovo, this was the only legal authority that the UNMIK officials could invoke.

The ambiguity regarding legal authority was addressed by UNMIK some weeks later, when on 26 July the SRSG issued Regulation 1999/1, which was described as "the Mother of all Regulations," and which provided "a legislative basis for the exercise of full governmental powers foreseen by the Security Council" (UNMIK Press Release, 26 July 1999). The regulation also gave UNMIK authority over the "administration of state property in Kosovo …," and confirmed that all laws that governed the territory prior to 24 March 1999 will continue to apply "insofar as they do not conflict with the fulfilment of the UNMIK mandate".

Political legitimacy was also a concern for the Kosovar Albanian officials. Most had been appointed to their positions in the parallel system by the (internationally unrecognized) 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Kosova', and they spoke in meetings of the 'ministry' and of their 'government'. In these early meetings it became clear that they regarded the United Nations' claim of authority over matters of civil administration as an interim arrangement pending the handover of authority to the Provisional Government.[18] When it was announced that UNMIK would operate in terms of Regulation 1999/1, which recognized the laws in effect prior to 24 March 1999, the Albanian officials protested strongly. This would accord legal status to the despised 'Temporary Measures' in

18 Of course, the legal status of this 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Kosova' was problematic for United Nations officials, not only because it conflicted with SCR 1244, but also because there were competing 'provisional governments' presenting themselves to UNMIK.

terms of which most Albanian officials had been dismissed a decade earlier, and control of the education system centralized under Belgrade. They made it clear that, as far as they were concerned, schools in Kosovo should continue to be governed by the education legislation of the Provisional Government, which had been in effect during the parallel system, and was based largely on the education law of the 'Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo', which was in force up to March 1989.

> *Phase Two (January 2000 – October 2001): Joint Interim Administration*

Over the next few months, UNMIK sought to consolidate its legal authority and repeatedly emphasized its status as "the only government in Kosovo … and not any other 'so-called' government" (UNMIK Press Release, 26 July 1999). However, the ambiguity regarding legal authority in education persisted at least until mid-December, when UNMIK announced agreement with the major Kosovar Albanian parties on the Kosovo-UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) and an Interim Administrative Council (IAC). This was an important development in the resolution of ambiguity over political authority. The IAC was the main decision-making body which provided for representation of the three main Albanian parties (known as the Rambouillet three) together with a yet-to-be-named Serb representative and four senior UNMIK officials. The 'Kosovo Transitional Council' (KTC) which had operated as a consultative body from mid-July was expanded to include representatives of 'civil society'.

More importantly for education, the agreement provided for Kosovar participation in administration as 'co-heads' of 14 departments, including one for Education and Science. At this early stage there was little clarity about how the arrangement for 'co-heads' would be implemented, except that there would be one UNMIK-appointed international official working in 'partnership' with a local official appointed by agreement of the IAC. From the start it was clear that this was not an equal partnership – the IAC was a 'consultative' administrative structure, while the KTC was described as "the highest consultative political body in Kosovo" (UNMIK Press release, 17 January 2000). In a briefing note for the Council of Europe, Elena Poptodorova offered a frank assessment: "Each pair [of co-heads] comprises an 'international', who is responsible for decision-making and a 'local', who acts as a consultant." (Poptodorova, 2001:7)

In order to get the Kosovar-Albanian political leaders to sign on to the agreement, the SRSG had first to agree to revise Regulation 1999/1 to the effect that the 'second applicable law' in Kosovo would be the law in force on 22 March 1989, prior to the revocation of Kosovo's self-governing status and the implementation of the 'Temporary Measures'. A critical element of this agreement, signed by leaders of the three Albanian political parties that had participated at Rambouillet, was that existing 'parliaments' of other 'governments' would be dissolved.[19]

Sustaining consensus on these new mechanisms provided an ongoing challenge for the UNMIK authorities. The second meeting of the IAC in February 2000 was suspended temporarily by UNMIK because the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) had not dissolved its parliament as agreed. It was not until April 2000 that a representative of the Serb community, Rada Trajkovic, attended Council meetings as an 'observer'. In July 2000 Hashim Thaci, president of the Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK) announced a boycott of the JIAS following an UNMIK agreement with the Serb National Council aimed at ending the Serb boycott of the same mechanism. Notwithstanding these setbacks, the existence of these structures provided at least a clearer official framework for the administration and development of the education system, and the establishment of the Department of Education and Science operating under the JIAS framework, with two 'Co-Heads'.

Phase Three (October 2001 – March 2002): Transition to Provisional Government

The groundwork for transition to a provisional government was initiated in May 2001 when the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government was promulgated by the SRSG, making way for the next step in the transfer of authority to Kosovars. An important provision in the Constitutional Framework specified that education was one of the functions that would be 'fully transferred' to the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), as opposed to some functions (such as security or international relations) that were 'reserved' and fell under the direct authority of the SRSG. The JIAS, with its arrangement of co-heads, had grown to number eventually 20 different departments. It operated until

---

19 The agreement to dissolve 'parliaments' applied only, of course, to the Albanian political entities. Representatives of Serbian authorities were not involved in the agreement.

the dissolution of the IAC and the KTC in October 2001 in preparation for the election campaign and the November 2001 election. The 20 administrative departments were clustered by UNMIK into nine Transitional Administrative Departments, which would be in place until the new ministries were formed. The nine Transitional Administrative Departments were to foreshadow the planned nine departments in the Provisional Government. All Kosovo co-heads were officially on leave from 3 October 2001; the transitional administrative departments were run by international officers until the new ministries were established.

The elections took place in November 2001, the Assembly first met in December, but agreement on the election of a president, and the formation of a government was not reached until March 2002. In the period from October 2001 to the appointment of the Minister of Education, Science and Technology, official authority for the education system resided in UNMIK's Principal International Officer.

Phase Four (since March 2002): Provisional Self-Government

Once the Minister was appointed officially in March 2002, the transitional arrangements entered a new phase as the Minister and the PIO (acting as Permanent Secretary) jointly managed the process of filling key administrative posts, especially the appointment of the Permanent Secretary. In a ceremony on 2 September 2002, the PIO and the Minister of Education, Science and Technology officially handed over responsibilities to the newly appointed Permanent Secretary (PS) for Education, Science and Technology. At that meeting Minister Rexhep Osmani announced that the PS and the MEST civil servants had full authority and responsibility for education as a 'transferred function', and that the role of all international personnel was advisory. The next phase in the hand-over of responsibilities had begun. While there remained some ambiguity about possible limitations of authority even for 'transferred' functions, and while the General Education Law had yet to be promulgated by the SRSG, this phase marked the final turning point in the transfer of authority covered by this study. As of the time of writing, the Higher Education Law had yet to be passed by the Kosovo Assembly, and the tertiary sector, including the controversial university campus in northern Mitrovica, continues to operate in terms of a decree issued by the SRSG (UN, 2002).

The transition to a full autonomous self-government in Kosovo awaits a further stage not reached at the time of this writing. In the Provisional Government, UNMIK retains authority over certain key functions of government, some of which – such as protection of minorities – are cross-cutting and have direct implications for education. This situation is likely to continue until the political status of Kosovo is finally resolved, and United Nations and KFOR are finally withdrawn.

Implications for the education system

Given the ongoing ambiguity and contested nature of authority in education and the legal basis for the education system in Kosovo, how did those responsible for getting schooling re-started, and the system and facilities reconstructed, begin? The sections that follow trace how these two sometimes contradictory challenges were managed as the political and administrative environment evolved. The first section traces how system and administrative capacities were established through each of the phases. Subsequent sections monitor the way in which these mechanisms and processes manifested themselves regarding three issues: access of children to schooling; curriculum development; and teachers.

As is not uncommon in such situations, developments on the ground, and arrangements made to meet urgent issues of delivery, sometimes moved well ahead of official policy. The tension between policy and changing conditions frequently drew on agreements reached in various consultative processes established between key stakeholders at various levels, from the high-level political discussions in the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) and the United Nations Security Council to ad hoc meetings in individual villages. In these circumstances, the process of policy development often has to catch up with political realities on the ground and incorporate them into 'policy'. *De facto* has to become *de jure*. For this reason, participation in the ad hoc planning and administration of the system becomes a highly contested arena.

Back-to-school

Even during the emergency phase, when almost half the children of Kosovo were refugees, there was very quick consensus on one key issue – getting schools started. In this regard, one of the earliest agreements of direct relevance to education was reached even before the United Nations

Mission was established in Pristina on 14 June 1999. It was an agreement between the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Headquarters that UNICEF would be Lead Agency in managing the return of children to school during the humanitarian relief phase, while UNMIK would have responsibility for establishing a civil administration in education. This apparently simple division of responsibility between managing the 'return to school' and initiating the 'reconstruction of the system' offered a way forward, although it also helped to create further ambiguity about who was responsible for education. This distinction was further blurred by the fact that the first UNMIK official in education was seconded by UNICEF.

Early in July, letters were sent by the Secretary-General to both UNESCO and UNICEF requesting them to assist UNMIK in re-establishing civil administration of education. Because of its emergency response infrastructure, UNICEF was able to get personnel into the field more quickly than UNESCO, which has no access to emergency operations infrastructure. At the request of UNMIK, UNICEF agreed to temporarily second an official to begin the process of establishing the education civil authority until more permanent arrangements could be made with the support of UNESCO. A fact-finding mission from UNESCO arrived in Pristina in the last week of July and agreement was quickly reached that UNESCO would take responsibility for the identification of personnel to staff the UNMIK education authority, and UNICEF would continue to support UNMIK Civil Affairs, through temporary secondment, until UNESCO was able to field the staff to assume that responsibility.

The secondment of one official to UNMIK, however, was a very small component of the role that UNICEF was to play in supporting education, especially during the first four months. In its capacity as OCHA-nominated 'Lead Agency' for education aspects of humanitarian assistance, UNICEF "pledged to give every primary school-age child in Kosovo the opportunity to be back in school by the start of the academic year in September" (UNMIK Press Release, 24 June 1999). Over the next four months UNICEF mobilized the resources and assembled a team of education and logistics experts who worked in collaboration with NGOs, other international agencies, KFOR and schools, communities and local education 'authorities' of every type to prepare for the opening of schools, initially planned for September, and ultimately achieved in the last week

of October 1999. In its capacity as lead agency, UNICEF established and chaired a co-ordinating committee of donors and NGOs in an attempt to co-ordinate the flood of organizations and funds that descended on Kosovo in the first few months. By 25 October 1999 UNMIK was able to report that "the vast majority of public schools throughout Kosovo formally reopened today." More than 300,000 children were estimated to have "returned to school," many in hastily rehabilitated buildings, or in temporary shelters and 400 tents. UNICEF had also co-ordinated the delivery of educational supplies and equipment, including furniture (over 30,000 school desks) to over 500 schools, and indicated that more was en route (UNMIK Press Release, 25 October 1999). The back-to-school campaign was widely heralded as a success, and was largely seen as the result of the UNICEF-led effort (Poptodorova, 2001: 8).

While much credit is due to the massive UNICEF-led operation in mobilizing and delivering resources to support rehabilitation of school buildings, temporary accommodation for schools, and delivery of essential learning materials and supplies, it is clear that the achievement drew on institutions, information, resources and facilities that were made available by local communities. UNICEF and NGOs did not appoint teachers or create schools. These were largely put in place by communities themselves, and to a large extent they built on existing institutions of either the former parallel system or the former provincial administration system. While UNICEF was busy undertaking a rapid assessment of the physical facilities to determine the extent of resources that would be needed for the back-to-school campaign, most communities did not wait for UNICEF or any international agency, and quickly set about occupying the school buildings, clearing them of debris and organizing catch-up classes.

Without seeking authorization from UNMIK, local interest groups also moved quickly to assert their control of the municipal education structures. In many cases the official who had served as Municipal Education Director (MED) in the parallel system simply occupied the offices vacated by the retreating Serb authorities. In some cases new 'appointments' were made of MEDs, school directors and teachers by one or other political party, and in some cases there were even parallel structures where two municipal authorities, representing competing political parties, claimed control of the municipality. Interacting with these unofficial (in UNMIK terms) authorities presented significant challenges for the

official education authority in UNMIK which, in the period leading to the opening of schools, numbered no more than three international officials and their interpreters in Pristina, and three or four regional education officers. UNICEF, however, whose mandate was not to establish a system but simply to support the return to school, was free to interact with and obtain information from all and any of these competing education authorities, or to ignore them and deal directly with schools.

In the meantime, Serb communities moved quickly to consolidate their control over local schools. In the predominantly Serb villages in the north, this presented few challenges, and schools opened in line with the school calendar of the Republic of Serbia. In communities where Serbs constituted a minority, they were often unable to access the schools they had used before, and set about establishing networks to transport Serb children from neighbouring villages to consolidated schools. While these activities took place without the explicit approval of UNMIK, they were often supported by international organizations (including UNHCR) and NGOs, and by KFOR.

The separation of responsibility for the resumption of schooling from system reconstruction provided UNICEF the political space it needed to collaborate with all and any communities and authorities to get the job done. It also enabled UNICEF to refer to UNMIK difficult policy questions – such as what curriculum to teach, what medium to teach in, and who would appoint and pay the teachers. These questions presented UNMIK with a very considerable challenge. UNSCR 1244 and Regulation No.1 conferred on UNMIK official authority, but provided no guidelines on how to answer such questions.

The first project of the UNMIK authorities was to establish a series of 'Joint Civil Commissions' as a mechanism to initiate contact with both Serb and Albanian communities and reach agreements to facilitate "a return to normal civil life as soon as possible" (UNMIK Press Release, 21 August 1999). Very little further guidance was given to the officials on how Joint Civil Commissions should be established or operate, and different sectors pursued quite different approaches. Initial discussions with education officials in both communities quickly revealed the lack of consensus regarding political legitimacy, and an early decision was taken to limit the first meetings of the Joint Civil Commission on Education (JCCE) to officials "professionally engaged in the delivery of education in Kosovo"

prior to the 1999 escalation of hostilities (JCCE, 1999*a*). The JCCE always conceptualized as a mechanism for initiating contact and opening channels for negotiation, existed officially from its inception in early July 1999 to the last recorded meeting on 19 October 1999.

In a sense, UNMIK's greatest contribution was to stay out of the way of the return to school effort and focus its energies on ensuring some mechanism for addressing the key policy questions. Operating under the auspices of the JCCE, UNMIK officials sought agreements on the most pressing policy questions. An early proposal tabled at the fourth JCCE meeting, attended only by Albanian officials, attempted to provide answers to the most pressing of these problems in the form of a set of 'Interim Arrangements for the Resumption of Schooling'. Schools should be open to all, and should not discriminate on grounds of ethnicity or gender. Teaching should as far as possible be offered in the children's language of choice. School directors and teachers should proceed with their work, but regard their appointment as temporary, pending the establishment of an interim personnel system. Teachers should use the existing curriculum and available textbooks, but should avoid content or teaching that may inflame conflict. The provisions were essentially common sense and focused on what was feasible.

As a negotiating forum, however, the JCCE failed. After the first abortive multilateral meeting, discussions continued with the Albanian and Serb authorities separately on a bilateral basis. In many cases these early basic policy guidelines did not reach schools and communities, as UNMIK had almost no means of communicating with schools, teachers or communities, and relied on the network of NGOs co-ordinated by UNICEF to carry the messages to schools. In addition, as the return to school, which started as early as July 1999, and accelerated with 'catch-up classes' in August and September, picked up pace, UNMIK officials confronted a fundamental problem common to many post-conflict reconstruction contexts – the tension between crisis management and system development. It was clear that UNMIK, to be effective, needed more capacity.

Increasingly, in those early months before schools reopened, the two or three UNMIK officials were being pulled into almost full-time conflict resolution, travelling from village to village, school to school and meeting to meeting. The reopening of schools coincided with a transition in the leadership of education in the Civil Affairs pillar of UNMIK. From June

to October 1999 the education function in UNMIK had been under the leadership of a series of officials seconded by UNICEF and UNESCO.[20] In early November 1999, a new UN-appointed Head of UNMIK's Education Section, Steffi Schnoor, assumed her duties in Pristina on a six-month contract. During October the first three of five international Regional Education Co-ordinators gave UNMIK an education presence in the Regions, and this permitted the harried UNMIK officials in Pristina some room to focus more attention on system development. What had started as an 'Interim Education Authority' was more formally constituted as the UNMIK Education Section.

The UNMIK/JIAS Department of Education and Science

In December 1999 agreement was reached on the JIAS, and in February the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) announced the appointment of Schnoor's 'Co-Head', Agim Vinca, with Rexhep Osmani as 'Deputy Co-Head' of the newly established Department of Education and Science. The choice of these officials was based on a political agreement negotiated in the IAC, which assigned nominations to parties on the basis of the distribution of votes in the November 1999 municipal elections. Vinca was the nominee of a relatively minor party, the LBD (United Democratic Movement), while his deputy Osmani had a long history of leadership within the parallel system and was an LDK nominee. These appointments were intended to promote a shared sense of ownership and control and to balance the growing influence of the international staff appointed by UNMIK (UNMIK Press Release, 14 January 2000).

From the beginning the co-head arrangement ran into problems. The relationship between Vinca and Schnoor broke down within a few weeks, and he resigned in April 2000. His replacement, also from the LBD, Naim Rustemi was appointed in May 2000, but had no time to establish a working relationship with the International Co-Head whose term of office had ended at the end of April 2000. It was also clear that the co-head arrangement was not seen by many as a partnership of equals – both international and Kosovar UNMIK officials were quick to point out that none of the Kosovar co-heads was given access to the UNMIK internet and e-mail system

---

20 Peter Buckland (UNICEF) from June to end July, Kayapradeth 'Rama' Ramachandran (UNICEF) in August, and Mark Richmond (UNESCO) from early September to end October. Peter Buckland worked again in UNMIK Education Section in September and October.

and so they were dependent on their UNMIK counterparts for that key resource in education management – information. Yet UNMIK officials were also highly dependent on officials in the former systems for other kinds of information, and for access to schools and teachers and for the administrative networks that were keeping the system running. While UNMIK was building its capacity and systems, continued functioning of the system would have to depend on transitional mechanisms that would provide for wider participation in both crisis management and in developing the education system.

Developing the Education System in Kosovo (DESK)

DESK (Developing the Education System in Kosovo) was an initiative developed by UNMIK education staff in consultation with the JCCE. At this time the JCCE consisted only of Kosovar Albanians, as Serbs had refused to participate in any consultative structures. Formally adopted by Schnoor on her appointment, DESK was described in March 2000 by Michael Daxner, newly appointed International Administrator of the 'Pristina University system', as an "advisory body to the Department of Education and Science … to deal not only with short-term issues, but to address longer-term and strategic objectives" (Daxner, 2000: 10). The initial concept was fairly elaborate – a broadly representative 'System Design Team' would identify key challenges and assign specific tasks to 'System Development Working Groups' of specialists drawn from UNMIK, the former education systems, national and international NGOs and other key stakeholders. In order to ensure that this important work on system development and design was not side-tracked by crisis management, the original concept paper provided for small core Transitional Task Teams of key officials within each Working Group to focus on the short-term day-to-day problems. The original proposal envisaged that these small task teams would work full-time and so would need to be paid for their services, an arrangement that was supposed to foreshadow the establishment of a more inclusive education department (UNMIK, 1999*b*).

In its implementation, however, the DESK proposal was somewhat modified. The number of working groups was limited to four – one for each sub-sector (Pre-primary/Primary, Secondary and Higher, and one for Statistics and Planning) – and the distinction between the wider System Development WGs and the proposed full-time Transitional Task Teams was not fully followed up. The attempt to meet concerns about inclusiveness

led to the System Design Team growing to an unwieldy 47 members, including 22 internationals and 25 Kosovars. As early as February 2000, a European Commission Kosovo Task Force report warned that recommendations in the original concept paper regarding wider consultation and information among all stakeholders had not been followed through. It also pointed to a "lack of guidance and common approach to DESK" within UNMIK, and the limitations on strategic discussion and decision-making that resulted from the very large System Design Team.

By June 2000 the initiative had lost much of its momentum, and was widely perceived to have been reduced to 'a talkshop'. DESK was formally dismantled by order of the new Head of Education, Michael Daxner, soon after his appointment as Co-Head of the Department of Education and Science in June 2000.

The Lead Agencies approach

When Michael Daxner assumed his new role as Principal International Officer and Co-Head of Education and Science, in addition to his role as International Administrator of the Pristina University system, he brought with him a surge of energy and resources that significantly accelerated the level of activity in the development of the education system. Concerned about the slow progress to date and the delays resulting from extended consultations, he moved quickly to get the remaining international posts filled, and to find a mechanism to replace DESK. He found this in an arrangement that built on a long-standing OCHA practice of identifying 'Lead Agencies' within the United Nations system. The Lead Agencies approach built on that concept to assign responsibility for ensuring both the delivery of services and the building of capacity in the identified area.

Different international agencies interpreted this role in different ways, but in most cases it included a written agreement between UNMIK and the agency undertaking to co-ordinate and deliver an agreed set of services. This inevitably involved the deployment of international staff and consultants by the agencies, many of whom worked side by side with UNMIK and local officials on both the delivery of services in the area of responsibility, and in the development of policy proposals for the future. Thus UNICEF was identified as the lead agency for curriculum development and the CIDA-sponsored Kosovo Education Development Programme (KEDP) was appointed to lead teacher training and professional

development. The World Bank agreed to take the lead in developing an Education Management Information System, as well as in management capacity building and decentralization of school governance and financing. Special Education, a seriously neglected component of the system, was led by the Finnish Support for the Development of Education in Kosovo (FSDEK). The Lead Agencies approach had the benefit of mobilizing and focusing significant resources for activities. It also largely left to those agencies responsibility for managing the relationship between their staff or consultants and local officials, communities and other stakeholders. The Lead Agencies arrangement lasted through the whole of the period of the Interim Administration, through the Transitional Administration, and into the Provisional Government.

During the JIAS phase, the Department of Education and Science was involved in a number of minor transformations while UNMIK wrestled with the challenge of making practical sense out of the cumbersome collection of 20 'departments'. At one time it also shared responsibility for Youth and Culture. But this was resolved during the Transitional Phase when nine Transitional Administrative Departments were constituted, prefiguring the nine ministries of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), including the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. During the transitional phase, with the exception of the Kosovar Co-Heads, the department continued to operate with its mixture of international and local counterparts in terms of a growing number of 'Administrative Instructions' issued by UNMIK.

For a closer assessment of the way in which these mechanisms were used in the process of system reconstruction, the section that follows focuses on four key issues derived from two basic policy questions: (1) Who learns what from whom; and (2) Who decides?

Who is learning? The question of access

Almost all children in Kosovo are able to attend and complete primary schooling.[21] The very few who do not attend are to be found largely among non-Serb ethnic minorities (especially Roma) and children with special needs. While the existing databases had grown in sophistication and

---

21 Until September 2002, 'Primary Education' in Kosovo, in line with the rest of Yugoslavia, consisted of the first eight years of schooling. In international terms, this constitutes primary and junior secondary education.

accuracy, and there are now credible data on the numbers of children enrolled in school, there is still no reliable data on which children are not in school. The World Bank-led Living Standard Measurement Survey estimated in October 2000 that net school attendance rates for Albanian and Serbian children 7-14 years of age was 97.5 per cent and 99.5 per cent respectively, while for 'other ethnic minorities' the figure was 76.8 (cited in Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2001: 16). Gender differences at the primary level were only significant in the 'Other Minorities' category. Access to secondary schooling is the lowest in the region, with even lower enrolment rates for non-Serb ethnic minorities (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2001: 55). An added dimension of discrimination emerges at the secondary level, with very low rates of transition to secondary schooling for girls. The discussion that follows provides a brief overview of some of the main issues relating to access that confronted planners and policy-makers in June 1999 and thereafter, and describes some of the strategies put into place to address them.

Before the imposition of the 'Temporary Measures' between 1989 and 1992, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo could report a proud record of expansion of its eight-year primary phase to near universal enrolment, estimated at around 95 per cent. Education was offered in mother tongue for the main language groups (Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish), in parallel streams in common schools. Many Kosovars refer somewhat nostalgically to that era, although a few acknowledge that conflict between groups was an underlying theme, particularly during the latter years. Many also acknowledge that access for some of the smaller minority groups, particularly Roma, was a persistent problem.

Not surprisingly, despite the extraordinary efforts of communities to sustain education during the period of the parallel system, enrolment in primary schools of Albanian-speaking children fell from over 304,000 in 1989 to just under 264,000 in 1999, a decline of some 13 per cent. In the absence of population data for the period, and taking into account that there was a significant exodus of educated population during the decade, it is not possible to calculate net enrolment rates for that period (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2001: 11). On the whole, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that relatively few children were unable to enrol in primary classes except in the conflict-affected areas during the period of intensified conflict beginning in 1997. Pupovci *et al.*, (2001) also document a steady decline

in the number of children enrolled in Serb medium classes, from over 64,000 in the 1970s to around 40,000 in 1996, dropping precipitously to 14,005 in 2000/2001. Clearly, a large part of this decline can be explained by population movement, which accelerated following the end of the NATO Campaign. There is little anecdotal evidence of school-age Serbian children who were not enrolled in school in 2000/2001. This is supported by the Statistical Office of Kosovo (2001: 55), which estimated net primary attendance rate for Kosovo as a whole of 97 per cent in 2000/2001.

At the secondary level, enrolments generally echo the pattern in the primary sector, with a steady growth over the period before 1992, and a steady decline thereafter until 1999. In the case of Albanian-medium secondary education, enrolment climbed dramatically in 2000/2001 by over 30 per cent to 83,000 from its low point in 1995, while enrolment of Serbs dropped even more dramatically by over 60 per cent to around 5,400 (Pupovci *et al.*, 2001).

Interim arrangements: unification of schools

Given that ethnic discrimination was seen to be one of the critical factors underlying the conflict, it is not surprising that the issue of ethnically separate schooling was a key policy concern in the eyes of both internationals and Kosovars at the beginning of the post-conflict reconstruction. At the level of rhetoric there appeared to be complete consensus – all parties quickly endorsed the position that all children should be accommodated in a single, inclusive education system that respected the language and cultural rights of all. However the decade of sometimes brutally enforced segregation and exclusion had taken its toll. In the first three months after the end of the NATO Campaign, a new version of the old parallel systems was re-established as the Kosovo Albanian refugees returned to their villages and homes and many Serb and other ethnic minorities either left Kosovo or moved to areas regarded as safer.

From the beginning UNMIK authorities were clear on the two key principles that children should be taught in their language of choice, and that all should be educated within a single, unified system. In its most extreme form this policy was interpreted to mean that there should be no separate schools for different ethnic groups. Realities on the ground, however, made this a difficult policy to implement. Although there were a few very small experiments in the first few months, the general pattern

was the same – while there were a few parallel medium schools that accommodated members of non-Serb ethnic minorities in either Serb medium schools or Albanian medium schools, there were virtually no reports of parallel medium schools that catered to both Serb and Albanian children. The major reason given for this was security, and there were indeed regular reports of intimidation of children even for moving through another community to reach their school. In some instances international agencies including UNHCR provided buses to collect Serb children from scattered villages and transport them to consolidated schools which were still operating under the direction of the Serb authorities in Belgrade. During this early period UNMIK had virtually no capacity to monitor or enforce its policy, and the system of separate schooling quickly became a de facto reality. In many instances it was accelerated and supported by efforts of international agencies and NGOs as part of the back-to-school campaign, but for the most part it was a result of communities making decisions to ensure their children safe access to schooling in whose quality they had confidence.

Faced with this conundrum – separate schooling was unacceptable, but separate schooling was a de facto reality and the only way to ensure access for all, UNMIK's next tactic was to propose an incremental strategy termed 'unification'. The concept was spelled out in the DESK Concept Paper and started from the proposition that unification should be a process implemented over time, starting with the unification of institutions (UNMIK, 1999*a*).

The creation of separate institutions has its origins in the conflict. In the 'golden era' of the 1970s and 1980s in Yugoslavia, many schools had operated separate language streams within a single institution, sharing facilities in separate shifts. After 1992 many primary schools in the parallel system continued to use the same building for official classes in the Serbian language, but they often only had access to a small number of classrooms, sometimes physically walled off, or for afternoon sessions after the Serb children had left. In addition, these 'parallel' schools were established as separate institutions, privately funded and with their own staff and management.

UNMIK's 'unification' concept proposed acceptance of the status quo of schools already established, but introducing over time a reversal of the institutional separation that had developed after 1992. Thus separate

schools operating in close proximity, or using the same physical facility would, in the first phase, be 'unified' into a single institution with a common name and a single management structure drawn from senior staff from both schools. This would be followed by common staff development and training and the establishment of common governing structures. The proposal met with resistance on all fronts. The Albanian members of the JCCE rejected it because it involved the acceptance of de facto separate schooling as a starting point (JCCE Minutes, 15 October 1999). The Serb education authorities rejected it outright. Even many international NGOs and agency staff in the field rejected it as idealistic and impractical.

As early attempts at unifying of schools fizzled out, a new alignment of forces emerged. The Kosovo Albanian parties in the JIAS and the KTC argued strongly that any form of separate schooling was unacceptable, and that Serbs should only be allowed to attend schools that operated within a single Kosovo system that accepted a common curriculum and language policy. Serbs argued that international law, human rights and the Provisional Constitution guaranteed them the right to continue to run separate schools, and that security concerns made it impossible for them to attend schools in predominantly Albanian-speaking areas. UNMIK, which had to deal on a regular basis with incidents of violence and intimidation of parents and communities, found itself increasingly defending the right of Serbs to run separate schools. While UNMIK protested against Serb schools operating under the direction of Belgrade, which continued to pay teachers, supply learning materials and support the Serbian curriculum, it put in place measures to ensure continued access by Serb children to those schools, including the provision of buses and security escorts. The same UNMIK press release that announced the reopening of schools throughout Kosovo "without incident" also acknowledged that "in a single instance, Dr Kouchner [the SRSG] has ordered the temporary establishment of separate schools for Albanian and Serb children" (UNMIK Press Release, 25 October 1999). In terms of the United Nations mandate to ensure all children the right to basic education, and of the UNMIK responsibility to enforce the provisions of the Constitution, its view was that it had little choice.

Progress towards integration of all schools within a single, unified system, which still remains the explicit goal of the MEST and UNMIK, has been exceptionally slow. A report of an international observer in late 2001 describes the situation in Pejë/Pec as follows:

"In the region of Peje/Pec there are Bosniak schools which are attended also by Roma and Albanian children (in Bosniak language) but other Roma and Bosniak children are integrated into Albanian schools. There is a single Serb enclave of about 1,000 inhabitants (protected by KFOR) and its 150 children attend the village school in Serb. Local Albanian children, however, 'attended school at home'. UNMIK education officers told me that education was the best in the whole Kosovo as far as non-segregation was concerned" (Poptodorova, 2001: 8).

The issue of unification of schooling provides a particularly graphic example of the challenges that planners confront in a context where official policy commitment to an integrated non-discriminatory system runs directly against the political realities on the ground, and depends on political agreements that are well beyond the reach of education officials.

Inclusion of children with disabilities

While considerable attention has been directed to developing strategies to ensure access to schooling of excluded ethnic minorities, until recently very little had been directed at what Handikos, an advocacy organization for the disabled, called "Kosovo's largest minority." Whether this epithet is applicable depends on definitions and is discussed below. Education for Kosovar children with special needs, in common with most countries in the region, was historically a very neglected area. Prior to 1999, children with special needs were either accommodated in the small number of special schools, or were unable to attend school, although there are reports of children with minor disabilities being enrolled in mainstream schools, without any special accommodations made for their learning needs.

The statistics for this area are extremely limited and estimates of the number of disabled children vary dramatically, depending on the definition of disability that is used and the proportion of children in the population estimated to fall into that category. As reported earlier, progress in this area had been very slow – only 503 children were enrolled in special needs schools and classes in August 2001, and this had grown to 510, under the care of 167 staff, by September 2002. Estimates of the proportion of children with 'moderate to severe impairments' in the population range from 5 to 8 per cent, which could suggest a total of over 30,000 children of school-going age. MEST data for April 2002 identify 11,461 children

with special needs enrolled in mainstream classes in grades 1-12, but there is no information on the extent to which their special needs are being met (Kosovo. MEST, 2002). The Department of Education and Science, in 2001, using the "most conservative estimates of children with severe impairments" (1 per cent) estimated that there were at least 4,000 severely impaired children who could not be accommodated in ordinary schools without special arrangements. Given this range of estimates and the lack of reliable information, planners were faced with a considerable dilemma. Experts in Handikos, a local advocacy-based organization, tend towards the higher estimate, but acknowledge that some of these children may be enrolled in regular schools that do not recognize or address their special learning needs.

Attention to the needs of children with disabilities, while recognized as an important issue during the back-to-school and interim administration period, received very little specific official attention, and what support was provided came from individual initiatives of NGOs and communities. It was the Lead Agencies Approach that provided a boost when UNMIK negotiated an arrangement with a Finnish-based NGO 'Finnish Support for the Development of Education in Kosovo' (FSDEK), supported by the Finnish Development Agency. They were commissioned to work with the Department of Education and Science and later with MEST to develop a strategy for implementing the 1999 commitment by UNMIK to a policy of inclusion of children with special learning needs. Over a period of almost two years the Finnish project FSDEK, building on work that had been initiated by NGOs and in close partnership with Handikos and other local organizations, made significant strides in building support for and developing consensus around a radical switch in approach to the education of children with special needs. Where the old system either failed completely to meet their learning needs, or consigned them to specialized institutions, the new policy involves a graduated approach that accommodates children in a range of institutional contexts, from inclusion in mainstream schooling, supported by appropriate physical and pedagogical accommodations, through 'attached' special education classes to specialized institutions. However, this progress in developing consensus around a major shift in approach has yet to be manifested in changes in schools themselves, as the data cited above indicate.

What are they learning? Curriculum development

Commitment to a common curriculum and to mother-tongue teaching, a mainstay of education policy in Kosovo during the Tito era, became the most significant bone of contention that led, in 1992, to the dismissal of all Kosovo Albanian teachers and officials and to the establishment of the parallel education system. As described earlier, work began almost immediately within the parallel system on a revised curriculum which drew largely on the existing Kosovo curriculum, but which contained some modifications, particularly in history and cultural subjects, to include a stronger focus on Kosovo Albanian interpretations. The curriculum was modified slightly over the next few years, but largely retained the structure and pedagogical approach implicit in the original curriculum. Textbooks were also adapted and printed to accommodate the curriculum changes.

'Interim arrangements' for the curriculum

At the start of the planning for the return to school in 1999, UNMIK officials were presented with a request from UNICEF and its partners managing the back-to-school campaign regarding choice of curriculum and textbooks. During the period of intensified conflict, and especially during the NATO campaign, schools, printing companies and storage facilities had been deliberately targeted and existing stocks of Albanian-language textbooks had been almost totally destroyed. Given the need to move rapidly on production of teaching and learning materials, and given the lack of any formal curriculum-development capacity, UNMIK was required to make urgent and practical decisions. In these circumstances, the choices for planners and administrators are very limited, and agreement was quickly reached that schooling would commence based on the curriculum in use at each school immediately prior to the suspension of learning, "subject to any exclusions or additions determined by the JCCE through its Interim Curriculum Working Group, and in line with a set of curriculum principles to be adopted by the JCCE" (JCCE, 1999*b*). The document also provided that in the event that the JCCE was unable to agree on the interim arrangements, "they may be implemented by the SRSG."

In the event there was little opposition to the proposal since it largely involved licensing the continued operation of the previous systems, although the specific wording was never formally accepted by the Serb officials. In

fact, in late July 1999 many schools were already operating 'catch-up classes' and using the existing curriculum and textbooks. The interim arrangements were very explicit that they applied for a period of three months from October 1999, although they were subject to extension "as determined by the SRSG." Once agreement on the curriculum was in place to the extent that UNMIK could effect it, arrangements were made for the printing of textbooks, with the support of a consortium of agencies led by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. At UNMIK's insistence, every book was screened by a panel of Kosovar educators and their recommendations presented to UNMIK for final approval, before printing could begin. Despite a number of delays in both the approval process and the appointment of printers, the massive effort mobilized over 4.5 million Deutsche Marks in an emergency textbook programme. A total of 130 titles was reviewed by a team of Kosovar educators under UNMIK supervision, and all but three subsequently published and distributed during the first semester of 1999/2000. Progress in the screening of Serb and other language textbooks was much slower, and to a large extent somewhat overtaken by events since many schools received textbooks shipped directly from Serbia. It soon became clear that considerable supplies of other textbooks that had not been screened were shipped in from Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and elsewhere for use in many schools across Kosovo (Daxner, 2000: 9).

While the 'Interim Arrangements' offered official approval for what was already taking shape on the ground, UNMIK's very limited capacity and reach meant that its impact on events was marginal. The interim arrangements did, however, provide an authoritative reference for agencies working with schools and communities, although one UNMIK official admitted that they were invoked 'selectively', as the requirements for the establishment of 'integrated institutions' were judged 'idealistic and unworkable'.

UNICEF as Lead Agency

The identification of UNICEF, working in close collaboration with the UNESCO International Bureau for Education (IBE) based in Geneva, as Lead Agency for curriculum development, led to the next significant advance on curriculum issues. International agencies are faced with particular challenges in dealing with curriculum issues and traditionally describe curriculum as a 'national affair', preferring instead to approach

curriculum issues more obliquely. In many cases this is resolved by a focus on pedagogy, through support for teacher training and development and the inculcation, for example, of child-centred approaches. Where international support is provided, it is often in the form of technical assistance and training for curriculum development units or institutes within countries. Kosovo was unique in that while there was wide, though not universal, consensus that the curricula currently in use were outmoded and inappropriate, there existed no formal and credible mechanism to develop a new curriculum (OECD, 2001: 15-16). The original DESK Concept Paper had proposed a 'System Development Working Group' on curriculum development, but this was dropped in the decision to streamline the DESK mechanism and reduce the number of proposed working groups to three. The agreement with UNICEF to serve as Lead Agency for curriculum development was UNMIK's strategy to take this issue forward.

In many ways, the Lead Agency arrangement for curriculum development presents a promising example of how this kind of mechanism can be successfully implemented. UNICEF quickly recognized that there was a need for good international technical expertise, to engage local specialists and to work in a way that built capacity within the emerging system. Early in the process, provision was made for the appointment of a team of 10 local specialists and posts were created, advertised and filled. The team participated in an intensive training programme run through UNESCO-IBE in Geneva, was accommodated in the UNMIK headquarters building and worked alongside other local and international education officials. By arrangement with UNMIK, a curriculum specialist was appointed in the Department of Education and Science to ensure integration of the work of the project into the emerging educational management infrastructure. Consultations with stakeholders, especially teachers, were organized in locations throughout Kosovo, and the findings discussed in workshops attended by international specialists. In line with modern curriculum-development practice, the initial focus was on the development of a curriculum framework rather than the traditional approach of focusing on syllabus content. At the time of the fieldwork for this study the Curriculum Framework Document had been published and was made widely available throughout Kosovo (Kosovo. DoES, 2001). Almost all commentators, local and international, regarded it as a high quality and important contribution to the modernization not only of the curriculum, but of the process by which curricula would be developed in the future. "This

process has opened our eyes," commented one enthusiastic MEST official. "We will never go back to the old way."

By October 2002, following the widespread approval of the framework document, plans had been considerably advanced for the next phase of the project – the development of subject-specific curricula. Arrangements had been made for the appointment of 30 local specialists and an institutional linkage to an international university. Resources had been mobilized by UNICEF, agreements reached and contracts signed. Then the process encountered a series of setbacks which help illustrate the complexity of the challenges of implementing an ambitious project of this kind in a context of rapid political change and limited trust.

The first snag described by one UNICEF specialist was that the curriculum framework, while widely lauded, was never "officially adopted, because there was no structure to do [so]." The release of the framework coincided with the difficult transitional process between the dissolution of the JIAS mechanism and the transfer of authority to the provisional institutions of self-government. The 'Transitional Administrative Department of Education, Science and Technology', without a Kosovar 'Co-Head', was envisaged lasting from the dissolution of the IAC and JIAS mechanisms in October 2001 to the establishment of the new government in December 2001. As mentioned previously, the transition in the end was an extended one, with an Assembly appointed in December, but unable to reach agreement on a government until March 2002. The Curriculum Framework document was caught between the competing pressures within UNMIK to finalize and cement into place as many as possible of the reforms from the interim and transitional administrations, and to hold issues for decision by the incoming ministry.

When the new Minister was appointed in March 2002, he suspended the arrangements made to appoint 30 curriculum specialists, most of whom were teachers, and refused to endorse the contractual arrangements made with the University of Ljubljana as partners in the process.[22] Senior MEST officials later explained that the Minister's objections revolved around four critical problems: the agreements were reached during the transitional phase without the involvement of Kosovar co-heads; the arrangement

---

22 Because of uncertainty about moving ahead before the appointment of the Minister, the contract made provision for a period within which it could be revoked by the Minister.

involved an inappropriately strong role for a foreign university, and did not involve the local university or its educationists; the existing curriculum framework focused only on the primary phase and needed to be part of a system-wide curriculum reform; and the applicants for the curriculum-development posts were largely teachers, and he expressed doubts that teachers possessed the necessary expertise to develop curricula.

The Minister was also concerned that the whole process had been unnecessarily long and complex, and had still only delivered a curriculum framework, not a curriculum. His argument was supported shortly thereafter by the development by the MEST, with minimum international assistance, of a new curriculum for the Grade 9 class that had been added to the compulsory schooling phase as part of the restructuring of the system to align it more closely with 'European Standards'. The work was completed in two weeks by a small team consisting largely of academics from the University of Pristina. While international educators derided the Grade 9 curriculum as a 'skeleton syllabus', its preparation by a small team of academics in the space of weeks, when contrasted against the UNICEF-led process that had taken over a year to produce a 'framework', pointed to very different conceptions of the curriculum-development process. In October 2002 it appeared that all the work that had been done by the UNICEF-led initiative had been rejected by the MEST, and several UNMIK and MEST officials mourned what they saw as a critical opportunity for real progress lost.

By late November 2002, however, a series of intensive negotiations between UNICEF, UNMIK officials and the MEST led to an agreement by the Minister for a resumption of discussions with the University of Ljubljana under the direction of the Permanent Secretary, and arrangements seemed to be on track for reinstatement of the curriculum-reform process that had been suspended by the Minister.

While a description of challenges that beset the implementation of the Grade 9 reforms will be reviewed in the next chapter, two policy-related lessons emerged from the overview of this process: the new political head was working with a significantly different model of curriculum development; and the ever-present tension between the need for quick and visible results and the slower process of negotiating consensus, securing buy-in and building capacity becomes particularly critical when a new political head arrives. Perhaps a third lesson could be added – the lasting

value of quality technical work and committed efforts to involve local officials. It now seems clear that the curriculum framework will serve as the basis for progress on curriculum development in Kosovo.

From whom are they learning? Teachers and teacher development

As they face the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction in education, planners and administrators also encounter a series of critical policy issues around the most expensive and critical resource for any education system – the teaching force. This section reviews some of these key issues and how they were tackled in Kosovo.

UNMIK 'inherited' from the parallel system a teaching force that had received virtually no in-service training for the past decade, was somewhat depleted by emigration and had often survived on small and sometimes irregular salary payments supported by in-kind contributions from communities (Davies, 1999). It was, however, highly motivated and held in high esteem by fellow Kosovar Albanians, and generally held high expectations for the role that it could play in the rebuilding of the Kosovo education system. The teachers that reported for duty in the Serb-medium schools between July and August 1999 quickly voiced concerns about their own personal safety and professional prospects, and almost all saw themselves as employees of the Serbian authorities in Belgrade.

Interim arrangements for teachers

The relationship of this body of teachers to the new UNMIK education authority in July 1999, however, was unclear. It was clear to the teachers that they were the only teaching force available, and that the United Nations had committed itself to the reopening of schools in September. It was also very clear that while UNMIK laid claim to being the official authority in education, it had very limited power – it did not even at that stage have the most basic information on teachers: their numbers, qualifications, level or institutions, let alone their names and records. Such information as did exist was outdated, inaccurate and in the hands of the officials of the former systems. The first step taken by UNMIK officials was to attempt to provide for the incorporation of these teachers into the system. Again, the Interim Arrangements proposed a strategy that would largely regularize the status quo – the plan provided for 'automatic absorption' of teachers

into schools at which they had been teaching in the previous school year, providing they reported for duty in person by a certain date. The assumption was that this would cover the majority of teachers, and that it would then be a more manageable task to supervise the appointment of the remaining teachers. At the time that the Interim Arrangements were developed, there was still no clear commitment regarding whether, when or how the proposed stipends to teachers would be paid, but they were developed with the assumption that the provision of the stipend would be the best way to get teachers to become part of the system.

Teacher salaries

The next burning issue to confront UNMIK officials, and about which officials of the parallel system expressed considerable anxiety, was the issue of teacher remuneration. Early meetings with teachers and with teacher organizations impressed on UNMIK the fact that most teachers had been working without any kind of pay since at least February or March 1999, when the intensification of hostilities and the massive population displacement brought schooling, and the parallel system, to a standstill. For some teachers, the period had been considerably longer. As early as August a precedent had been set by the payment of stipends to health workers in Pristina, followed by a commitment by UNMIK to extend the system to all health workers and other public employees, including education staff. By late August, the UNMIK education authority in Pristina launched a massive effort to collect the names and details of education workers at every school. This effort was only possible by working with UNICEF and the network of NGOs involved in planning the back-to-school programme, with local NGOs, with the 'unofficial officials' in many municipal offices that were already building school and teacher lists. UNMIK invested considerable resources in technology that would help to reduce double counting, 'ghost teachers' and ensure more reliable identification.

After a number of delays and postponements, payments of stipends to teachers began, three days before the delayed opening of the new school year on 25 October (UNMIK Press Releases, 22 and 25 October 1999), and continued through November and December, although they were not sufficient (one payment of DM200 for period September to December) or timely enough to prevent a brief teachers' strike in November. The stipend system elicited a mixed response – with criticisms focusing on the

relatively small amounts, repeated delays and, in some areas, systematic errors that listed teachers at the wrong schools, or confused or duplicated names. Some representatives of the parallel system argued that the effort was unnecessary, and that the parallel system already had the infrastructure and systems to disburse payments to teachers, and had even used them in making a one-off payment to teachers out of a donation mobilized by Oxfam (interview with SBASHK officials). This offer was not taken up by UNMIK on the grounds that there would be no way to control use of funds, and that it would confer recognition on 'unofficial parallel structures'.

Mechanisms to avoid duplication and errors met with limited success. OECD reports that the initial stipend system "lured some 2,000 'ghost' teachers on to the payroll," and UNMIK immediately set about negotiating a salary scale for education. The scale that emerged from these discussions ranged from DM 600 per month for the university rector, to DM 318 for secondary and DM 291 for primary teachers. Payments using the scale and the payroll emerging from the stipends exercise began in February 2000. The salary scale differentiated between three categories of teachers: qualified teachers, provisional teachers (competent but not qualified) and a third category of teachers deemed neither qualified nor competent. They were to be identified, but not issued with new contracts (OECD, 2001: 22).

Catching ghosts

In mid-2000, the Department of Education and Science (DES) undertook what was known as a 'spill', in which all staff had to apply for their posts and go through a school-based selection procedure. The contracts made provision for a performance rating scale to be used in each municipality to assess the quality of teaching, and drew on a set of selection criteria designed to prioritize experienced women teachers below 40 years of age. School directors managed appointments of teachers to schools under UNMIK guidelines that called for a 'commission' to be established at each school to review appointments. In September 2000 the DES sent out some 20,000 contracts, reducing the payroll by some 6,000 personnel. By June 2001 OECD was able to report that "UNMIK is generally able to pay on time" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 22). Shortly thereafter arrangements were made to transfer the appointment and payment of teachers to the municipal education authorities.

Having 'inherited' a body of teachers of unknown name and number, with a wide range of competence and experience, UNMIK was able, within 18 months, to move from 'automatic interim appointment' in unpaid positions in schools to devolution to municipalities of a working, if fairly fundamental, personnel system employing over 28,000 staff. In many respects this constitutes a remarkable achievement, and signalled that progress had been made in backing up the official authority conferred by UNSCR 1244 with power – vested in institutions, information systems, policies and the ability to control and direct the major resource in education: teacher salaries.

Not surprisingly, the achievement is not without limitations and critics. First, the extent to which UNMIK contracts for teachers in Serb schools brought them 'into the system' is debatable, since Serb teachers still saw themselves, and were seen, as part of a separate "sub-system that is still beholden to Belgrade" (Crighton *et al.*, 2001: 16). The allegation by UNMIK and MEST officials and (non-Serb) teachers that Serb teachers still received salaries from Belgrade in addition to their UNMIK salaries was a source of considerable grievance among many teachers, although by agreement with Belgrade those who signed contracts were supposed to no longer receive salary payments from Belgrade (Crighton et al., 2002: 20).[23] Salary levels for non-Serb teachers in Kosovo were perceived (even within MEST) as unacceptably low, and were a factor in the teachers' strike that took place in early November 2002 (UNMIK Information Note, 15 November 2002*a*). A recent World Bank review of medium-term public expenditure supports a complaint by SBASHK, the most powerful teachers' union, that employees in central government general administrative services and police earn substantially more than their counterparts in education, health and municipalities. The World Bank report notes: "While wage levels in central government general administrative levels have been increasing (at least in nominal terms), pay rates have been declining in education …" (World Bank, 2002: 35).

Teacher training and professional development

Having put in place mechanisms to appoint and remunerate the education system's most critical resource, planners also confronted the challenge of investing in the development of this human capital. Mention

---

23 Serb perceptions of the UNMIK-Belgrade salary issue will be addressed in *Chapter 4*.

has been made above of the lack of pre-service and in-service training that the majority of teachers received during the decade of the parallel system. By June 2000, before the first 'spill' and the new contract system, UNMIK reported a total of 28,625 teachers in the entire system. The Kosovo Education Centre (KEC) estimated that around 78 per cent of primary teachers were 'qualified' (Crighton *et al*., 2001: 21; Pupovci et al., 2001: 33). However, when this is broken down into subject specializations, there is a wider range, with more than 65 per cent of foreign-language teachers and 34 per cent of mathematics teachers lacking formal qualifications, as opposed to only 17 per cent of teachers of Albanian language and literature (Pupovci *et al*., 2001: 35). The figures for secondary school teachers were very similar (Pupovci *et al*., 2001: 53). The attraction of English language teachers into UNMIK and other international agencies reached a point in October 1999 that Kosovar Albanian educators complained to UNMIK representatives that there were "no English teachers at any primary or high schools in Pristina." An UNMIK internal memo in September 1999 requested international staff to consider making arrangements for flexible working hours for teachers employed as interpreters so that they could also serve as part-time teachers in local schools.

Teacher training 'workshops' are among the easiest and quickest 'projects' to mount, and a large proportion of the plethora of NGOs and agencies that flooded into Kosovo in the second half of 1999 had teacher training as an important, if not the central, component of their project activities. During the return-to-school phase, UNMIK did not have the capacity to co-ordinate this flood of teacher-training initiatives. The first step was to request UNICEF, which was managing the Education Co-ordination Committee as the lead agency for the back-to-school campaign, to try to keep track of projects. Shortly after this a simple mechanism was established for all education projects undertaken in schools or with teachers to 'register' with UNMIK, and this yielded some success, although perhaps not enough was done with the information derived from registration because of capacity limitations, and the policy was not initially enforced effectively.

The original DESK Concept Note proposed a System Development Working Group and a Transitional Task Team on 'Teacher Development', but in the streamlined implementation these groups were not constituted, and teacher training and development activities proceeded on a very ad hoc basis that was in large part supply-driven rather than based on any

coherent strategy or assessment of training needs. These initiatives operated in parallel with the formal pre-service teacher-training provision in four different faculties of the university, and in four teachers colleges or higher schools, each of which had been quickly re-established by the returning officials of the parallel system.

The co-ordination of teacher development and training took longer than most initiatives to get off the ground. As late as June 2001, the OECD Report concluded that "no coherent strategy or harmonized donor operation yet exists [and] the in-service training market is fragmented and overloaded …" although by then an agreement had been reached on the appointment of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as Lead Agency (Crighton *et al*., 2001: 24). Leadership in the field that had become a major growth industry in the NGO world presented particular challenges to the Kosovo Educator Development Programme (KEDP), which was established by CIDA. It was a field in which virtually all actors, local and international, had a stake, including the local university and teacher-training institutions, the teacher union and teacher organizations, local and international development agencies and NGOs. Providing teacher 'trainings' often in the form of one- to three-day workshops quickly became the most common mechanism for projects. By early 2000, Kosovar educators complained that there was such intense competition for teachers to participate in training courses and workshops in some areas that teachers could spend more time in training than in the classroom. Apart from almost routine end-of-workshop evaluation questionnaires, there was no systematic attempt to assess the impact on teachers or learning of the multiple training initiatives.

Following a request from the UNMIK-JIAS Department of Education and Science, in 2001, to NGOs and training agencies to limit the disruption of teaching, many agencies scheduled their workshops for the summer vacation. In an effort to bring about some co-ordination in this near-chaotic situation, KEDP arranged for a 'Kosovo/a Summer Institute for Educators' in June/July 2002. The Information Brochure for the Summer Institute listed 138 courses/workshops, offering training in an extraordinarily wide range of areas, from 'Active Learning Methods as Pedagogic Tools' through 'Introduction to Psychosocial Programme' to 'Youth Involvement'. The brochure listed 21 'organizations and institutions that provide courses' in the Summer Institute, and offered a standard application form and guidelines

and principles for selection (KEDP, 2002). A senior KEDP official described the Summer Institute as an effort to make teachers aware of the learning opportunities that were available to them, and to stimulate demand. "Until people see what to ask for, they don't start demanding," the official explained.

The co-ordination of teacher training was constrained by a range of conflicting pressures and the extraordinary challenge of co-ordinating NGOs, described by one international as "like herding cats." When KEDP was finally commissioned, it was instructed to "hit the ground running" and requested to focus its energies in the first instance on the category of Provisional teachers that had emerged out of the September 2000 teacher contract renewal. Since the terms of the contract required teachers to undergo an approved training course in order to upgrade from Provisional to Qualified status, there was a clear and strong demand, and a need to deliver quickly. Instead of being able to engage in a needs identification process, however, KEDP was forced into service delivery mode from the start. A nine-day course was designed and advertised and rapidly oversubscribed. "In the rush to hit the ground running," commented a KEDP official, "we started with Canadian trainers, but … now have 32 Kosovar trainers with follow-up by Canadian coaches" (interview with KEDP).

Another KEDP representative described the state of the Kosovo curriculum as 'appalling', while acknowledging that the new curriculum framework offered hope for real progress on curriculum development. In the absence of a good curriculum the strategy was to focus on changing pedagogy to more learner-centred instruction.

In the meantime, progress had been made on the policy front. An in-service framework within which all donors were supposed to operate had been established, to limit disruption of teaching. Progress had been made on establishing a Faculty of Education at the University of Pristina as part of a wider teacher-development strategy. The long-term goal, according to KEDP, is to "move to school-based teacher development," but there was a need for a tremendous amount of capacity development to reverse the impact of years of teacher-driven pedagogy. "Kosovars have difficulty in dealing with open-ended questions" explained one KEDP official.

By late 2002 there still seemed a long way to go in developing a coherent and integrated approach to teacher development that linked in-service and pre-service, management training, curriculum development and assessment of learning. A factor contributing to this lack of coherence may lie in the very Lead Agencies Approach responsible for the significant progress in each area – each of these areas is under the agency leadership of a separate agency – UNICEF for Curriculum, KEDP for Teacher Development, World Bank for Standards and Assessment. Curriculum development had progressed significantly but had reached a stage only of developing a new curriculum framework and some indigenous capacity to further develop it within the MEST. Problems were encountered in the handover process from the Transitional Administrative department to MEST. Teacher Development, a much more complex field in terms of the number of local and international players involved, had made slower progress, but had eventually been able to focus its energies on the development of a wider policy framework. The initiative to establish a Standards and Assessment Board, led by a Finnish NGO and funded by the World Bank, had also made limited progress, and had operated largely in isolation from the teacher and curriculum-development initiatives. The linkage of all these separate components into an overarching framework called for strong leadership and direction from the central authority just at the period when that authority was most constrained by the process of transition from the Interim Administrative System to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.

Who decides? School and system governance

In this brief overview of a very broad topic, we focus on three critical themes that policy-makers, planners and administrators confront in post-conflict reconstruction: legislation, decentralization and management information.

Legislation

A previous anecdote described how an early challenge to UNMIK's authority in education rested on the issue of legislation – under which laws was the system to be governed? UNMIK's hasty response was to issue Regulation Number One (1999/1) that made explicit the legal convention that the "second applicable law" was "all laws that governed the territory prior to 24 March 1999," subsequently revised to 22 March

1989, when it had become clear that the laws in force in 1999 included those that revoked the autonomy of the province and imposed a form of direct rule from Belgrade. The 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Kosova' had passed its own education law in 1992 under which the parallel education system was governed. With resources from the World Bank, UNMIK commissioned a team of specialists in the Council of Europe to draft the education legislation governing both Higher Education and General Education. This was the genesis of the laws that had such a difficult passage through the Kosovo Assembly in late 2002, referred to earlier in this chapter.

While the General Education Law was seen by most observers interviewed for this project as an important step forward and a good mechanism to take Kosovo towards the treasured 'European standards', there was concern expressed by a number of senior officials and Kosovar educators that the law had been developed outside of Kosovo, with limited consultation with local specialists. Council of Europe drafting teams, faced with a very challenging and politically charged environment, had made considerable efforts to consult with a cross-section of Kosovar opinions.

Decentralization

A conundrum facing the challenge of school and system governance is captured in the phrase "you cannot decentralize without a centre." In June 1999, education in Kosovo lacked a centre, and a considerable part of the drama that played out over the following three years was, ironically, about the struggle for control of that central authority.

An impact of the Kosovo conflict on the education system was a significant shift of power from central authorities towards schools and communities, first by shifting control of the schooling of most Kosovar children to a non-government entity, and secondly because of disruption and under-resourced mechanisms for administration and control. Conflict disrupted the centre's capacity to control and direct the education system, but schooling rarely came to a standstill, except during the most violent phases of conflict in the most conflict-affected areas. The schooling system proved to have enormous momentum, and as direction and flow of resources from the centre were disrupted, local authorities and communities continued to mobilize resources and keep schooling going.

The most interesting challenge for the planners, policy-makers and administrators in approaching post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo was to support the reconstruction of the system in ways that built on the beneficial aspects of this process (greater community involvement, local input and control, community-ownership) while helping to bring coherence, quality and equity to the system. Decentralization, or recentralization, involves the transfer of power or authority, and it is not surprising that it became a highly contested issue.

From the 1970s, Kosovar Albanians gained increasing control of the education system through their political dominance in the government of the 'Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo', which explicitly accorded responsibility for education policy akin to that of the other republics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The education system that emerged had much of the mix of centralized and decentralized features of the systems in place throughout Yugoslavia. The provincial government had considerable control over broad policy direction and even curriculum, although primary and secondary education was delivered by the municipalities. Autonomy at the school level was limited. Central control and coherence were maintained largely through a system of centrally determined 'norms' that applied to virtually every aspect of education, from class size to teaching hours per week and, of course, financing.

The emergence of the parallel system was not an overnight phenomenon – the process lasted at least from 1989 when the Serbian government began to flex its muscles through the suspension of Kosovo's autonomous status, to 1992, when almost all Albanian public servants were dismissed, including all teachers and education officials. A result of this protracted process was that, in many respects, setting up the parallel system was a matter of finding ways to replace the public resources and infrastructure that supported the existing institutions of governance that were absorbed into the emerging parallel system. In this way, the parallel system was in many ways a carbon copy of the Kosovo provincial system from which it broke away, and it inherited much the same mix of centralized direction and municipal provision, with limited autonomy at the school level.

There was, however, some impetus to decentralization emanating from the League of Albanian Educators (LASH), an organization that played a very significant role in developing the parallel system, driven, in

part at least, by a concern to ensure its own members' continued employment. It was driven by three primary goals: preserve existing institutions "for the sake of continuity," "keep students and teachers, but also their families active and not thinking about abandoning Kosova," and start to build "local genuine political and state institutions through the system of education" (Rexhaj, 2001: 3). Rexhaj goes on to comment on these "not always purely academic" goals: "As a result, a solid structure for the co-ordination of efforts in the system of education emerged that eventually (together with the financial structures) presented the backbone of the parallel Kosovar state structures as opposed to those imposed by the Serbian regime". One commentator noted that every school and municipal director in the parallel system had an official stamp of the 'Republic of Kosova' with which it stamped school certificates – certificates that were not recognized by Yugoslav authorities but were "accepted in Albania".

At the end of the conflict in 1999 the two 'former' education systems found themselves in competition with the new civil authority for control of education. While there was much talk of 'decentralization,' the struggle over governance was initially a struggle for control of the central authority. UNMIK started with virtually no resources for its task of 'civil administration' except the formal authority conferred by UNSCR 1244 and backed by NATO's military might. Even that authority was not unchallenged, especially in the early days when Serb authorities continued to invoke 'international law' and 'territorial sovereignty' while many Kosovar Albanians continued to refer to one or other 'ministry', 'government' and 'parliament.' As the process advanced and UNMIK was able to mobilize more and more human, financial and institutional resources, the contested ground shifted to who would exert the greatest influence over the institutions of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure. By this time, UNMIK had established an institutional presence in every municipality, and an international Education Officer in each of the five regions. A centre, however streamlined, had been established.

A significant development in the decentralization process was the emergence during the JIAS period of the 'two-layer management system' which provided for a division of responsibilities at the municipal level between the (elected) Municipal Education Director (MED) and a new category of official – Senior Education Officer (SEO) appointed by the UNMIK Department of Education and Science and reporting through the

(international) Regional Education Co-ordinators to UNMIK/DES in Pristina. The innovation met with considerable resistance, particularly from the MEDs, and the move was interpreted as a covert attempt to undermine the authority of the municipalities and to centralize real authority in Pristina (Field interview, SBASHK). From UNMIK's perspective, it was a key part of the process of decentralization.

An important activity at this stage was the work undertaken with the support of the World Bank to develop procedures and manuals and to conduct training in their use. The purpose was to help build capacity at municipal and school level to respond to the devolution of education funding to municipalities and schools. In May 2002 two concise handbooks, the *Handbook on Municipal Education Governance* and the *Kosovo School Funding Handbook* were published by the PISG MEST. They were widely distributed throughout the system, and were expected to be supported by an intensive programme of training. The handbooks had been in use in draft form in many municipalities for some time and offered the most systematic guidance on how the new decentralized financial management system was to function effectively.

However, meetings with municipal officials, finance officials in Pristina, and with school directors all suggest that the impact of these manuals, and of the decentralization of management to the municipal and school levels has yet to be effectively manifested in practice. While administratively funds were transferred in 2001 through block grants to municipalities, several municipal directors complained that much of their attention had been focused on meeting the accountability requirements that accompanied this devolution of control, and they had had little time or resources to follow fully the procedures laid down in the manuals. While several school directors confirmed that they had been to meetings at which they had an opportunity to express their preferences with regard to non-salary expenditure, a number of others complained that the only difference that they were aware of was that supplies had taken longer to arrive. Municipal financing officials confirmed that several municipalities had not managed to fully commit their budget allocations for goods and services by the end of the 2001/2002 financial year.

A clear conclusion from these discussions is that while the manuals provide an important tool, and transfer of financial resources to municipalities is an important step, there is still a need for a sustained

programme of capacity building at school and municipal levels to ensure that the flow of funds to municipalities and schools actually follows the channels developed, and provides the schools with the degree of discretion over non-salary expenditure that was intended. The devolution of control to municipalities and schools provided for in these reforms was only reaching the end of its first year of implementation at the time of writing. With the support of the manuals and sustained training, it could still emerge as one of the more significant reforms introduced by UNMIK.

Information management

A considerable amount of energy continues to be devoted to the development and control of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) that was one of the components of the first World Bank-supported Education and Health Project. In the world of system management, information is an important source of power. UNMIK started from a position of almost complete powerlessness in education because it lacked even basic data on how many schools, teachers, students, etc., there were. In 1999, the officials in the former parallel system had a considerable body of information on that system as it was in 1998, but its data did not cover developments since the conflict. Similarly, the Serb-controlled provincial administration had detailed information on schools, teachers, facilities etc. in the official system in 1989, but the massive exodus and population displacement made these data of questionable value. National and international NGOs and organizations that had been active in Kosovo during the previous decade also had their own sets of statistics, and UNICEF with its mandate to lead the back-to-school campaign quickly set about managing a huge assessment exercise involving site visits to every school, and assessment of their condition and capacity. A key source of statistical information for the parallel system was the company that had managed acquisition, printing and distribution of textbooks, although, again, its data were out of date, and did not reflect the population displacement and movement during and following the conflict.

This situation, combined with the large presence of international agencies and projects in the first two years, accounts for the proliferation of statistical databases and publications, many of which contained conflicting and contradictory information. UNMIK recognized during the back-to-school period that the establishment of a reliable and accurate education management information system would be a key to establishing

coherent management required by a modern, decentralized education system. The project was designed with the assistance of an international consultant and, as of the time of writing, had just begun to provide data tables, but not in a form that could be widely distributed through the system for management purposes. A frustrated MEST official complained that getting data from the EMIS group was like "getting blood out of a stone," but the EMIS team responded that the database was only preliminary and that data had not been checked for final release.

Interviews with officials in the Project and in UNMIK and MEST provide some insight. The project had encountered a set of problems that confront many information management projects in developing countries. Management information is only useful if it is used for the purposes of decision-making in a coherent management system. However, developing a modern management system requires the existence of basic and reliable management information. This chicken-and-egg problem was resolved in the case of Kosovo by employing an international consultant to work, with such local managers as could be identified, to develop a basic system that could be incorporated into the management development programme in due course. On the basis of the framework drafted by the consultant, the first version of the system was developed in the World Bank supported Project Co-ordination Office within the DES/DEST/MEST. In this early phase the greatest contact that education officials had with the EMIS was the requirement to provide data to be input to the system. It is thus some time before the system is able to produce output data that is seen by the same officials (if they are the same officials) as useful for planning and administration.

A second problem was that the technical demands of getting a computerized system to operate reliably, and in a way that is simple and friendly enough for managers to be able to employ, require sustained employment of local computer programming specialists. Such people usually have limited experience with education management data and are very hard to retain in employment on local salaries. While these technical and administrative problems are being ironed out, it is not uncommon for the EMIS system, around which there is often considerable publicity and high expectations, to be perceived as a 'black hole' into which huge amounts of data are 'poured in' but little is seen to come out. This was the stage at which the Kosovo EMIS system stood at the time of writing.

The next challenge is to compile the database into a format that is useful for managers and cannot be corrupted, and to incorporate the usage of the EMIS system into the management training and development programme to be run by the MEST. The World Bank plans to support the finalization and implementation of this initiative as part of its second education Project, currently under discussion. A full assessment of this initiative can only be made when it has reached the stage where reliable and useful data are regularly made available to planners, managers and the wider public. It holds the potential to be a very significant tool for the development of the system, but it was at an early stage of development at the time of writing.

Final comments

The process of moving from a context of no legal authority responsible for education, and no policy, through building on the remnants of two competing and conflict-shattered systems, towards a new and vibrant single education system preparing young Kosovars for a future in a modern Europe, is far from complete. Yet significant progress has been made and a range of innovative and challenging strategies applied to address an array of challenges that most educational planners and administrators have little preparation for. This account has focused on how the policies and the system were developed. It has identified many achievements and many continuing challenges, but it describes only half of the story. The next section views these reforms and the developments around them from the perspective of those affected by the system. From these reflections it will be possible to identify some key lessons emerging from this innovative experiment in educational reconstruction.

Chapter 4

A system in transition:
educational practice in Kosovo

The diversity and depth of need for education in Kosovo, not only to improve but simply to stabilize the education system, are considerable. Following a broad examination of social history, the current educational context and the evolution of central administrative policies and structures in the previous two chapters, this chapter will examine some issues pertaining to the practice of formal education in Kosovo. In advance of this discussion, however, the following description of a classroom visit, by Marc Sommers and an interpreter, helps illuminate the wide range of educational issues that confront Kosovo's education system, regarding how students are taught, how schools are supported, how priorities are decided, and how reforms are instituted.

> The surgery class in the medical high school was in an old building lacking running water or toilets. The high school had been transferred there temporarily due to a reform trumpeted as helping Kosovo education meet 'European Standards' by aligning the grade structure of primary and secondary schools more closely with those in other European school systems. Accordingly, and for the first time ever, primary school in 2002-2003 was to include the ninth grade, one more year of primary than before. The implementation of the reform was announced just before the school year began, leaving primary schools and municipal education offices scrambling to find space for the ninth graders.
>
> Some of the resulting solutions created a domino effect, solving one problem while creating another in its wake. One town resolved the problem, for example, by shifting the ninth graders into facilities normally used by medical high-school teachers and students. This left the medical high school without a home. Indicative of its low prominence in the post-primary education scheme in Kosovo, the medical high school was split in two, with each half sharing space in other high-school buildings in town. The students and teachers from the medical high school that Sommers visited had to use the bathroom facilities in another school building nearby.

The schoolroom itself had windows along one wall. The walls were cream coloured and bare. An old, worn wood stove rested in one corner. It was not lit, even though autumn had arrived and the classroom was dank and cold, because the Education Ministry had yet to purchase firewood for schools in Kosovo in advance of generally severe winters. System administrators and teachers alike had already begun voicing their concern about the firewood issue. The classroom was jammed with old desks and chairs, and students had to wedge themselves between them to find a place to sit down. There were 41 students in the packed class, only five of whom were boys – a male-female ratio not unusual in medical high schools, the only schools in Kosovo where girls regularly outnumber boys. At the front of the class was a small table for the teacher and an empty blackboard – the only writing within view, in fact, were the initials 'PDK', a political party in Kosovo, scratched into the back of the door.

It was a review class. Students got out their exercise books containing notes from earlier class lectures. For 45 minutes, the teacher asked a series of general questions. Following each question, some students would raise their hands to answer. "What is the work of the nurse?" the teacher asked. "Who discovered penicillin?" she asked shortly afterwards. Most of the students in the front row had their hands up for every question, leaning towards their teacher with pleading eyes, hoping to be called on. Few in the back half of the classroom ever lifted their hands.

The student whom the teacher called upon would stand up and recite an answer rapidly. The information from each student's answer was all obtained, apparently, by memorizing notes in their exercise book. Nothing was demonstrated, everything was described, even the answer to "How does the nurse wash her hands?" The contents in the students' books were virtually identical, a result of students each recording everything that their teacher had written on the board during previous classes. No observed exercise books contained any figures or drawings inside, even though this was Surgery class.

By the end of the class, very few students in the back half of the class were paying attention. They talked among themselves. Conversations dimmed each time their teacher pleaded for quiet, then perked up again afterwards. It would have been difficult to hear what was said at the front of the class even if it had been quiet, however. After class, the teacher (who was actually a university medical student lacking training as a teacher) explained that "The students say they can't get the [Surgery textbook], so I recite the highlights in class." "That's how I teach," she said.

Over the course of the fieldwork period, five prominent issues surfaced that were directly related to the practice of education in Kosovo. All of them are influenced by the historical precedents and system structure that were analyzed in the previous two chapters. These five issues emphasize relationships between different actors in the education system. The first issue examines ideas of change and reform as they were defined by internationals and received by Kosovars. The second issue looks at gender and access concerns surfacing at medical high schools, and explores some of the values and views of educators and community members. The third issue investigates the difficult and seemingly intractable problem of Serbian education in Kosovo, examining the perspectives and agendas of a number of actors, including Kosovac Serb educators, UNMIK, the Yugoslav government in Belgrade, and Albanians in Kosovo's Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The fourth issue explores the challenges of handing over the responsibility and authority for education from UNMIK internationals to Kosovar education professionals, all of whom, at this stage, are members of Kosovo's majority Albanian community. The final issue considers relations between members of the centre of the system in Pristina and the constituent actors in schools and municipalities, and how Kosovo's emerging post-war education system appeared to school and municipal-level actors.

The push for reform

One of the most significant elements of the case of education in post-war Kosovo was the speed and breadth of its United Nations-led reform agenda. This movement towards reforming education in Kosovo inspired controversy and attracted criticism from some quarters, as may well be expected. It also received praise and achieved a great deal. In addition, the charge towards change was led for two years by a dominant individual: a foreigner at the helm of Kosovo's education system. What follows in this section is a review of the nature of UNMIK's unusual push for education reform.

As the Principal International Officer (PIO) of UNMIK's Department of Education and Science, Daxner was given considerable power to move forward and pursue his vision for education in Kosovo. "I had great support from my superiors, the Deputy SRSG and the SRSG," he explained when interviewed. One result was that "I could hire who I wanted, with some exceptions." Daxner's largely hand-picked team

proved useful in enacting sweeping changes in education but less useful in establishing continuity after he left.

In his final address, Daxner recalled that:

"We wanted to keep the [UNMIK] Department [of Education and Science] very lean. All experts, consultants, and the numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations were to be co-ordinated by Lead Agencies, which represented one strong partner in a specific field of reforms, and were under the general political direction of the Department, and operated with very little administrative or structural interference from the [Department of Education and Science] bureaucracy" (Daxner, 2002*b*: 7).

Specific sectors of educational activity were to be entrusted mainly to foreign organizations, among them: the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canadian NGO, Kosovo Educator Development Project (KEDP) for teacher training; the Kosovo Law Centre (an NGO created by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE), responsible for reforming the law faculty of the University of Pristina; GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), responsible for vocational education; and UNICEF, which was responsible for the important task of curriculum reform, in addition to other activities. The World Bank and the Council of Europe were also part of the mix, "acting as Lead Agencies and, at the same time, as key resources to leadership of the Department" (Daxner, 2002*b*: 7).[24]

The Lead Agency approach represented a different sort of development model, as it resembled a kind of corporate entity more than a traditional education ministry, with an executive decision-making branch that relied on allied organizations contracted to provide specific services.

24 On KEDP's web site, the current list of Lead Agencies is presented: Curriculum Development (UNICEF); Early Childhood Development (UNICEF); Special Needs/Inclusive Education (Finnish Support to the Development of Education Sector in Kosovo, or FSDEK); Vocational Education and Training (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, or GTZ); Teacher Training (CIDA and KEDP); Law Faculty Reform (Kosovo Law Centre, or KLC); Education Management Information System (EMIS) Project (World Bank); and Standards and Assessment Unit (FTP, funded by the World Bank) (KEDP Web site: "Education in Kosovo: Major Reforms" [http://www.kedp.ca/education_1.htm]).

The idea of the Lead Agency approach, an UNMIK official explained, was "not to exclude any of the locals and their experience, but to co-ordinate a multitude of players on the ground." An UNMIK briefing document, for example, described how "the Lead Agencies function as the intellectual and organizational leaders in their delegated area of expertise, are responsible for delivering products and procedures, co-operate with and co-ordinate responsibilities with other NGO[s] and experts" (UNMIK, 2002*b*: 11). At the same time, since the remodelled administrative structure reserved significant roles of non-Kosovar entities (UNMIK, UNICEF, GTZ, and so on), Kosovar education officials and organizations were not always featured actors in the reform movement. An excellent example of the successful integration of Kosovars in Lead Agency activities took place in UNICEF's Curriculum initiative. From the outset, UNICEF sought to involve and train Kosovar personnel, locate the curriculum reform work within the Department of Education and Science building, and facilitate a broad-based process of community involvement and consultation.

In other Lead Agency activities, however, one could identify the challenge of linking reform and local ownership, such as in the following description of vocational education in Kosovo. "The 'lead agency' or outsourcing approach for reform of vocational education," the author states, "is good in that it provides a framework for an independent and inclusive dialogue, consultation and development of concepts and options for vocational education reform." At the same time, the author noted, "progress on the VET [that is, vocational education training] Lead Agency has been slow," in part because "efforts at reform are essentially starting from scratch" (European Training Foundation, 2001: 23, 24).

In creating a new education framework, Daxner believed that the previous UNMIK system, known as DESK (Developing the Education System in Kosovo), which existed from December 1999 until May 2000, had been problematic in part because it incorporated the "old elites of the parallel system." His assessment of the parallel system is significant because it separates a sympathy for a struggle to educate children from the process of educational development:

"The way the parallel system functioned appealed to our emotions
and to our positive labelling of anything that has to do with education,
and not the basic effects of an education process, the teacher-pupil
interaction, to support the maturation of children and adolescents,
etc." (Daxner, 2002*b*: 3).

The parallel system, Daxner argued, did not promote equity, since "a
good portion" of the money raised "never reached education or was used
to provide a privileged and comfortable position for a minority of
functionaries and teachers." He also contended that "the quality of education
in the parallel system was deplorable" (2002*b*: 4). Finally, since "the parallel
system never changed the Yugoslavian structure" of education, it had to
be left behind. Modern ideas, structures, and frameworks had to be
imported. Daxner admitted in an interview that he was 'authoritarian' in
his management style. But he insisted that his philosophy and approach
were born out of necessity. He envisioned his role in modernizing Kosovo's
education system as similar to someone rescuing a drowning person. "You
grab the person by the neck and pull him to safety," he explained.

This view that education in Kosovo was drowning in the past and
required extensive system reform clashed with local ideas regarding system
change. This difference between reform and change is not mere wordplay.
"When I said reform," Daxner argued, "I meant from the beginning the
replacement of an old isolated form by a new one, which I always attached
to Europe." In turn, Daxner was concerned that when Kosovar educational
leaders spoke of change, there was a "danger of leaving the basic structures
as they were" (2002*b*: 5). This tension between foreigners seeking the
wholesale reform of a structure and veteran Kosovar education officials
seeking change within it was noted by others interviewed as well. To skirt
the potential intransigence and resistance to reform from local leaders,
UNMIK sought to recruit and develop a new set of Kosovar educationists.
As Daxner explained, "in the emergency phase [that is, soon after NATO's
entrance into Kosovo]" it was "already clear that a change of mindset in
the peers [in Kosovo] was needed, which meant that a change of elites
must become desirable" (2002*b*: 10).

The way in which UNMIK created space for reform inspired strong
responses. UNMIK sought to replace the Kosovar Albanians' parallel
education system, which had preserved the practice of education under the
pressure of often severe repression, with a new but largely unfamiliar

education system. In addition, UNMIK's educational leaders considered the education system emanating from the Yugoslav government, which Kosovac Serb educators sought to retain, as archaic and thus problematic, or what Daxner called "a Belgrade-directed continuation of the past" (2002*b*: 4). One can assume that UNMIK officials anticipated some of the subsequent criticism, given the legacy of resistance and self-preservation among both Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo. In any case, the response was to look ahead. Indeed, it appears that Daxner, in particular, sought to drive UNMIK's thrust towards education reform, and its attempt to break away from local tradition, with a sequence of bold public statements. Numerous Kosovars and internationals interviewed for this case study insisted on telling stories of Daxner's comments and speeches. A Kosovac Serbian school director recalled meeting Daxner, who "wanted to tell us what to do." An UNMIK official recalled that Daxner "used to speak his mind with everybody. He was abrasive, but his intentions were good." At the opening ceremony of one of the lead agencies in education, another UNMIK official recalled Daxner "condemning the local education system, saying that it had no quality," in his speech, with former parallel system officials present. The official concluded that "Daxner was right, but was that the way to create change?"

"Daxner was right." Everyone at the higher levels of the education system seemed to have an opinion about Michael Daxner. Some internationals were devoted to him. "What accomplishments you see in the education system here," one insisted, "are due to Daxner." "The most misunderstood notion about Michael Daxner is that he excluded people and even insulted them," said another. "He was an unstoppable presence," a third added, "a bull moving ahead." The same official also considered him "bombastic, courageous, and visionary."

Most Kosovar Albanian educators who were interviewed backed UNMIK's push to reform Kosovo's education system. But their own part in enacting reforms was often less clear. One University of Pristina faculty member recalled Daxner's first meeting there:

> "Daxner was emotional and lecturing. He alienated nearly everyone except a handful of professors, including myself. We were definitely for changes, so we supported him. Daxner tried to construct a building from the roof. He should have started with the foundation."

Another faculty member added:

"UNMIK said Albanians couldn't help because they didn't know where UNMIK was going. [UNMIK's] system was not one we knew. Their idea was different, modern. But they didn't share it, and if we couldn't understand the new system, how could UNMIK show us the way? They didn't introduce it to us."

While the issue of handing over UNMIK's system will be discussed shortly, it is useful to note that a disconnect between foreign reformers and Kosovar practitioners was evident to many. While UNMIK was vigorously pushing for change, many Kosovars interviewed were generally supportive but unsure of their role. At any rate, pushing ahead was, in the view of many UNMIK officials, the only way to make a break with an educational tradition that had seemingly been frozen in time for decades. "I wrote editorials and I gave speeches. I was honest," Daxner explained. In addition, his tendency to publicly and privately 'dish out challenges', as another international official characterized it, certainly inspired much talk in Kosovo about education, reform, and Michael Daxner.

To begin to understand Michael Daxner's brand of reformist fervour, it is useful to reflect on six contextual issues.

First, UNMIK assembled a solid array of achievements since the creation of the Lead Agency framework in 2000. A number of UNMIK's accomplishments began before and were continued during Daxner's tenure, such as the rebuilding of school facilities, producing and distributing textbooks, and raising the prominence of special needs and minority education. Daxner's final speech as PIO listed still other important developments which took place within the Lead Agency framework, including: developing a child-centred curriculum framework, introducing new teaching practices, reforming long-standing education structures, and elaborating a visionary education law (Daxner, 2002*b*).

Second, a number of UNMIK officials related that they believed they had no alternative to initiating dramatic education reforms in Kosovo. An UNMIK official insisted that "You couldn't build anything" on the existing education systems and their officials. In the field of education, UNMIK should simply "support the relative value of education itself," an approach that would largely set aside the existing structure and standards

of Kosovar education and allow for the development of a largely new framework for education in Kosovo. In addition, another official asserted that "DESK was going nowhere." In its place, "the Lead Agency concept was conceived and initiated to unify, strengthen and give direction to the needed reforms identified by DESK itself." As for UNMIK's leadership role, and Daxner's in particular, one international official asked, "Might it not have been necessary to have a strong European leader in a post-conflict situation where a tattered system was yearning for European recognition and inclusion?"

Third, the ability of an outside entity to lead a broad reform movement had little precedent, in Kosovo or anywhere else. This situation was directly derived from the nature and extent of UNMIK's power in Kosovo. The United Nations filled the governance vacuum in Kosovo beginning in June 1999, following NATO's entrance and the Serb army's retreat. To this day, with Kosovo's political status unresolved and a legacy of ethnic violence in its recent and ancient past, the SRSG's office remains the ultimate authority in Kosovo. Even with a democratically elected, representative government in place, "laws passed by the Kosovo legislature are invalid without [SRSG] Mr Steiner's signature" (Trofimov, 2003: A4). The example of a foreigner atop of the government system in Kosovo, as previously discussed, has little precedent anywhere else in recent times (Yannis, 2001). Similarly, the position of the PIO of UNMIK's Department of Education and Science represented a situation – a foreigner at the helm of an education system – that may have only had the United Nations regime in East Timor as a parallel in the world (Chopra 2000, Yannis 2001). The opportunity for Michael Daxner, as PIO, to lead the reform of Kosovo's education system, was almost unique.

Fourth, the veteran parallel system leadership was under direct attack. Daxner publicly accused the education system as being plagued by corruption (others did so privately).[25] Part and parcel of the problem, in Daxner's view, were the 'pre-war' elites in charge, who carried with them "paternalistic and parochial attitudes" that recall Yugoslavia's

---

25 Some critics of UNMIK, in turn, "point to a corruption scandal at KEK, the UNMIK-run electricity monopoly, as evidence of a lack of accountability in the [UNMIK] administration" (Trofimov, 2003: A4).

communist era and routinely exclude "young and female members of society" (Daxner, 2002*b*: 14). Daxner also charged these leaders with being central to what he considered "the main obstacles for change" in Kosovo education: "old systems … built on fear and top down rules; methodological backwardness;" and "discrimination of girls and women" (2002*b*: 12).

Fifth, Daxner related that the many changes he was advocating, and the forceful style he employed to press change ahead, took place in the highly emotive field of education, while communities were in the process of recovering from traumatic experiences during the war years. As he recalled, internationals working in education (that is, UNMIK and its Lead Agency colleagues) "only realized much later that the collective traumas [of Kosovars] were well hidden, but [were] nevertheless heavily influencing the attitudes and behaviour of people" (Daxner, 2002*b*: 9).

Sixth, the push to bring 'European Standards' to Kosovo's education system was being led by UNMIK's highest ranking education officials, most of whom were themselves Europeans. UNMIK promulgated the need to incorporate an array of standards and objectives designed to more directly connect education in Kosovo with education systems, regulations, and procedures in Western Europe. While this drive appeared to be broadly supported by Kosovar educators, Albanians in particular, the apparently vast distance between present Kosovar education realities and European standards left some feeling inadequate. Attaining those standards seemed near to impossible. One Albanian teacher, for example, reflected that "We're only two million people [in Kosovo]. How can we reach the high [European] standard right away?" For others, the emotions surrounding 'reaching Europe' inspired a defensive posture. Some Kosovar educators who were interviewed believed that UNMIK internationals did not consider them well trained or particularly qualified to do their work. Even if their teaching methods were different and perhaps even antiquated, they said, they were nonetheless experts in the subjects they taught. This sentiment was particularly strong among Kosovac Serbian teachers who were interviewed.

Gender and access: the case of medical high schools

The tradition of girls dropping out of school before reaching the secondary level has deep roots in Kosovo. Writing in 1982, Georgeoff (1982: 5) observed that educational development in Kosovo (in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina)

"has been, perhaps, the slowest of all" in Yugoslavia, particularly among Muslims. He also stated that "education for [girls and] women was almost totally neglected until the communists came to power after the Second World War". Even after the change of regimes, "most girls from Moslem families initially did not attend more than the first two or three grades". In Kosovo, while most families are Muslim, the tradition of favouring boys over girls in post-primary education opportunities continues, and does not seem to correspond with religious affiliation. It is simply widespread. Recent statistics bear out this tendency. While girls constitute 48 per cent of Kosovo's primary-school student population (Pupovci *et al.*, 2001: 27), in secondary schools "female drop-out is more common" (Andersson *et al.*, 2001: 15). Only 42 per cent of the secondary-school student population are girls (Andersson *et al.*, 2001: 26). The drop-off is thought to be most common among girls from rural households, who "are likely to be the first victims of economic circumstances and will be withdrawn from schools if parents are unable to afford schooling for all their children" (Davies, 1999: 15-16).

Given the notable drop-off in female enrolment, particularly among girls from rural homes, an examination of Kosovo's medical high schools is useful. The three medical high-school directors who were interviewed all reported that about 80 per cent of all medical high-school students were female. There are serious questions about the relevance of the education provided in the medical high schools in Kosovar Albanian areas, and the school directors are concerned about reforms that would either marginalize or close their schools. One municipal education official explained that UNMIK and the Ministry "are planning to close the medical high schools." Both UNMIK and Ministry officials denied this, although they noted that significant reforms are under discussion.

There are a host of different high-school options in Kosovo. The chief ones are general (or 'gymnasium'), medical, technical (vocational) and economic (also referred to as business administration). There are also agricultural schools, in which students can study specific programmes such as dairy farming and butchery (one school director explained that girls are trained to work in butcher's shops while boys are prepared to work in meat-processing plants). The enrolment for these schools, with the exception of medical high schools, is overwhelmingly male. Out-of-school youths, young men in particular, can partake in a diversity of

programming at youth centres, although the quality and availability of such offerings differ by region and municipality.[26]

The main reported purpose of medical high schools is to prepare students to become nurses (some of the boys are interested in seeking careers as, for example, medical or dental technicians, or physical therapists). Medical high-school graduates may attend a three-year nursing school programme or pursue other medical positions. Graduating from a medical high school, however, does not seem to be a requirement for students planning to attend medical school. Although it occurs, students graduating from 'gymnasium' high schools can also study medicine at the university level. The social purposes of a medical high-school education, however, are much more diverse, and suggest an understanding of the relevance of education among Kosovars expanding far beyond employment concerns. Excepting Kosovac Serb schools in northern Kosovo, relatively few Kosovar high-school students are reportedly able to find work after graduation, regardless of which school they attend. The best opportunities, education officials explained, were available to technical high-school graduates, and even those may be meagre.

In Kosovar Albanian communities, a medical high-school director explained, medical high schools are significant for two reasons. First, it is not uncommon for girls who have graduated from primary school, particularly those from rural areas, to be presented with two options: 'either get into a medical high school or remain at home'. Second, parents clearly understand that a job may not be waiting for their daughters when they graduate from a medical high school. But the skills and knowledge gained at a medical high school are considered useful regardless of the employment situation. Unemployed graduates can still apply their medical knowledge and skills to 'help their families' as daughters, wives and mothers. This idea of medical high-school graduates becoming family and community health workers became particularly significant during what some Kosovar Albanians referred to as the 'war years' (1990-1999). As a medical high-school director recalled, "Medical high-school student graduates had a high status during the war because of their ability to aid others." Girls with medical high-school degrees aided

---

26 An excellent resource for examining youth concerns in Kosovo is *Making the choice for a better life: promoting the protection and capacity of Kosovo's youth* by Jane Lowicki, published by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, New York, 2001.

those injured during the war, while in flight to refugee camps, and following their return to Kosovo.

For at least some Kosovar Albanian families, then, a medical high-school education constituted an important social asset for female graduates. Among education leaders in Pristina, however, the medical high schools were thought to be outdated, poorly equipped, not cost-effective, and fairly irrelevant, particularly since there already was a plethora of trained but unemployed nurses in Kosovo. As one UNMIK official reported, "The Ministry [of Education, Science and Technology] wants to change the medical high schools because there are already too many nurses." Cutbacks in investment and enrolment levels for medical high schools appear to be in the works. A MEST official cited a Ministry of Heath study reporting that "Medical high-school graduates aren't good enough to get jobs [in nursing], so the recommendation was to close the schools until changes in the curriculum were made." The official also recalled that UNMIK education leaders had wanted to close the medical high schools, again citing their irrelevance. Given the popularity and social significance of medical high schools for female students, the impact of this move on girls' enrolment in secondary school is potentially both negative and significant.

The situation for students at the medical high school in North Mitrovica, the only one located in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo, was remarkably different. There, while the proportion of female students was similar (80 per cent), the ratio of applicants to openings at the school is two to one, half that in the medical high school in the Kosovar Albanian-dominated area of Djakova, where it is four to one. The lower demand is significant but remained unexplained, because graduates from the Serb school "can get a job right away" following graduation, according to one education official. In both North Mitrovica and Djakova, youth unemployment is extremely high. Graduates from the medical school, however, are not limited by Kosovo's borders in their quest for opportunities. Unlike their Albanian counterparts to the south, they can search for jobs, or attend university, within Yugoslavia as well.

The Serbian challenge

Crossing the bridge from South to North Mitrovica, made famous because it became the epicentre of Albanian-Serb hatred and distress long after NATO's bombs had stopped falling, still has the feel of entering a

war zone. French KFOR soldiers on the bridge are heavily armed. The deeply embittered and politicized 'Bridgewatchers' eye all intruders crossing into North Mitrovica. This Serb part of town is tense. Armed KFOR patrols still stand at downtown intersections, and convoys clot the narrow highways heading towards the Serbian borderlands. The language, of course, is different from the one heard in South Mitrovica, and so is the currency – Yugoslav dinars. They are a symbol both of the Kosovac Serbs' allegiance to the government that can still formally claim hegemony over Kosovo and their resistance to UNMIK, KFOR and Kosovar Albanians, who all use Euros. Still, it is easy to appreciate the Serbs' strong sense that, in the areas north of the bridge in Mitrovica and in Serb enclaves as well, the land is occupied by foreign victors.

Serbs and Serbian education remain explosive touchpoints for Kosovar Albanians. "We share nothing with the Serbs," one particularly defiant Albanian teacher declared, "not history, not culture, not language – nothing. All we know is how to be repressed by them." "Albanians have more humanity than Serbs," another stated, "because an Albanian cannot kill a child or a pregnant woman." "The internationals [UNMIK and KFOR] are only protecting Serbs," a third asserted. "They are forcing us to accept Serb criminals."

Serbs, in turn, have their own volatile views. "The problem is that Albanian families raise their children to hate all Serbs," one argued. "The Serbs do believe one thing," another contended. "The international community doesn't want to create peace in Kosovo." "The Albanians only won because they received help from the Americans," a third complained. And so on. The comments from both sides often seem especially designed to incite an emotional outburst from their ethnic antagonists.

Education in Kosovo is enmeshed in politics and emotion, but none more so than the question of education for Serbs. The situation directly involved the government that was chased out of Kosovo (in this case, Belgrade's Ministry of Education) and the international actors who replaced them: NATO and UNMIK. It is an uncomfortable relationship, made all the more uncomfortable by the fact that the Serbs' adversaries, Kosovar Albanians, run the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in Kosovo. Retaining an allegiance to the curriculum and policies emanating from Belgrade is thus a highly political act. Openly doing otherwise –

working with MEST officials on education issues – is, at least politically, unthinkable, as it is a sign that Serbs are being controlled by their enemy.

With education still a toxic cocktail involving Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs at perpetual loggerheads, UNMIK remained mired in the middle with a particularly thankless task. Inclusion, never an easy matter in post-war situations, has proven especially difficult in Kosovo, and represented the most difficult challenge that UNMIK education officials faced there. As one UNMIK official observed, "Kouchner [the first UNMIK SRSG] said that all schools should be multi-ethnic. Not one is yet." Another noted that "There is no interaction between Albanians and Serbs [in Kosovo]. Not at all. It's really carried to an extreme here. The internationals are supposed to reconcile the two groups, but it's not working. There is no real mixing anywhere." An UNMIK document stated the situation plainly: "The education system is still divided between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb" (UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Field Office for Education, Science and Technology, 2002: 1).

Relations between UNMIK and Serbs might be characterized as UNMIK's forceful persuasion meeting the Serbs' unyielding resistance. Nothing appeared to be easy or relaxed. On the UNMIK side, as one official explained, "We have to show there is a[n UNMIK] government." In the view of an UNMIK official, the northernmost part of Kosovo (that is, in the Serb-dominated area including and to the north of North Mitrovica) is similar to:

> "the Southern part of Serbia. So, for Kosovac Serbs, their authority is Belgrade, which is present in North Mitrovica. This is the structure UNMIK needs to break. You can get a Yugoslav driver's licence in Mitrovica, and there are Yugoslav dinars. It is, for [Kosovac] Serbs, Southern Serbia."

Kosovac Serbs, as a result, refuse to recognize the primacy of UNMIK and Kosovo's Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). UNMIK's ability to persuade them otherwise is exceedingly limited.

One can see in this Serbian, and Belgrade government, response a denial of UNMIK's victory and a struggle to ensure that their defeat was not complete. But it is actually even more complicated than that. The Serbs' response is a curious mixture of pronounced defiance, fierce political

confrontation, and sadness to the point of resignation. Attitudes of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs over some education issues could not be more polarized. One prominent issue concerns reform. Unlike generally strong Albanian expressions of the need for change, many Serbian educators who were interviewed contended that no change – none – was required until the Ministry of Education in Belgrade ordered it. "I have to tell you the truth," one Serbian school director stated. "Our education system is one of the world's most developed." "We don't want to be brainwashed" [by UNMIK-approved teacher trainings], a Serbian teacher contended. "All our teachers have been fully trained and have passed their teacher certification exams. So why would they need to be trained by UNMIK?" KEDP, the Lead Agency charged with teacher training, has only recently begun efforts to break through Serbian barriers and attempt to stage training for them. It will not be easy. As one Serb educator intoned, "We don't need any education from [UNMIK], we just need security and safety to allow us to work!"

In addition, agreeing to work with UNMIK, and, by extension, the Kosovar Albanian-dominated government, is widely considered a traitorous act. There is reportedly considerable political pressure to resist working with UNMIK. Everything that UNMIK does on education for the Serbs, accordingly, is perceived as an act of establishing their hegemony, and thus the hegemony of Kosovar Albanians as well, over Serbs. Serbian resistance to UNMIK's entreaties is thus mixed with the fact that nearly every Serb educator interviewed made it clear that the Serbs had lost the war. Kosovar Albanians won, they explained, and NATO and UNMIK were seen as their undeniable allies. Taken together, as one educator summed it up, "Albanians are the real winners, and we are the real losers."

By implication, then, Kosovac Serbs are only aligned with and supported by the defeated Yugoslav government in Belgrade. As one Serb leader observed, "We all want to be closer to Belgrade; we're not divided on that issue. But some Serbs believe they should not pull away entirely from Kosovo, that Serbs should participate in institutions here." And then, the leader added a qualifier on this involvement with Kosovar/UNMIK institutions: "as long as Kosovo is an autonomous region in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not independent." It is a stance that no Kosovar Albanian politician could accept and survive, and hardly a perspective that any Kosovar Albanian could publicly pronounce, even if they did agree. The stalemate continues.

It would not be an exaggeration to describe Serb enclaves within Kosovo as islands of fear. The surrounded Serbian villages are regularly patrolled by KFOR troops. They commute to other Serb enclaves, sometimes across fields and farms to avoid notice from Albanians. A few visit Kosovar Albanian-dominated towns and cities. But mostly, they sit. Unemployment is widespread. Surrounded by Kosovar Albanians generally perceived as hostile (the feeling appears to be mutual), Kosovac Serbs in enclave villages have very little to do. According to UNMIK, Albanian and Serb informants, their purpose, in political terms, is to remain within Kosovo and so maintain the Serbs' claim to the territory. Shackled with limitations, their day-to-day purpose is far less clear.

Serbs in enclaves have considerably less power and freedom than their counterparts north of Mitrovica. The communities are small, and in most cases, they are dwindling. Young Serbs from the enclave villages are known to migrate to Serbia in search of work. It appears that joining the Serbian army is common. It may be the only employment opportunity they can find there. Interviews with Serb residents in two enclaves suggested that the credibility of international workers is questioned. "The same person from UNMIK never comes twice," one teacher related. "The reason we distrust the foreigners [in general]," another added, "is that they come to hear our problems and then nothing is done." Similar sentiments were expressed by Serbs living north of Mitrovica as well.

An entire study could be devoted to this case of educational apartheid in Kosovo's Serb Bantustans. Here, two central concerns will be addressed, both of which, not surprisingly, are directly tied to politics. The first addresses the controversial and highly emotive (apparent) compromise over Kosovac Serb teacher and school-director salaries. The second briefly reviews UNMIK's complicated struggle to influence education for Kosovac Serbs through political negotiations.

Salaries and symbolism

The conflict over teacher salaries is about political control. UNMIK cannot really influence educators in Serbian areas if they are not on UNMIK, and now, MEST, payrolls. The Ministry of Education in Belgrade pays all Kosovac Serb teachers double their ordinary salaries. This is done, Serbian educators explained, because they view working in Kosovo a hardship posting. It is also done, UNMIK officials related, to keep them

in Kosovo. In addition, if Kosovac Serb teachers receive salaries from Belgrade, it certifies their allegiance to Belgrade's Ministry of Education and its commitment to implement Yugoslav education policies and curricula. It is an act of preservation: preserving pre-war ties between Kosovac Serbs and Belgrade, and preserving traditional Yugoslav education in Kosovo.

UNMIK's reforms and Lead Agency strategy thus had no place in the professional lives of Kosovac Serbian educators. But its money did. A strong effort was made to persuade Serbian teachers and school directors to accept UNMIK salaries like all other teachers in Kosovo. In the end, after a round or two of stops and starts, the teachers and school directors accepted money from UNMIK, with one caveat: that they could still accept their double salary from the Ministry of Education in Belgrade at the same time. The battle over Kosovac Serb educators' hearts had begun, and it was proving profitable. "Serbian salaries are better," one school director explained. In addition,

> "UNMIK keeps putting pressure on us to give up the Belgrade salary. But our reason we don't is that the UNMIK salary is only 130 Euros. We get 370 Euros from Belgrade. If UNMIK offered more, we would of course give up the Belgrade salaries."

Approximately 500 Euros per month [the precise amount was debated by UNMIK and Serb officials] is more than three times the salary of other teachers in Kosovo. For many Kosovar Albanian educators interviewed, it clearly and unquestionably demonstrated UNMIK's favouritism towards Serbs. Serb teachers defended the double payment with a variety of explanations. For all of those interviewed, it was entirely justified. For many, UNMIK's payment recognized the hardship caused by displacement. As one educator noted, "Yes, we receive two salaries. But I'm an IDP." Even so, defiance coloured their analyses. "It's not a salary for us, only a small amount," another Serb educator noted. "UNMIK is paying us to make us obey them, to control us."

The irony involved in this arrangement is that most of UNMIK's supplemental Serbian salaries are now bankrolled by Kosovar Albanian taxpayers. As one international adviser explained,

> "The Albanians are paying taxes for Serb teachers who are already double paid [by the Belgrade government]. UNMIK is now only

putting in 5 per cent of Kosovo's education budget. This Serbian subsidy is unsustainable, and it's paid for by Albanian taxpayers."

In the end, it is unclear the degree to which the salary issue has secured UNMIK's influence over Serbian education and its corps of educators. Belgrade's Ministry of Education remains a formidable adversary.

Belgrade

Belgrade's stranglehold over education issues in Kosovac Serb areas appears to be nearly complete. The Yugoslav representative for the Ministry of Education based in North Mitrovica, one UNMIK official admitted, "runs education in Serbian areas." He received no argument from the representative himself. "We provide [Kosovac Serb] teachers with a service. The main role is to help them run their subjects, plan, and develop their skills." Connections between schools and the Yugoslav Ministry were also assured, since "All schools [in Serb areas] have bank accounts where the Ministry of Education deposits money" for salaries. Serbian schools in Kosovo will also shift their grade structure to include a ninth primary-school grade for the 2003/2004 academic year, matching the reform that took place in other Kosovar schools beginning in 2002. The prospect of this reform in Yugoslavia, and thus the Kosovac Serbian areas as well, is a victory of sorts for UNMIK. But it is a victory achieved indirectly, since it will take place at the behest of Belgrade's education ministry. Some UNMIK officials credit UNMIK with influencing this reform for all schools in Yugoslavia, in addition to Serbian schools in Kosovo.

The method of influencing Serbian schools by negotiating with the Ministry of Education in Belgrade is an approach that UNMIK's education team accelerated during Michael Daxner's tenure. Indeed, it was one that, according to many international education officials, absorbed a considerable amount of attention among high-level UNMIK education officials. The negotiations no doubt required such devotion, but the symbolism of such a time investment had, almost inevitably, a downside. The belief that UNMIK favoured Serbs appeared to be widely felt by Albanians (Serbs strongly believed the reverse), which may not be especially surprising in a situation where being seen as impartial appeared to be virtually unattainable.

According to interviews with many international officials, UNMIK's negotiations with Belgrade primarily involved a small team of high-level UNMIK education officials. Officials interviewed about this process indicated that they did not often include Kosovar Albanian contributions or involvement, and even months after UNMIK's handover of control to Kosovo's new education ministry, Kosovar Albanian ministry officials appeared to be working the margins of this issue. The reasons for this were hotly debated. To some Kosovar Albanian officials, the situation was uncalled for. They ran the Ministry, and Kosovac Serbs, they argued, were part of their responsibility. UNMIK retained responsibility for Serbian issues on the grounds that it remained a core part of their minority protection responsibility in Kosovo. How this delicate and difficult process of including Albanian officials on Serbian issues will proceed over time is unclear, but interview data suggested that some of the UNMIK officials did not feel they could yet include some of their high-ranking Albanian counterparts on this issue. Serbian issues still seemed too emotional, too explosive. As one UNMIK official observed, "We are just beginning to see a nascent willingness, or ability, for the Kosovar Albanian majority in power to become involved in Serbian education issues." The suggestion that Albanians were not yet prepared to handle Serbian issues, in turn, rankled if not infuriated some Albanian education officials in the Ministry, who questioned the capabilities of some UNMIK personnel involved with Serbian issues and were offended by what they felt was disrespect. It probably did not help matters that the Serbian question proved emotive not just for the people of Kosovo but for some UNMIK officials as well.

Some distance may have been necessary between the two groups of education colleagues, who shared the same building and in many cases the same offices, on such a potentially explosive issue. But the distance between the two groups on this issue was definite. At a meeting to discuss questions of Serbian school directors in the autumn of 2002, for example, chaired and hosted by UNMIK officials working on Serb issues, invited Albanian education officials declined (perhaps intentionally) to attend. The meeting then simply proceeded without them.

Negotiations with the Yugoslav Ministry of Education in Belgrade centred around the development of a so-called 'Joint Document' during 2000-2002. The research team was unable to examine the details of the document. Its title is revealing: it featured negotiations between UNMIK

and Belgrade's Ministry of Education. Neither Kosovar Albanians nor Kosovac Serbs were directly involved.[27] The contents were focused, in the view of one UNMIK official involved, on "avoiding a parallel system" of education for Kosovac Serbs. From the Kosovar Albanian and UNMIK perspective, this term seemed appropriate, since the Kosovac Serbs were tied to a separate education system. Moreover, the presence of a Yugoslav Ministry of Education office in North Mitrovica constituted, in the eyes of one UNMIK official, "Belgrade in Kosovo." But for many Serbs, their system hardly seemed a parallel one, since it was the same one they had always belonged to. It was also the one that displaced Kosovac Serbs residing in Serbia and Montenegro were using. Accordingly, some Serb officials argued, changing the Kosovac Serb curriculum to one emanating from Pristina would marginalize displaced Kosovac Serb students living elsewhere. As one Serbian education official observed, "People want all Kosovac Serbs to get the same curriculum – the Belgrade curriculum."

The Joint Document attempted to address a host of controversial and unresolved issues, including how (and which) teachers and school directors would be appointed, which curriculum would be used in Kosovac Serb schools, and how the Mitrovica university question might be addressed. Agreement appeared near in June 2002, when a delegation of UNMIK officials met with Yugoslav Ministry of Education officials in Belgrade.[28] In the end, unity on the Yugoslav side did not hold together. UNMIK officials were deeply disappointed. As one recalled with resignation, the Joint Document "would have been the Bible of the day" for education issues involving Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

A novel approach of linking Kosovac Serbs with Kosovar Albanians on education issues has arisen. It appears to be working. Led by UNMIK's office in Mitrovica Region, the Mitrovica Regional Education Board (MREB) is not officially a part of UNMIK's education system or MEST.

---

27 One UNMIK official illustrated this tendency with the following comment: "UNMIK didn't share information openly about Serb education policy with Kosovar Serbs or Albanians."

28 The Kosovar Albanian Minister for Education, Science and Technology, Rexhep Osmani, was invited but declined, reportedly citing the lack of precedent for such a visit: if the leaders of Yugoslavia and Kosovo had yet to meet, how could he visit Belgrade?

Instead, it is connected to UNMIK's Regional Administrator for Mitrovica. The MREB meets with UNMIK officials, but it gives its members – Kosovac Serb leaders based in northern Kosovo – the chance to learn about and comment on issues arising in MEST. "It's an advisory board with no executive authority," an UNMIK official explained. The MREB contains advantages for both sides. For the Albanians leading MEST, it allows them "to get into the Serb schools," at least to some degree. For Kosovac Serb education leaders, the MREB "gives them the possibility to screen and comment on decisions coming from MEST." For both sides, the UNMIK official continued, it provides the chance for some co-ordination and mutual accommodation, since "if the MREB puts their stamp of approval" on a policy coming from MEST, "it'll fly with Serb educators." In effect, the MREB provides Albanian and Serb educators with an indirect communication channel.

The future of the education of Kosovac Serbs is perhaps more uncertain than ever, since, in the view of one UNMIK official, "the [UNMIK] internationals, don't have the power any more" over Serbian issues. MEST leaders do, at least formally, although in practice many Ministry responsibilities conflict with UNMIK minority protection responsibilities. The future of negotiating Serb issues, and who will lead it, in other words, remains unresolved. In the meantime, the promising MREB mechanism may eventually create a way for UNMIK, Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs to work together.

Handover politics

While UNMIK formally handed over responsibility and authority for education in Kosovo to the MEST on 4 March 2002, the actual process of handover was never going to be easy. The education agenda for reform was too broad, the time-frame too short, and the capacity-building needs too great. Some of the contributing factors that made this process unusually difficult, however, require examination.

First, the combination of a narrow time-frame for implementing UNMIK-led reforms appeared to leave little time for patient mentoring and careful capacity-building work. UNMIK officials were preoccupied. Descriptions of the management style at the top of the education system resembled the sort of action-oriented operations that commonly surface during humanitarian emergencies. "We're doing reform and handover at

the same time. That's the problem," one UNMIK official commented. "It's all chaos." As a consequence, many education officials who were interviewed reported that Albanians in UNMIK's Department of Education and Science were subordinate. Many believed that the 'co-head' titles created for Kosovars working in UNMIK's Department were accurate in name only. "UNMIK education had a militarist command structure," one high-level international official observed. Many Kosovar officials suggested that UNMIK comprised a "parallel system of its own," an idea that some UNMIK officials also agreed was the case.

Not everyone agreed with this depiction. One official, for example, commented that UNMIK's achievements took place "with very significant local inclusion and consultation." Nonetheless, an international official recalled how "There were only 15 central administration staff who were locals" in UNMIK's Department of Education and Science prior to handover, "and none had any responsibility." The official concluded that "Kosovar Albanians were just pushing papers." Some UNMIK officials that had worked in the pre-handover Department of Education and Science were upset by the power relations that prevailed. One, for example, recalled how:

"The Kosovars were totally excluded. It was unfair. The Albanians were in rooms without computers or telephones. People were saying that they couldn't do the work, but how could they do it with nothing? UNMIK was doing reform, but they weren't showing reform, or working on reform, with Albanians."

The same official characterized a view held by many UNMIK international staff members who were interviewed, of the parallel system that suggests a low regard that UNMIK generally had for the skills, and even the motivation, of their Albanian counterparts:

"We assumed that there was no education here [during the parallel system era]. But there was, and it worked. Why didn't we use their skills? UNMIK only used people from the parallel system as translators."

To be sure, good relations between some UNMIK and Kosovar officials did exist. However, interviews with many leading officials suggested that this perspective constituted an exception to a broader general

trend. In addition, it was not only Kosovars who felt excluded. Some internationals, those working beyond the Department of Education and Science's headquarters in particular, also expressed feelings of being marginalized. In the end, one UNMIK official admitted ruefully, "UNMIK parallelism is what has really hurt us."

Second, it was unclear whether every UNMIK education official was prepared to hand over authority. The power to create and nourish a new education system was exciting, and for some international officials, the job felt unfinished. Some Kosovar officials also maintained that UNMIK was handing over responsibility for education in Kosovo before the reform processes were complete. "UNMIK's mistake was to pull out too soon," an UNMIK official observed. "We had a chance to lead a new society, and we let it go too soon." This is a remarkably revealing comment, because it contains the notion that an influential yet tiny group of foreign civil servants could drive social change in Kosovo. Another UNMIK official put the post-handover situation more plainly. "Our job is implementing, but we can't implement: it's not our job anymore," the official explained. As a result of the handover process, "Things are falling back already." The same official later noted, with some resignation, that "I liked it better when we [that is, UNMIK] were in charge."

Third, relations were reportedly poor, in general, between incoming Albanian Ministry officials and UNMIK officials who were expected to step aside. For one thing, a belief that the parallel education system had been plagued by corruption regularly arose during interviews about parallel education with both Kosovars and internationals, the latter in particular. Michael Daxner's final speech catalogued what he asserted were different kinds of corruption in the system, including:

> "You can buy: examinations, grades, degrees, the right class for your children, the right teacher ... You can avoid: relegation, low grades, the wrong class for your children, endless repetitions of an examination ..." (Daxner, 2002*b*: 13).

Daxner also said in his speech that "All this has a traceable tradition," "there was never a real break with the past," and "there was no exchange of elites" following NATO's arrival (2002*b*: 14). These statements suggested that Kosovo's education leaders were corrupt, or at least were heirs to a corrupt system. Allegations of corruption were also directed at

Michael Daxner, and the swirl of ensuing controversy appeared to inflame an already challenging situation. There were certainly reports of exceptions to this tendency – some officials on both sides of the international-Albanian divide were quick to point out allies, and even friends, on the other. But what became apparent through accounts of the early handover period was that handover was complicated by stories of accusations and counter-accusations. It was widely described as a difficult time. Months later, the atmosphere in the MEST building remained tense. The impact of the handover process on rooting out, much less eradicating, corruption is less clear.

The training of Kosovar education officials in preparation for handover formally took place through a specific initiative, the Ministry Empowerment Project (MEP). This project was instituted to provide approximately four months of training for Kosovars who would assume authority in the new Ministry for Education, Science and Technology. Funded by the World Bank, UNMIK's Department of Education and Science instituted this project several months in advance of handover. "The core training focused on English, computer skills, education management and law and governance for the education system in Kosovo," one official who was involved in the training related. The training was full-time, was led by Kosovar professors, and trained up to 40 Kosovar professionals. Issues of planning, evaluation, and interactive learning were featured components of this work.

The impact of this proactive training initiative is debated. Internal evaluations suggested that the trainings were quite successful. Others disagreed. "It provided just some courses in English and computer training. It wasn't enough," one MEST official explained. At the same time, there was a widespread belief, among Albanian and international officials, that the technical capacity of Kosovar education administrators needed considerable enhancement. "Albanians don't have a tradition of sound public management," one international official stated. "We were trained in the previous system of education," a Kosovar official explained, "in the old approach, for a closed, Communist system. Now, we are in a new system." However imperfect, the attempt to train a significant number of local professionals represented an important effort that involved a number of local and international organizations.

The central problem associated with the training programme appeared to be political, not technical. Those Kosovars assuming authority in MEST viewed the MEP trainees as UNMIK allies, not theirs. "Politically, the MEP was a disaster," one international official recalled. The incoming Minister disapproved of the list of those who had been trained, since the trainees had been selected by UNMIK and not by his incoming staff. A stand-off ensued: although all trainee graduates anticipated receiving a job in the Ministry, only half would be allowed to receive postings. The uncertainty and debate surrounding this issue fed the already tense atmosphere in the main Pristina building where UNMIK and MEST officials were working. Eventually, MEP trainees were either absorbed or withdrew themselves from consideration.

While the technical training programme was thought to be a capacity-building exercise, there were few corresponding reports of effective mentoring and one-on-one capacity-building between UNMIK education officials and their Kosovar counterparts, some of which were called 'co-heads'. The co-head title, in fact, was widely thought to be something of a misnomer, since many contended that Co-Heads had minimal power or authority in UNMIK's Department of Education and Science. There were exceptions to this tendency, however. One Kosovar official, for example, worked with an UNMIK official in a regional office where relations, in the official's view, were productive. In this situation, capacity building occurred over time. "The best kind of training takes place when people don't know it's going on," the official related. It featured participatory exchanges – a concept stressed in the reformed curriculum framework as well. Listening to Kosovars mattered, in the official's view, because it developed trust between Kosovars and the UNMIK expert. As a result, the UNMIK official was seen as "compassionate," while, at the same time, "he gave support and built confidence."

The institution of the ninth grade curriculum reform underscored how some of the efforts meant to assure proper handover from UNMIK to its Kosovar successors failed to go as planned. The reform was instituted for the 2002/2003 academic year, and has, from the perspective of school directors, teachers, and a host of education-system officials, not gone particularly well. While this process is detailed in *Chapter 3*, a brief look at the level of UNMIK and MEST interactions and decisions illuminates how the fairly negative early returns on this difficult yet potentially important process came to pass. An international official close to the

curriculum process noted that UNICEF's curriculum experts recommended that grades 1 through 5 should be reformed first, followed by grades 6 through 9 and then grades 10 through 12. To facilitate this process, experts from the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia were recruited to help lead the curriculum reform process for grades 1-5.[29] This arrangement took place just prior to handover, was supported and even praised by several international officials who were interviewed, yet nonetheless proved to be something which incoming MEST officials resisted. While the particular reasons are outlined in the previous chapter, an international official close to the Grade 9 reform process observed how, in political terms, the decision to turn down the plan to use Slovenians to help reform Kosovo's curricula "made sense." Indeed, applying a political perspective on the decision-making process of incoming MEST officials was, in the official's view, "the only way to make sense of things at MEST." Kosovars had to be seen as leading the curriculum reform, not Slovenians. Accordingly, over the course of the first two weeks of August 2002, hand-picked Kosovar Albanian curriculum and academic subject experts, particularly those from the University of Pristina, were assigned to one of 23 different content areas to design the new Ninth Grade curriculum. They were under tremendous pressure to create the new curriculum quickly, since "the Minister had promised a new [Ninth Grade] curriculum by September 2002, so it had to be done." The official realized, during this process, that "the Albanians [working on the Grade 9 reforms] thought a curriculum was a syllabus – just content, and nothing else." An Albanian involved in the curriculum reform supported this view. "Even the word 'curriculum' is new. We had always used 'plans' and 'programmes' instead."

The inclusive, consultative process developed by UNICEF and its colleagues to create a new Curriculum Framework for Kosovar education was not a featured component of the Ninth Grade reform process. The UNICEF-led Curriculum Framework process was groundbreaking. "For the first time in Kosovo," a Kosovar official involved with UNICEF's curriculum work recalled, "we included stakeholders" in the process of developing a curriculum. The official described meetings on curriculum issues with "parents, students, community members, school directors, and

---

29 They were to be joined in the effort by a group of Kosovars who had been trained in curriculum reform at UNESCO's International Bureau of Education (IBE), located in Geneva, Switzerland. UNICEF officials and Kosovar trainees, among others, praised IBE's training programme.

even students." Given the traditional teaching methods in Kosovo, which were dominated by teachers supplying content and students receiving it, consulting with students was particularly unusual. As a relative of the official asked, "Why are you asking students what they want to know? They are supposed to learn from you!" In the end, although some of the officials leading the Ninth Grade reform understood and tried to apply elements of the new Curriculum Framework process, most of those involved were unfamiliar with it, and besides, time was working against them. The pressure was on getting a new curriculum completed.

The pressure to deliver a reformed Ninth Grade curriculum by the time school opened in September 2002 left little time to train teachers on how to use the new curriculum. One official involved in the process said that the '1,500-1,600' Ninth Grade teachers were told to attend one of seven centres. What ensued, the official said, was less training teachers about how to use the new curriculum than 'informing' teachers of its content. Teachers subsequently reported that they were poorly prepared for the change. School and municipal administrators reported that they had little time to find space to accommodate an additional grade of primary-school students, and lacked critical materials and support to help make the reforms work. A Kosovar municipal education official summed up the difficulties in the following way: "Why the Ministry of Education supported the set-up of the Ninth Grade reforms this year, we really do not know, especially when it is obvious that there are not even minimal conditions for doing the reforms [in 2002]."

Despite such problems, a high-ranking MEST official declared that the Ninth Grade reform process was a success. In the official's view, this was mainly because it proved to all that Kosovar Albanians could deliver a critical reform soon after the handover had taken place. The Kosovar-led Ministry requires international consultants, the official explained, "not Lead Agencies to lead all things." The official envisioned internationals, or "outsiders," as "an infusion of medicine only." The Ninth Grade reform process, the official concluded, "proved that we [that is, Kosovar Albanians] can do" major reforms "with the help of one [international] consultant."

The analysis of handover from UNMIK to Kosovar officials suggests that many Kosovars and some internationals were critical of the process. This may seem unfair to the commitment and accomplishments of the many international officials working on education in Kosovo. In some

respects, the criticisms probably were unfair. It appears that the general expectations of UNMIK and its Lead Agency colleagues among Kosovars were unreasonably high. The internationals may well have been, in part, victims of their own success: if the internationals can start new reforms, then why can't they lead the handover process as well? At the same time, UNMIK's general political dominance in post-war Kosovo eventually led them to be seen by some Kosovars, as a kind of occupying force. As Trofimov (2003: A1) reports, "Many Kosovars accuse the U.N. of excluding locals from key decisions, sheltering U.N. officials suspected of misdeeds and hobbling Kosovo's new elected institutions". One Kosovar working in the education system recalled, "My neighbours tell me, 'We had the Serbs, and now we have the internationals.'" After years of struggling to remove Serbian dominance, being led by UNMIK afterwards was almost bound to eventually become distasteful to many Albanians. This is not to say that every Albanian leader grasped what it would take to lead a new government, including those working in the new Ministry for Education, Science and Technology (MEST). As one Kosovar Albanian education official noted, "Albanians say, 'Kosovo will be the best.' But how? We don't know, but we believe it will be the best." Many Kosovar and international officials also suggested that many Kosovar Albanians had an unrealistic understanding of their capabilities and the time-frame it would require to achieve success. But this sentiment strongly suggests that at least some Kosovars were yearning to assume the reins of leadership. And it was a sentiment that frequently surfaced in interviews with high-ranking Kosovar education officials.

In addition, some MEST officials who assumed leadership of the education system expressed a degree of uneasiness with some of the reforms that UNMIK had spearheaded. The following comment from a leading Kosovar education official illuminates the fact that while UNMIK handed its leadership of the education system over to Kosovar Albanians, the Lead Agencies did not hand over their responsibilities. "We can't control or monitor the Lead Agencies," the official explained. "We know how to deal with things, but we need financial and professional support." The new leaders of MEST had assumed the leadership of a system that they did not entirely control. In fact, there appears to be a lack of clarity over whether or when Lead Agency responsibilities would be handed over to Ministry officials. UNMIK's "Briefing Document for the Minister of Education, Science and Technology," published just before official handover

from UNMIK to the newly formed MEST in March 2002, and described by PIO Daxner in the text's Introduction as a "Handover Document" (2002*b*: 5), lists those Lead Agencies "that are operating now [that is, February 2002] and shall operate in co-operation with the Ministry" (UNMIK, 2002*b:* 11). There is no suggestion that the Lead Agencies would hand their responsibilities and delegated leadership to MEST officials at an appointed time.

Perhaps the timing for handing over Lead Agency responsibilities remains unclear, particularly given the fact that so much change continues to take place in Kosovo's post-war education system. Regardless, UNMIK-led innovations in education, such as the Lead Agency approach, may have collectively succeeded as an effective reform strategy that produced rapid, positive, and even truly groundbreaking results in Kosovo. But with so little time for those involved in education in Kosovo to create and adjust to rapid change, it was unreasonable to expect that UNMIK's handover to the Kosovar leadership would proceed smoothly.

Views from below

Understanding what takes place at different levels of an education system can resemble how a story whispered from one person to another eventually evolves into an entirely different tale. Such difficulties are almost bound to surface, given the difficult tasks that confront educators and education officials at each system level. With this in mind, the following review of themes arising from interviews with school and municipal-level officials about education in Kosovo since the end of the NATO war will be briefly described.

Perhaps the most persistent theme arising from interviews with school and municipal-level officials was a sense of not being heard or understood by what one school director called "the people from above, from Pristina." As one municipal education official explained, "I'm sorry to say, but UNMIK didn't get involved in municipalities for education. They remained in Pristina." The sense of separation, and what another school director characterized as 'tremendous frustration' arising from it, was expressed in a number of ways, one of which surfaced when members of the research team arrived at a municipal official or school director's office or a school teacher's staff room. In almost every case, with both Albanian and Serbian educators, coffee and cigarettes were immediately offered

to the visitors. Often, emotions ran high by the end of such meetings. Discussions frequently led to descriptions of sad, frustrating or despairing circumstances from the past and present. In addition, there were frequent expressions of surprise over the team's interest in asking teachers and officials questions and recording their responses. "You're the first UN people to come to this school," one teacher said to research team members. "UNMIK tells us to change our teaching methods and says that we're backward," the teacher continued, "and then never comes to see us." "I'm amazed you're here," one school director said. "Nobody has ever spoken with us like this." "We have so many sad stories to tell, but nobody asks about them," another related.

Serbian and Albanian educators shared a similar sense of separation from powerful education officials. Recollections of dealing with KFOR as well as UNMIK officials led one Serbian school director to comment that the interactions made him feel "like a leftover, like I was irrelevant." The same director also explained that internationals who arrive at his school "never ask questions. They never ask what we would do." Another school director recalled a visit from an early international education visitor to his school. The international official "was pretty arrogant, and talked down to us, as if we had never been involved in education before. The way [the official] behaved was so insulting."

It is useful to attempt to put such expressions of criticism and isolation into context. Education professionals at every level of Kosovo's post-war education system have regularly confronted considerable frustration in their attempts to improve the state of education in Kosovo. Nothing arising from this research suggests, in any way, that the work of rebuilding, much less reforming, Kosovo's education system has been easy. On the contrary: the tasks that confront teachers, school directors, municipal officials, and those in Pristina may have seemed, at times, insurmountable. The situation was frustrating, tiresome, wearying, and, sometimes, cause for despair. In such circumstances, that education-system members at one level may not feel adequately appreciated by colleagues working at another level, is probably to be expected.

Nonetheless, the consistent expressions of distance, and feeling under-appreciated and overlooked, as reported by nearly every education professional interviewed at the municipal and school levels, indicated that a significant problem existed. In the collective view of those interviewed

at schools and municipalities, their concerns were not being adequately heard and appreciated, and their participation in the formulation of critical decisions was minimal. As a result, and regardless of whether this estimation seemed fair, or properly took into account the arduous work that officials in Pristina carried out on their behalf, the research findings clearly pointed to a widespread contention among low and mid-level education officials that the education system was essentially closed. This finding, while usually applied to UNMIK and members of other international agencies during interviews, also applied to MEST officials in Pristina, as evidenced in criticisms from school and municipal officials regarding MEST's handling of the Ninth Grade reforms described earlier in this chapter.

The finding about school and municipal-level perceptions of a closed education system was supported by international officials working at the regional or municipal levels of Kosovo's education system. The UNMIK-led education system, one official explained, maintained a "heavy top-down approach" which "makes me feel that we haven't achieved much because we haven't turned the approach towards bottom-up." Another official wondered, if "Kosovo is a top-down place," then "why strengthen it?" "What Kosovars have seen is that UNMIK operates in an autocratic way," the official continued, "just as Yugoslavia did." Another international official working at the regional level felt excluded from much of the decision-making that took place at the highest levels of the education system. There was, the official contended, a "concentrated focus in UNMIK on being secretive, parallel, and not open-minded, even with other [UNMIK] staff."

In general, officials with experience below the 'top' level in Pristina had a detailed and compassionate view of the struggles of Kosovar educators. They also regularly confronted the bitterness and frustrations of Kosovars. "Some locals don't trust internationals," one official explained, "and want us to get out as soon as possible, while some still appreciate our abilities." The issue of trust was taken up by another official as well. "There's a complete lack of trust of people at the local level by UNMIK internationals at the top," the official asserted. A third official expressed a level of confidence in the abilities of Kosovar educators that, in the official's view, many colleagues did not share. "Among the internationals, I was the only one to say that the education system will continue as it is now," the official explained. "All other internationals predicted collapse" following

handover to Kosovar officials in MEST. At the same time, another official believed that the changes that post-war reforms have wrought have been slow to reach schools. "It's hard to find any real change," the official explained, "in the way things are running at the school level."

One can see how UNMIK's need to establish an education system in the chaotic aftermath of war and displacement may have inspired significant misunderstandings. To avoid the influence of political forces in local school operations, for example, UNMIK has expended considerable effort to control how teachers and school directors are appointed. Similar concerns were apparent in recollections from international officials about the need to separate actual teachers from 'ghost' teachers, which was described in Chapter 3. Such processes may well have been necessary, but developing such system controls appears to have negatively impacted the building of trust between UNMIK and Kosovar education officials. The actions, indeed, appear to have been interpreted by many low-level education officials as UNMIK wresting control from the hands of local education officials. In fact, some of the school and municipal-level Kosovar Albanian officials who were interviewed contended that the post-war education system was more centralized than it had been before NATO's air war. As one school director noted, "Everything that concerns the education system and school workers in general is centralized and does not give us any room to act." "I can freely say that there is a completely centralized system of education," a municipal education official stated. At the same time, accounts from many Kosovar Albanians interviewed at the school level suggested that the parallel system experience had empowered them. When the parallel system was first being formed, for example, a school director recalled that "the curriculum was compiled by us," before the [parallel system's] Ministry of Education in January 1992."

In addition, it appears that symbolism contained in each parallel system school having its own 'Republic of Kosova' stamp remained powerful. "All schools used to have their own Republic of Kosova stamps, and now, not even us, at the [municipal] level, have a stamp," a municipal education official explained. There appeared to be a certain nostalgia for the days when school directors, among others, could use such a stamp, as it conferred a measure of authority and recognition on them that no longer seemed to exist.

The issue of decentralization, perhaps more than any other, reveals the parallel perceptions of the same reality that this study found so emblematic of post-conflict Kosovo. UNMIK officials in Pristina saw themselves working hard to put into place a system that reversed the centralized control patterns of the pre-war years, and devolved financing and significant decisions to the municipalities and schools. Municipal and school officials, on the other hand, did not necessarily experience the changes in the same way. Those interviewed for this study interpreted the steady flow of administrative directives from Pristina, and UNMIK's "two layer management system," as the exercise of centralized authority. In fact, the points of reference behind these two perspectives were different: UNMIK saw itself as reforming Yugoslavia's highly centralized system, while municipal and school officials compared UNMIK's reforms to the level of autonomy they had experienced during the parallel system era.

It may be that time will prove to be an important factor in reconciling these separate experiences of post-war change. Any expectation that the handover process, which shifted responsibility for Kosovo's education system from UNMIK's Department of Education and Science to the Kosovar-led MEST, would lead to an increase in municipal or school-level authority and responsibility, has yet to be widely recognized. Indeed, as a high-ranking Kosovar official within MEST noted, Kosovo's education system remained centralized:

> "Lots of things still have to come from the centre. It's a tradition [in Kosovo] to look to the centre rather than to do things creatively themselves. We can't expect such creativity yet. People have to be trained first. Now, there's a lack of partnership between schools, municipalities and the centre. Decentralization will take time."

Chapter 5

Conclusion: an unfinished odyssey

The first convoys of United Nations officials arriving in Pristina in mid-June 1999 encountered an extraordinarily tense environment. Education in large portions of Kosovo had ceased, beginning in late 1998, when the conflict between Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) fighters and Serbian military intensified. By April 1999, the threat of NATO bombing stopped schooling across Kosovo. The United Nations, which had had only a matter of days to prepare for its role as interim civil authority following the cessation of NATO's bombing, was severely understaffed, under-resourced and ill-equipped.

The withdrawal of Serbian troops, some in vehicles heavily laden with loot, including truck-loads of school desks and equipment, had created a power vacuum during which successive waves of raiding devastated most public buildings. Public services came to a complete standstill. More than half of the school buildings in Kosovo had been destroyed or severely damaged, and the remaining schools were vandalized or showed the effects of years of official neglect. Meanwhile, members of the Belgrade-controlled Provincial Administration, some with their families, holed up in the Provincial Administration building and university staff residences under the protection of KFOR troops. Security in all areas of Kosovo was a constant concern. For the first few weeks following the arrival of NATO and the United Nations, the night sky was regularly lit by burning Serb-owned houses that were allegedly torched by Kosovar Albanian dissidents or departing Serb families. In the first three months of KFOR's presence in Kosovo, over 200 murders were reported.

Across the education system, in interviews with Kosovars and international officials and educators alike in the autumn of 2002, the researchers gained a strong sense of dedicated people feeling overwhelmed. Post-war education work, to be sure, is almost always difficult. Work conditions are often terrible. Rebuilding schools, delivering school supplies, upgrading education standards, paying staff, training teachers and administrators, devising and revising a curriculum, maintaining equitable relations across ethnic and rural-urban divides, in addition to the central

task of educating students – these and many other important tasks all demand considerable attention and generally call for more funding than will ever arrive. It is never easy for a dedicated educator to realize that the needs of teachers and students are not being met, and yet also know that there may be little that can be done, at least in the short term, to adequately address their needs. The needs of teachers and students, moreover, are usually much greater following wars, as trauma and loss get in the way of educating and learning. Given all these problems, high levels of stress are almost to be expected in post-war education work. It is in this overall context that the strivings of those involved in the arduous and evolving process of reconstructing a post-war education system should be considered, and have been over the course of this case study.

It is important, too, to recognize that at the time of this case study, the process of 'normalizing' governance in Kosovo was far from complete. While there exists an elected government with authority over most aspects of the key social-development portfolios, and with effective control over most but not all areas, the government is merely provisional, pending resolution of the political future of Kosovo. As long as the politics in Kosovo remain so complex and contested, reforming the education system will continue to be even more challenging than it is in less complex political environments.

Reviewing the reconstruction legacy

Viewed against a difficult and complex background, many of the achievements of the internationally supported reconstruction of the education system must be recognized as significant. Within three months of the arrival of NATO troops, United Nations agencies and international NGOs, at least 80 per cent of all primary and junior secondary school-aged children in Kosovo were back in school. The most reliable survey data available at the end of 2002 suggest that fewer than 3 per cent of the age group for primary and junior secondary are not attending school in Kosovo. Progress on (senior) secondary-school access is much less impressive, and the sub-sector continues to be stratified by gender and ethnicity. It also faces serious questions about the relevance of some of its educational programmes.

In terms of the quality of schooling in Kosovo, there is clearly a great deal yet to be achieved. More than half the schools in Kosovo have been

extensively repaired, and considerable progress has been made on providing schools with greater access to potable water and improved sanitation facilities. In most municipalities, more effective mechanisms have made needed supplies and educational materials more accessible to school personnel. Most unqualified teachers have been eliminated from the education system. The process of realigning the educational structure with most European systems, including lowering the age of entry and extending compulsory education to nine years, is well underway, although neither reform could be described as having been implemented smoothly.

UNMIK and many international agencies have been effective in raising the prominence of gender issues in Kosovo's education system. The case of medical high schools, however, suggests that more research and investigation is required to understand and respond to the particular educational needs of girls. Since medical high schools remain the most popular secondary-school option for girls, there is a possibility that closing or reforming the medical high schools might undermine efforts to increase female enrolment in secondary education. The concerns and values of education for girls, not only with female students but among their families and communities as well, call for increased attention, particularly when gender issues in the education system, such as the fact that male teachers already outnumber female teachers by a ratio of two to one (UNMIK/ MEST, 2003), remain so serious.

UNMIK inherited two debilitated management systems – one Albanian, one Serbian – that had operated simultaneously for almost a decade before NATO's air campaign. UNMIK succeeded in bringing one of them, the Kosovar Albanians' parallel system, largely within its orbit, to the point where authority over most aspects of educational administration and management could be devolved to the incoming provisional government. All teachers belong to a single payroll system, and receive regular, if inadequate, salaries. It is too early to determine the extent to which these changes will be reflected in measurable outcomes in learning achievement, but progress on reconstructing the system remains an impressive achievement.

Progress on incorporating the former Belgrade-controlled provincial management system into a single Kosovo administration is limited, and remains at the level of delicate negotiations and short-term, fairly tentative,

agreements. In the eyes of one senior UNMIK education official, "the Serb issue remains as the most important priority for UNMIK."

Advancing policy

Much of the early work on reopening schools was carried out under the leadership of UNICEF as the designated United Nations Lead Agency for education in the humanitarian phase. UNMIK, with its extremely limited resources, saw its primary mission during this phase as facilitating agreement on the key policy issues that the Lead Agency was not in a position to address. Those issues included language of instruction, curriculum, textbooks, teacher appointments and access to school. With the return to school in late October 1999, UNMIK's capacity increased, and it took a more assertive role in laying the groundwork for policy and system development as well as seeking to extend its authority over the system.

Both the literature reviewed and the interviews conducted for this case study identified a number of reforms as having had a lasting impact in laying the groundwork for a process that will still take years to complete. The General Education Law was widely recognized as farsighted, and was adopted, with minor modifications, by the Kosovo Assembly. While the Curriculum Framework that emerged from the UNICEF-led initiative encountered difficulties in the handover stage, it was also widely acknowledged as an important and potentially valuable contribution to the overall transformation of education in Kosovo. Indications are that it has now been accepted by the MEST as the basis for ongoing work on curriculum reform. The development of a new, inclusive approach to addressing disabled children's educational needs, while it has yet to be manifested on any scale in Kosovo schools, was widely perceived as a major policy breakthrough.

Less generously praised, though potentially very important, was work on the decentralization of financing and management responsibilities to municipal and school officials. While this initiative still holds the potential to significantly improve the way that Kosovo's education system is managed, the impact will not be felt in schools until progress is made on the capacity-building at the school and municipal level that the project initiated. Even fewer clear signals were detected regarding some of the other reforms, such as work on improving standards and assessment

measures, and the still-formidable task of developing a coherent teacher development programme for Kosovo.

Reform in practice: considering the Lead Agency approach

The education system's Lead Agencies played a featured role in much of the progress cited just above, making the benefits from the Lead Agency approach quickly apparent. The assembled international organizations that comprised the Lead Agencies, while still governed by their own management procedures, had the flexibility, experience and training to mobilize funds and implement programmes quickly and efficiently. This meant that UNMIK could keep its infrastructure relatively 'lean' – a key requirement of the donors that were bankrolling UNMIK's education operation. The Lead Agencies, in addition, could quickly contract consultants and fill capacity gaps with speed and flexibility. Many of the international agencies also had on their staff, or were able to recruit, qualified and experienced Kosovar specialists at rates that were well above UNMIK's salary scales for local employees. Many of the international agencies had extensive networks in Kosovo and links with local communities, some stretching back a decade or more before the conflict. All of these factors made the Lead Agency option an attractive one for UNMIK.

But the Lead Agency strategy clearly came at a price. First, the way it was implemented left the Lead Agencies largely to their own devices in both mobilizing and accounting for funds, and in choosing how they operated. Some opted for a strategy that involved considerable consultation with local communities and employment of local staff. Others relied much more heavily on their own international staff and consultants recruited from abroad. In the latter instance, the opportunity to develop institutional capacity and human resources within the emerging education authority was diminished, and many of the reforms that flowed from this process were perceived as imposed by outsiders.

A second major limitation of the approach was that the Lead Agencies were free to pursue their own programmes with limited obligations to co-ordinate their work with those being undertaken in other fields. The observed lack of co-ordination between the work on curriculum reform, teacher training and standards and assessment provides a clear illustration of this problem.

A third limitation concerns how the Lead Agency framework aligns with the new Ministry for Education, Science and Technology. Whatever the Lead Agencies' role during the interim and transitional phases, senior MEST officials may not allow the Lead Agencies to continue operating in the decentralized management arrangement that currently exists. Now that a provisional government has been established, there might be opportunities for the government to contract out some aspects of service delivery to identified agencies, both international and Kosovar. There might well be grounds for these agencies to use their resources and networks to contract consultants to support policy development within the new Ministry. However, the Lead Agencies' role in leading both policy development and service provision ultimately does not appear to be compatible with the responsibilities with which the provisional government is charged. As a result, the lasting impact of Lead Agencies, and how the Ministry manages and applies their work in the future, remain open questions. The first two points noted above are not a limitation of the Lead Agencies approach as such, but a result of the way it was implemented by UNMIK. The last makes it clear that it functions best as an interim strategy that should incorporate plans for transition to normal ministry control as the capacity of the government develops.

Missed opportunities

While early UNMIK efforts recognized the previous systems' strengths, and initiated collaborative arrangements with their leaders, UNMIK's shift towards 'Lead Agencies' intentionally not only marginalized a host of experienced Kosovar veterans of the previous systems, but in some instances publicly deprecated both the Parallel System and the former provincial system. With this step, a significant resource for confidence building, collaboration, information sharing, credibility, and – most important – trust was sacrificed. This was not the result of poor communication or confused messages, but the result of a deliberate strategy based on a conviction that the existing systems did not provide a basis for incremental change, and thus should be replaced by a completely new system that circumvented the surviving officials of the parallel system.

The strongest arguments against building reform upon the parallel system centred on concerns that the 'capacity' did not exist to support change, and allegations that the parallel system was riddled with corruption.

The majority of Kosovar educators interviewed in this study freely acknowledged that the decades of struggle had left them out of touch with modern trends. They expressed a strong desire to work with, and learn from, international specialists. Many also acknowledged that there had been irregularities in appointments and the handling of finances in the past, and professed a commitment to work for a system that would, as far as possible, eliminate such practices. Instead of building alliances with and strengthening the hand of these potential partners, however, UNMIK discourse discredited the previous systems and sought to build a new system drawing heavily on foreign expertise.

In the long run, it proved possible neither to build a completely new system nor to marginalize the leadership of the former systems. While excluding the majority of the Kosovar education specialists from significant decision-making roles in the reform process may have created space for more radical ideas to be imported, it also alienated a significant corps of education managers and specialists who had expressed a commitment to change. Many of these persons withdrew from direct involvement in the management and reform of the system, and were quickly absorbed by the growing demand for good educational expertise by the local and international NGOs and development agencies.

A second missed opportunity that emerged from the research was the almost complete omission by UNMIK of training in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. To be sure, there were unrealistic expectations from the international community on what could reasonably be achieved in terms of reconciliation between the ethnic groups that had just emerged from a truly brutal conflict that built on decades of discord and repressed animosity. Experience elsewhere in former Yugoslavia attests to the difficulty of this challenge. At the same time, conflict negotiation programmes are increasingly common in post-war situations, particularly where ethnic animosities lie at the core of conflict. Programmes of this kind became increasingly common in Rwanda following the genocide, to name just one example.[30] But in Kosovo, efforts to train people to begin to appreciate the perspectives of those on the opposite side of a conflict, for instance, have only infrequently been advanced. A few independent efforts

---

30 See, for instance, Marc Sommers and Liz McClintock (forthcoming, 2003) "On hidden ground: one coexistence strategy in Central Africa." In: Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow (Eds.), *Imagine coexistence: restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

were launched during the humanitarian assistance phase (two international officials noted an early programme carried out by the International Rescue Committee), and the Curriculum Framework provided space for such programmes. In the end, however, progress on this issue has never got off the ground.

Why has this been the case? A veteran UNMIK education official surmised that the reason was that "We had other things to do; other things were much more important, in a way." Another UNMIK education expert suggested a second reason: "The top UNMIK people deal so much with hard-line politicians that they don't know the views of ordinary people, who are much more forgiving." This is a telling comment, because it suggests that the array of experiences and perspectives that ordinary Albanian and Serbian educators shared were not identified as resources worthy of development. The same official noted that "there are many examples of Serbs and Albanians getting along." There were also, of course, many examples illuminating just how challenging and time-consuming Serb-Albanian conflicts could be. Nonetheless, Albanian and Serb educators shared a similar sense of being misunderstood and overlooked by more powerful groups, UNMIK, MEST and the FRY government in Belgrade among them. They also shared in many respects a similar educational heritage and approaches to teaching and learning.

There may have been many opportunities to help advance coexistence initiatives taking place between non-elite Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, through education and skills training. Accessing these commonalities might have helped advance coexistence initiatives already quietly taking place between non-elite Kosovar Albanians and Kosovac Serbs, through education and skills training. Such initiatives that demonstrate inclusion, rather than those that address Albanian or Serbian concerns separately, are sorely needed in Kosovo. And some material for building such initiatives certainly appears to be in evidence. As a Kosovar Albanian school director noted, "I'm willing to sit and have coffee with [Serbs]. I don't think hatred inside of us can help us develop. This is the twenty-first century. We have to be developed and tolerant."

Tough trade-offs

Findings from an extensive programme of qualitative research should not be interpreted as judgemental. There clearly will always be views, in

hindsight, on how things could have been handled differently, and the authors are keenly aware that in the heat and pressure of a post-conflict context, there are always trade-offs to be made.

An important trade-off that every education authority in such a situation faces is the tension between the need to get things done quickly to respond to urgent needs and the need to build consensus for change. There are strong pressures from donors and international agencies to deliver measurable results, and there are often unrealistic local expectations of what can be achieved quickly. Doing things in a way that enhances capacity and trust and builds the necessary consensus to ensure that changes eventually become a sustainable and lasting part of the system, is difficult and takes time, as the early efforts to work through the DESK process have clearly demonstrated.

UNMIK ultimately opted for an approach of bringing about reform as quickly as possible. It sought to reconstruct a system fast, and reform it in nearly the same breath. As a result, the kind of 'hard' results that relief and humanitarian work is known for – rebuilding schools, getting children into schools, getting teachers paid – all took place quickly in post-war Kosovo. More controversially, however, UNMIK approached education reform at breakneck speed. Core education-system responsibilities were outsourced to international actors under the Lead Agency framework. But was the education system developed through this process? On paper, results arising from the Lead Agency framework are in evidence, sometimes impressively so. However, it remains unclear whether many of UNMIK's early reforms will ultimately manifest themselves as demonstrable and lasting changes at the level of schools and classrooms.

A consequence of UNMIK's decision to implement rapid reforms was that Kosovars did not consider the process as either open or learning-based, and UNMIK's top education leaders were widely perceived as not being receptive listeners. The handover process was limited, in large part because building capacity and trust, and developing a receptive system, were not awarded a particularly high priority. The choice ultimately came between actions that intentionally pressured local leaders and more patient, and perhaps more painstaking, capacity-building work. In the end, trust was not built because trust was not sought.

Managing expectations

One persistent issue that arises from this study is the challenge of managing expectations. The system appears so devastated, the needs so overwhelming, and the amount of good will so great that expectations almost always exceed what can be achieved. In many respects the UNMIK officials' sense of battling incredible odds and meeting frustration at every turn is a product of the extraordinary expectations they placed on themselves. Schooling can be, and was, recommenced with remarkable speed. It even proved possible to develop policy documents relatively quickly, although there was a clear trade-off between the extent of buy-in from those who will implement new policies and the speed with which policy is developed. But system change takes time, even in circumstances where resources are relatively plentiful and management and governance systems are in place. Communities and teachers, too, harboured unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in political terms, and in terms of modernizing and re-invigorating the education system.

Time will tell

In light of more realistic expectations, the post-conflict reconstruction of education in Kosovo is a remarkable achievement that attests to the dedication, commitment and generosity of the people of Kosovo and the international community. In the end, the reforms instituted during this extraordinarily intense three-and-a-half-year period can only be assessed over a longer time-frame. Some will survive the difficult period of transition and be more systematically incorporated into policy by the new government and practice by Kosovo's educators. Of the many lessons that can be derived from this remarkable episode, two somewhat contradictory ones stand out. First, education systems with roots in the past have remarkable resilience and cannot be easily displaced by new frameworks, no matter how rational or progressive the new frameworks appear. Second, conflicts create significant and unusual opportunities to introduce changes that can, in time, and with local involvement, transform an education system. The challenge, then, is to strike a balance between enduring traditions and visionary changes.

Bibliography

References

Alva, S.; Murrugarra, E.; Paci, P. 2002. *The hidden costs of ethnic conflict: decomposing trends in educational outcomes of young Kosovars*. Policy Research Working Paper 2880 (August). Washington: World Bank.

Andersson, R.; Rexhepi, H.; Avdiu, A.; Shrestha, R.K.; Pesämaa, T.; Wiseman, M.; Klein-Beekman, C. 2001 (December). *Statistics on education in Kosovo 2001*. Pristina: Statistical Office of Kosovo, UNICEF, and Transitional Administrative Department of Education, Science and Technology.

"Answering the unanswerable," In: *The Economist,* 15-21 February 2003, pp. 32-33.

Bellamy, A.J. 2001. "Human wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99." In: Booth, K. (Ed.), *The Kosovo Tragedy: the human rights dimensions*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Chopra, J. 2000. "The UN's kingdom of East Timor". In: *Survival, 42*(3), 27-39.

Clark, H. 2000. *Civil resistance in Kosovo*. London; Sterling, VA.: Pluto Press.

Crighton, J.; Bakker, S.; Beijlsmit, L.; Crişan, A.; Hunt, E.; Gribben, A.; Ramsey, G.; Roberts-Schweitzer, E.; Sahlberg, P.; Stromberger, C.; Whitman, I. 2001. *Thematic review of national policies for Education-Kosovo*. CCNM/DEELSA/ED 6. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. [http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLIS/2001DOC.NSF/ c5ce8ffa41835d64c125685d005300b0/ c1256985004c66e3c1256a76002526e6/$FILE/JT00110115.PDF]

Crnobrnja, M. 1999. "Recent events in Kosovo: a perspective". In: *Papers of the Canadian Centre for German and European Studies*, *1*(2), Autumn. Montreal: Canadian Centre for German and European Studies.

Davies, L. 1999 (August). *Education in Kosova: Report to the British Council*. Birmingham: Centre for International Education and Research, School of Education, University of Birmingham.

Daxner, M. 2000. *Education in Kosovo: from crisis to recovery and transformation*. 2000. Presented at the Graz Stability Pact Meeting, 9-10 March 2000. Pristina: UNMIK (unpublished).

_____ . *Education Policy Statement 2001*. Pristina: UNMIK (unpublished).

_____ . 2002*a*. "Introduction". In: *Briefing Document for the Minister of Education, Science and Technology*. Pristina: UNMIK.

_____ . 2002*b*. *Education in Kosovo – 1999-2002: a critical report on progress, successes, and flaws*. Authorized version of presentation delivered at the OECD Kosovo Education Conference, Pristina, June 2002 (unpublished).

Demekas, D.G.; Herderschee, H.; Jacobs, D.F. 2002. *Kosovo: institutions and policies for reconstruction and growth*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Duhamel, C. 2001. *Synopsis of the Report about a mission in Kosovo at the Department of Education and Science of the UNMIK*. Orsay, France: French Ministry of Education, Delegation for International Relations and for Co-operation. (http://www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_kosovo.htm)

European Training Foundation (ETF). 2001 (June). *Labour market-vocational education and training assessment, Kosovo* (working document).
[http://www.etf.eu.int/etfweb.nsf/pages/downloadbycountryfiles/$file/kosovolma.pdf].

Fromkin, D. 1999. *Kosovo crossing: American ideals meet reality on the Balkan battlefields*. New York: The Free Press.

Georgeoff, P.J. 1982. *The educational system of Yugoslavia*. Washington: US Department of Education, International Education Programs.

Ignatieff, M. 2000. *Virtual war: Kosovo and beyond*. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Co.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo. 2000. *The Kosovo Report: conflict, international response, lessons learned*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Joint Civil Commission on Education. 1999*a*. *Minutes of the meetings of the JCCE*, July 1999, 15 October 1999.

———— . 1999*b*. *Interim arrangements for the resumption of schooling*, document tabled at the meetings of the JCCE on 15 October 1999.

Judah, T. 2000. *Kosovo: war and revenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Junger, S. 2002. "Slaves of the brothel". In: *Vanity Fair*, 503 (July), 112-117, 162-166.

Kosovo Department of Education and Science, Core Curriculum Team. 2001. *The New Kosovo Curriculum Framework: pre-school, primary and secondary education: Discussion White Paper*. Prístina: Department of Education and Science (www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_kosovo.htm)

Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. 2002. *School Education Statistics 2002*. Statistics prepared by the Education Management Information System (EMIS), MEST, November 2002. Pristina: Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.

Kosovo Educator Development Programme (KEDP). 2002. *Kososvo/a Summer Institute for educators*, June/July 2002. Pristina: KEDP.

Lambeth, B.S. 2001. *NATO's air war for Kosovo: a strategic and operational assessment*. Arlington, VA.; Pittsburgh, PA.; Santa Monica, CA.: RAND.

Lowicki, J. 2001. *Making the choice for a better life: promoting the protection and capacity of Kosovo's youth*. New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.

Malcolm, N. 1998. *Kosovo: a short history*. New York: New York University Press.

Mattich, N. 2001. *Power and participation: the use of local knowledge in humanitarian assistance programs during the Kosovo complex emergency*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science (unpublished M.Sc. thesis for social psychology).

Minear, L.; Van Baarda, T.; Sommers, M. 2000. *NATO and humanitarian action in the Kosovo crisis*. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University.

Nedeva, I. 1998. "Kosovo/a: different perspectives". In: Veremis, T.; Kofos, E., (Eds.), *Kosovo: avoiding another Balkan war* (pp. 99-144). Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, University of Athens.

Paci, P.; Murrugarra, E.; Stevens, J.; Lasagabaster, E.; Tracy, W.; Wes, M.; Mezam, T.; De La Briere, B.; Sederlof, H.; Mitra, S.; Gjonca, A. 2001 (December). *Kosovo poverty assessment, Volume I: Main Report*. Washington: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region.

Pavković, A. 2001. "Kosovo/Kosova: a land of conflicting myths". In: Waller, M.; Drezov, K.; Gokay, B. (Eds.), *Kosovo: the politics of delusion*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Poptodorova, E. 2001. *Cultural Situation in Kosovo: Report. Doc 9053*. Committee on Culture, Science and Education, Council of Europe (23 April).

Pupovci, D.; Hyseni, H.; Salihaj, J. 2001. *Education in Kosova 2000/2001*. Pristina: Kosova Education Centre.

"Reconstructing Kosovo". 2000. In: *The Economist,* 18-24 March 2000, 31-33.

Rexhaj, X. 2001. "Higher Education Reforms in Kosova: A Case of Strong International Influence in Local Reforms", Budapest: The Center for Policy Studies of the Open Societies Institute (unpublished).

Sell, L. 2002. *Slobodan Milosevic and the destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, London: Duke University Press.

Sinclair, M. 2001. "Education in emergencies". In: Crisp, J.; Talbot, C.; Cipollone, D. (Eds.), *Learning for a future: refugee education in developing countries.* Geneva: UNHCR, pp. 1-83.

Sommers, M.; McClintock, L. 2003. "On hidden ground: one coexistence strategy in Central Africa". In: Chayes, A.; Minow, M. (Eds.), *Imagine coexistence: restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass (forthcoming).

Statistical Office of Kosovo. 2001. *Statistics on education in Kosovo 2001*. Pristina: Statistical Office of Kosovo; UNICEF; Transitional Administrative Department of Education and Science.

Trofimov, Y. 2003. "Uneasy peace: UN's long stay, power in Kosovo stir resentment: after three years, mission aimed at self-rule still issues laws and postage stamps: cops who drive 'Coca-Colas'. In: *Wall Street Journal*, 3 January 2003, *CCXLI*(2).

UNESCO. 2000. *Dakar Framework for Action*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNHCR. 2002. *Refugees Daily* (11 October).

UNICEF. 2002 (July). *Consolidated donor report for Southeastern Europe: January-December 2001*. Belgrade: UNICEF Area Office for the Balkans.

United Nations. 2002. *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,* S/2002/1126 (9 October).

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 1999. "Developing the Education System in Kosovo (DESK): a concept paper". Paper presented to the Meeting of the JCCE of 15 October 1999, Pristina.

———. 1999, 2000. *Press releases.* 24 June 1999, 26 July 1999, 30 July 1999, 25 October 1999, 14 January 2000.

———. 2001 (December). *Education statistics 2000/2001*. Pristina: Transitional Administrative Department of Education, Science and Technology; World Bank/Educational Management Information System Project.

———. 2002*a*. *Information note,* 15 November 2002, Pristina.

———. 2002*b* (February). *Briefing document for the Minister of Education, Science and Technology*. Pristina: UNMIK

UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Field Office for Education, Science and Technology. 2002. *Situation Report (SITREP)*. Mitrovica: UNMIK

US Committee for Refugees. 2002. *Country report: Yugoslavia (includes Kosovo). Worldwide Refugee Survey.* Washington, DC: US Committee for Refugees.

(http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/
wrs02_europe5.cfm#yugoslavia)

US Department of State. 1999 (May). *Erasing history: ethnic cleansing in Kosovo*. Washington: US Department of State (unpublished).

World Bank. 2001. Europe and Central Asia Region: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. "Chapter 3: Policy priorities and UNMIK response: education". In: *Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Kosovo): economic and social reforms for peace and reconciliation, 1*(3), 32-34. Report No. 21784-KOS. Washington, DC: World Bank.
(http://www.seerecon.org/Kosovo/KosovoDonorPrograms/
WBEconReport/wb-kosovo-econreport-1-3.pdf)

———— . 2002. *Kosovo, FR Yugoslavia medium-term public expenditure priorities,* Report No. 24880-KOS. Washington: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region.

World Education Forum. 2000. *The Dakar Framework for Action.* Paris: UNESCO

Yannis, A. 2001. *Kosovo under international administration: an unfinished conflict*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

Supplementary bibliography

Bibliography of books

Abrahams, F.; Andersen, E. 1998. *Humanitarian law violations in Kosovo*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Abrahams, F.; Stover, E.; Peress, G. 2001. *A village destroyed, May 14, 1999: war crimes in Kosovo*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Acree, J.C.; Islami, K. 2001. *What happens when it happens?: Albania's Emergency Management Group and the 1999 Kosovo refugee emergency*. Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

Amnesty International. 1999. *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: humanitarian evacuation and the international response to refugees from Kosova*. New York, NY: Amnesty International.

Be Active, Be Emancipated. 1999. *Human rights, Advocacy, and the Empowerment of Women: an Education and Action project in the Yugoslav successor states*. Washington DC: International Centre for Research on Women/Centre for Development and Population Activities.

Bon-Rudin, E. 1982. *Reforming secondary school in Yugoslavia: myth, retrenchment and equality*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University Graduate School of Education, Cambridge.

Booth, K. 2001. *The Kosovo tragedy: the human rights dimensions*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Buckley, W.J. 2000. *Kosovo: contending voices on Balkan interventions*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub.

Bush, K.D.; Saltarelli, D. 2000. *The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: towards a peacebuilding education for children* (Viewpoints). Florence: United Nations Children's Fund Innocenti Research Centre.

Daalder, I.H.; O'Hanlon, M.E. *Winning ugly: Nato's war to save Kosovo*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Destani, B.D. 1999. *Albania and Kosovo: political and ethnic boundaries, 1867-1946*. Slough: Archive Editions.

Djuric, Z.E. 1996. *Development of education in the FR Yugoslavia, 1994-1995: the report for the 45th session of the International Conference on Education, UNESCO-IBE*. Paris: UNESCO.

Dragnich, A.N.; Todorovich, S. 1984. *The saga of Kosovo: focus on Serbian-Albanian relations*. Boulder: East European Monographs; New York: distributed by Columbia University Press.

Duijzings, G.; Janjic, D.; Maliqi, S. 1996. *Kosovo-Kosovo: confrontation or coexistence*. Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre, University of Nijmegen, Political Cultural Centre.

Elsie, R. 1997. *Kosovo, in the heart of the powder keg*. Boulder, East European Monographs. New York: distributed by Columbia University Press.

"Ethnic Albanians in the SFR of Yugoslavia: constitutional, legal and socio-economic status and the exercise of national rights". 1989. In: *Review of International Affairs, 40*(1989), 7-16.

Falk, R.A.; Wheatley, J.; Bartram, V. 2001. *Final report of the task force on humanitarian intervention after Kosovo*. Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

Fond Za Humanitarno Pravo. 1995. *Kosovo Albanians II*. Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Centre.

————— . 1998*a. Kosovo, human rights in times of armed conflict*. Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Centre.

Fond Za Humanitarno Pravo. 1998*b. Education of Kosovo Albanians*. Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Centre.

Hibbert, R. 1999. *The Kosovo question: origins, present complications and prospects*. London: unpublished manuscript.

International Crisis Group. 1999. *Reality demands: documenting violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo, 1999*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Jelavich, C. 1990. *South Slav nationalisms – Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Krieger, H. 2001. *The Kosovo conflict and international law: an analytical documentation 1974-1999* (11). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 1998. *Kosovo, protection and peace-building: protection of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and minorities*. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

McAllester, M. 2002. *Beyond the mountains of the damned: the war inside Kosovo*. New York; London: New York University Press.

Mertus, J. 1999. *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Motes, M. 1998. *Kosova Kosovo: prelude to war 1966-1999*. Homestead, FL: Redland Press.

O'Neill, W.G. 2002. *Kosovo: an unfinished peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1981. *Reviews of national policies for education: Yugoslavia*. Paris: OECD.

Pavlowitch, S.K.; Biberaj, E. 1982. *The Albanian problem in Yugoslavia: two views*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Pettifer, J. 2001. *Albania and Kosovo* (3rd ed.). London: A&C Black; New York: WW Norton.

Ramet, S.P. 1999. *Balkan Babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the War for Kosovo* (3rd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Robson, B. 1994. *Yugoslavia: Country Status Report.* Washington, DC: Institution Centre for Applied Linguistics Language Area Reference Centre.

Schwartz, S. 2000. *Kosovo: background to a war*. London: Anthem Press.

Serbian Ministry of Education. 1997. *System of education in the Republic of Serbia*. Belgrade.

Sherrow, V. 2000. *Encyclopedia of youth and war: young people as participants and victims*. Phoenix: The Oryx Press.

Sonntag, S.K. 2002. Language rights and the destruction of Yugoslavia. In: Tollefson, J.W. (Ed.), *Language policies in education: critical issues, xiii*. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Veremes, T.; Kophos, E.P.; Panepistemio, A. 1998. *Kosovo: avoiding another Balkan war*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, University of Athens.

Vickers, M. 1994. *The status of Kosovo in Socialist Yugoslavia*. Bradford: Research Unit in South European Studies, University of Bradford.

———— . 1998. *Between Serb and Albanian: a history of Kosovo*. London: Hurst & Co.

Waller, M.; Drezov, K.; Gökay, B. 2001. *Kosovo: the politics of delusion*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Weller, M. 1999. *The crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999* (*1*). Cambridge, UK: Documents & Analysis Publishing Ltd.

Bibliography of periodicals

"AFT backs Nato action on Kosovo". 1999. In: *American Teacher, 83*(8), May/June.

Agovino, T. 1998. "Ethnic strife in Kosovo wrecks deal for Serbs and Albanians to share University of Pristina". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 45*(12), 13 November.

———— . 1999*a*. "Academics are feared dead in wake of Kosovo strife". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 45*(47), 30 July, A41-A42.

———— . 1999*b*. "In wake of Serb exodus, almost all people at University of Pristina are ethnic Albanians". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 46*(17), 17 December.

———— . 1999*c*. "Kosovo Albanians supplant Serbs as new order reigns at University of Pristina". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 45*(48), 6 August, A55-A57.

———— . 2000. "Kosovo's University of Pristina attempts to climb out of the ruins". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (No. 36), May, A55-A57.

"Agreement allows educational facilities in Kosovo to be shared by Serbs and Albanians". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 44*(30), 3 April.

Bennett, C. 1992. "Secret schools shelter separatist dream". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1992*(3948), 28 February.

Bollag, B. 1999. "Albanian University opens its doors to scholars and students driven from Kosovo". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 45*(39), 4 June.

Cohen, M. 1999. "Kosovo strains limits of thought". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1384), 14 May.

"Cold comfort in Kosovo". 1989. In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1989*(3809), 30 June.

Coulter, A. 1998. "Kosovo's struggle". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1998*(4294), 16 October.

Doder, D. 1992. "Ethnic Albanians in Serbia's Kosovo hold secret classes to keep a university alive". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 39*(9), December.

_____ . 1995. "Ethnic Albanians defy ban on university in Macedonia". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 41*(20), January.

Durant, A. 1999. "Albanian control of faculties restored". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1374), 5 March.

Farrar, S. 2000. "When heritage becomes history". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1423), 18 February, 20-21.

Friend, M. 1999. "Serbs stay away from Pristina". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1406), 15 October.

Galbraith, K. 1997. "Yugoslavia's ethnic-Albanian students press for return of their university". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 44*(28), November, A47-A48.

Ghouri, N. 1999*a*. "Little peace for children of war". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1999*(4325), 21 May.

_____ . 1999*b*. "Waiting to care for Kosovo's children". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1999*(4319), 9 April.

Hawkesworth, C. 1999. "First casualty – democracy". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1381), 23 April.

Holdsworth, N. 1999. "Academic links survive bombing". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1387), 4 June.

Iggulden, A. 1996. "Students help Kosovar peers". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement, 1999*(1396), 6 August.

_____ . 1999. "Pristina University talks fail to happen". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1395), 30 July.

Jobbins, D. 1998. "Eye witness". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1360), 27 November.

_____ . 1999*a*. "After the bombs, what next for Belgrade University?" In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1390), 25 June.

_____ . 1999*b*. "Eye witness". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1384), 14 May.

_____ . 1999*c*. "Rector's tale of Belgrade bombing". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1380), 16 April.

————— . 2000*a*. "International academics wait in wings for Serbian democracy". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1458), 20 October.

————— . 2000*b*. "Pristina struggles to get back on its feet". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1458), 20 October.

Kaltsounis, T. 1999. "Democratic citizenship education in Albania". In: *The Social Studies, 90*(6), November/December, 245-249.

"Kosovar students jailed". 1998. In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1348), 4 September.

Llamazares, M. 1999. "Renewal hangs on fragile truce". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1396), 6 August.

————— . 2000*a*. "Ethnic divide foils UN efforts". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1423), 18 February.

————— . 2000*b*. "A contribution to Kosovo's reconstruction. In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1418), 14 January.

————— . 2000*c*. "Talks begin over jailed Kosovans". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1422), 11 February.

Lowndes, D. 1999. "Balkans to Barking". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1999*(4325), 21 May, 12-13.

Loyn, D. 1998. "A lifetime's work put to the sword". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1998*(4266), 3 April.

Marseilles, M. 1999. "Displaced medics sue to stay in country". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1389), 18 June.

Mason, L.-A. 2000. "A community of caring: reaching out to the children of Kosovo". In: *Young Children* (No. 3), May, 52-54.

McDonagh, M. 1993. "A fine education in hell". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1993*(4004), 26 March.

Nuthall, K. 2001. "Pristina thanks EU for its revival". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1496), 20 July.

O'Grady, C. 1997. "From Kosovo to King's Cross". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1997*(4251), 19 December.

O'Malley, B. 1999*a*. "Peace will not end schools' plight". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4313), 26 February.

_____ . 1999*b*. "Shell-shocked but school must go on". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4316), 19 March, 4-7.

Pesic, M. 1998. "Serbs appoint new Kosovo University chief". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1342), 24 July.

Pirani, S. 1999. "Teachers confront rise in extremism". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4318), 2 April.

Rich, V. 1994*a*. "Serbia castigated for suppressing language". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1994*(4090), 18 November.

_____ . 1994*b*. "Serbs crush Kosovo Academy". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1114), 11 March.

_____ . 1996*a*. "Academic accused of forgery". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1253), 15 November.

_____ . 1996*b*. "Albanian protests for profs". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1238), 26 July.

_____ . 1996*c*. "Albanians rejoin Serb fold". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1246), 20 September.

_____ . 1996*d*. "Student shot after exam party". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1226), 3 May.

_____ . 1997*a*. "Albanians fight for campus". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1301), 10 October.

_____ . 1997*b*. "Kosovo protests at Serb standstill". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1296), 5 September.

_____ . 1997*c*. "Kosovo sit-in against Serbian. In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1300), 3 October.

_____ . 1997*d*. "Pristina pressure still on". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1305), 7 November.

_____ . 1998*a*. "Albanian students arrested". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1353), 9 October.

_____ . 1998*b*. "Clashes over Serbian rule". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1314), 9 January.

_____ . 1998*c*. "Kosovo crisis hits takeover". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1336), 12 June.

_____ . 1998*d*. "Lecturers beaten at Kosovo demo". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1323), 13 March.

_____ . 1998*e*. "US students in Kosovo jailed by Serb officials". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1325), 27 March.

_____ . 1999*a*. "Kosovo students return". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement, 1999*(1398), 20 August.

_____ . 1999*b*. "Albanians repeat food and lodging protest that once led to Kosovo war". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1415), 17 December.

_____ . 1999*c*. "Serb anger at UN's 'passivity'". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1400), 3 September.

_____ . 1999*d*. "Serbs flee death city". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1391), 2 July.

Rose, M. 1999. "Crass, crude and confused". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1381), 23 April.

Sandford, G. 1999. "Refugees heighten education crisis". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4326), 28 May.

_____ . 2001. "UN deal on Serb return to Kosovo". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1506), 28 September.

Secor, L. 2001. "Terms of engagement". In: *Lingua-Franca* (No. 8), November (2001), 50-57.

"Three campus killings spur flight of Serb academics from University of Pristina". In: *The Chronicle of Higher Education, 45*(44), July.

Tuckey, J. 2000. "War zone learns to counter hatred". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4369), 24 March.

Utley, A. 1999. "Mission to Pristina". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1389), 18 June.

Vickers, M. 1994. "Turmoil greets Serbian curbs". In: *The Times Educational Supplement, 1994*(4075), 5 August.

_____ . 1996. "Albanians go back to school at long last". In: *The Times Educational Supplement* (No. 4189), 11 October.

Weaver, K. 1999*a*. "No job spells end of study". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement, 1999*(1398), 20 August.

_____ . 1999*b*. "Learning amid war zone horror". In: *The Times Educational Supplement,* 1999.

_____ . 1999*c*. "Social work on the frontline". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1383), 7 May.

Young, B. 1999. "Serb staff stay away after third murder". In: *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (No. 1416), 24/31 December.

Bibliography of journal articles

Banton, M. 1996. "The international oversight of ethnic relations". In: *American Behavioural Scientist, 40*(1), September, 86-101.

Bevc, M. 1993. "Rates of return to investment in education in Former Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s by region". In: *Economics of Education Review, 12*(4), December (1993), pp. 325-343.

Dorn, D.N. 1993. "A war against children: schools closed, teachers persecuted as part of 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosova". In: *American Educator: the Professional Journal of the American Federation of Teachers, 17*(1), Spring, 36-41.

Ivic, I. 1992. "Recent developments in higher education in the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". In: *European Journal of Education, 27*(1-2), 111-120.

Lackovic-Grgin, K.; Dekovic, M. 1991. "Some predictors of Yugoslavian adolescents' problems". In: *Adolescence, 26*(103), Autumn, 599-611.

Novak-Lukanovic, S. 1988. "Bilingual education in Yugoslavia: some experiences in the field of education for national minorities/ nationalities in Yugoslavia". In: *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 9*(1-2), 169-176.

Pesmazoglou, S. 1999. "Universities, the social sciences, and civil society". In: *Higher Education in Europe, 24*(4), 493-507.

Savicevic, D.M. 1996. "Universities and adult education in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". In: *International Journal of University Adult Education, 35*(2), July, 88-100.

Seufert, P. 1999. "The US Kosovar Refugee Programme: Operation Provide Refugee". In: *ESL Magazine, 2*(4), 10-14.

Soljan, N.N. 1991. "The saga of higher education in Yugoslavia: beyond the myths of a self-management socialist society". In: Comparative Education Review, 35*(1), February, 131-153.*

Tollefson, J.W. 1980. "The language planning process and language rights in Yugoslavia". In: *Language Problems and Language Planning, 4*(2), 141-156.

Uvalic-Trumbic, S. 1990. "New trends in higher education in Yugoslavia?" In: *European Journal of Education, 25*(4), 399-407.

Zgaga, P. 1998. "School failure and education policy in a social transition". In: *Education Canada, 38*(2), Summer, 31-36.

Bibliography of Internet resources

Ahmeti, X.; Reikki, J.; Urpola, S. 2002. "Kosovo Education Centre Project: didactic centres case study". (http://www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_kosovo.htm)

Apthorpe, R. 1999. "Chapter 3: Evaluations of humanitarian aid in response to the 1999 Kosovo crisis: Synthesis and meta-rvaluation". In: Haughton, R. with Robertson, K. (Eds.), *ALNAP's Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
(http://www.odi.org.uk/newalnap/AR2001/chapter3.html)

Bal, L.; Korkut, U. (Eds.). 2000*a*. "Yugoslavia: important research". In: *Open Society EducationUpdate, II*(9), Spring. (http://www.osi.hu/iep/Newsletter/ii_9.htm)

———— . (Eds.). 2000*b*. "Yugoslavia: Education for all". In: *Open Society Education Update, II*(9), Spring. (http://www.osi.hu/iep/Newsletter/ii_9.htm)

———— . (Eds.). 2000*c*. "Kosovo: Donor partnerships to meet community needs". In: *Open Society Education Update, II*(9), Spring. (http://www.osi.hu/iep/Newsletter/ii_9.htm)

Canadian Agency for International Development. 2002. *Kosovo projects: Teacher training program in Kosovo*.
(http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/vLUDocEn/4A97B9CDCCCD3BF185256BC90064EDC5#3)

Catholic Relief Services. 2002. *Improving education through Parent-School Partnership project.*
(http://www.catholicrelief.org/where_we_work/eastern_europe/kosovo.psp.cfm)

Corrin, C. 2000 (June). *Gender audit of reconstruction programmes in South Eastern Europe*. NY/Fairfax, CA: The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.
(http://www.womenscommission.org/reports/womenscommission-gender-reconstruction-e-europe.PDF)

Crighton, J.; Bakker, S.; Beijlsmit, L.; Crişan, A.; Hunt, E.; Gribben, A.; Ramsey, G.; Roberts-Schweitzer, E.; Sahlberg, P.; Stromberger, C.; Whitman, I. 2001. *Thematic review of national policies for education-Kosovo*. CCNM/DEELSA/ED 6. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
(http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLIS/2001DOC.NSF/c5ce8ffa41835d64c125685d005300b0/c1256985004c66e3c1256a76002526e6/$FILE/JT00110115.PDF)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2002. "Peace and stability through cross-boundary civil society collaboration programme document 2002-2003." In: *Volume 2 – Programme Components*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(http://www.see.fresta.org/downloads/progcom02_03.pdf)

Demekas, D.G.; Herderschee, J.; Jacobs, D.F. 2002. *Kosovo: institutions and policies for reconstruction and growth*. KOSED 17. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/kosovo/2002/eng/iprg/IPRG.pdf)

Duhamel, C. 2001. *Synopsis of the report about a mission in Kosovo at the Department of Education and Science of the UNMIK*. Orsay, France: French Ministry of Education, Delegation for International Relations and for Co-operation. (http://www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_kosovo.htm)

European Agency for Reconstruction. 2002. *Kosovo*. (http://www.ear.eu.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm)

European Commission / The World Bank. 2003. *Economic reconstruction and development in South-East Europe: Donor and agency programs for Kosovo*.
(http://www.seerecon.org/Kosovo/KosovoDonorPrograms/
KosovoDonorPrograms.htm)

European Training Foundation. 2001 (June). *Labour market-vocational education and training assessment Kosovo* [working document].
(http://www.etf.eu.int/etfweb.nsf/pages/downloadbycountryfiles/
$file/kosovolma.pdf)

Gribben, T.; Krissler, D. 2000 (February). *Education and training in Kosovo: situational analysis and pre-programming Paper*. Prishtina, Kosovo: European Training Foundation, European Commission.
(http://www.etf.eu.int/etfweb.nsf/pages/downloadbycountryfiles/
$file/post-war_kosovo.pdf)

International Crisis Group. 2001*a*. *Kosovo: a strategy for economic development*. ICG Balkans Report No. 123, 19 December. Brussels: ICG.
(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/kosovo/reports/
A400514_19122001.pdf)

————— . 2001*b*. *Religion in Kosovo*. ICG Balkans Report No. 105. Pristina/Brussels: ICG.
(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/kosovo/reports/
A400226_31012001.pdf) 31 January.

————— . 2002*a*. *A Kosovo roadmap(I): addressing final status*. ICG Balkans Report No. 124. Brussels: ICG.
(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/kosovo/reports/
A400561_01032002.pdf) 1 March.

————— . 2002*b*. *A Kosovo roadmap (II): internal benchmarks*. ICG Balkans Report No. 125. Brussels: ICG.
(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/kosovo/reports/
A400562_01032002.pdf) 1 March.

Kosovo Educweb. 2000*a*. *'Educational diplomacy' via the Internet: a transatlantic citizens' dialogue for Kosovo/a*. TISK2000 Seminar, Berlin. (http://users.skynet.be/bs974554/Kosovo-E/Tisk/Tisk0.htm)

Kosovo Educweb. 2000*b*. *UNICEF: the situation of schools in October 2000*. (http://www.users.skynet.be/bs974554/Kosovo-E/Project/Unicef.htm) October.

Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. 2002. *Kosovo School Funding Handbook* (First edition). Pristina: World Bank Education Project.
(http://www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_kosovo.htm)

Open Society Institute. 2000. *Reforming education in Kosovo*. (http://www.soros.org/osn/winter2000/reforming_education.html)

Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe. n.d. *Tolerance begins here: OSCE community centres help to bring Kosovo NGOs together*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/features/in_focus/community_center.php3)

_____ . 2002. "News from the field: OSCE mission in Kosovo streamlines field presence". *OSCE Newsletter, 9*(2), 14. (http://www.osce.org/publications/newsletter/2002-02/nl022002.pdf)

Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe's Mission to Kosovo. 1999. "Pristina: access to education". In: *As seen, as told, Part II: a report on the human rights findings of the OSCE mission in Kosovo*. June to October: 81-82 (http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part2/part2.pdf)

_____ . 2000. *Mission reports on human dimension activities: mission in Kosovo*. Report presented at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, 17-27 October.
(http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/hdim/missions00.pdf)

_____ . 2002*a*. *Mission in Kosovo fact sheet*.
(http://www.osce.org/publications/factsheets/kosovo_e.pdf)

_____ . 2002*b*. *Building sustainable capacity in Kosovo's civil society*.
(http://www.osce.org/news/generate.pf.php3?news_id=2550) 27 June.

_____ . 2003. *Kosovo Police Service School*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/factsheet/police/kps_factsheet_eng.pdf)

Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2000*a*. *(Fourth) Assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (period covering November 1999 through January 2000)*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/ min_rep_04_eng.pdf)

_____ . 2000*b*. *(Fifth) Assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (period covering January through May 2000)*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/ min_rep_05_eng.PDF) June 15-16.

_____ . 2000*c*. *(Sixth) Assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (period covering June through September 2000)*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/ min_rep_06_eng.PDF) October 20-21.

_____ . 2001. *(Eighth) Assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (period covering March 2001 through August 2001)*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/ min_rep_08_eng.pdf) October 12-13.

_____ . 2002. *(Ninth) Assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (period covering September 2001 to April 2002)*.
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/ min_rep_09_eng.pdf) May 20-25.

Pupovci, D.; Hyseni, H.; Salihaj, J. 2001. *Education in Kosova 2000-2001*. (http://www.kec-ks.org/education_in_kosova_2000.htm)

Samardzic, S. 1995. *Kosovo-Metohija – Political aspect of the problem*. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute for European Studies.
(http://www.suc.org/politics/papers/kosovo/samardzic_kosovo.html)

United Kingdom Department for International Development. 2001. *Kosovo: Strategy Paper 2001-2004*. London: DFID.
(http://62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/Pubs/files/kosovo_csp.pdf)

United Nations Development Programme. 2002*a*. *Schools' rehabilitation in Kosovo (SRK)*.
(http://www.kosovo.undp.org/projects/SRK/srk.html)

_____ . 2002*b*. *Support for health and education to vulnerable communities (SHEC)*.
(http://www.Kosovo.undp.org/projects/SHEC/shec.html)

_____ . 2002*c*. *Youth empowerment project (YEP)*. [http://www.kosovo.undp.org/projects/YEP/yep.html)

_____ . 2002*d*. *Youth post-conflict participation project*. (http://www.kosovo.undp.org/projects/YPCPP/ypccp.html)

United Nations Mission in Kosovo. 2002. *The New Kosovo Government 2002 Budget*. (http://www.unmikonline.org/civiladm/cfa/2002Budget_eng.pdf) Pristina: UNMIK.

World Bank. 2001*a*. "Chapter 3: Policy priorities and UNMIK response: education". In: *Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Kosovo): Economic and social reforms for peace and reconciliation, 1*(3), 32-34. Report No. 21784-KOS. Washington, DC: World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit.
(http://www.seerecon.org/Kosovo/KosovoDonorPrograms/WBEconReport/wb-kosovo-econreport-1-3.pdf)

_____ . 2001*b*. "Chapter 5: Education." In: *Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Kosovo): Economic and social reforms for peace and reconciliation, 2*(5), 107-117. Report No. 21784-KOS. Washington, DC: World Bank Europe and Central Asia Region: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit.
(http://www.seerecon.org/Kosovo/KosovoDonorPrograms/WBEconReport/wb-kosovo-econreport-2-5.pdf)

_____ . 2001*c*. *Kosovo: Poverty assessment – Volume 1: Main Report*. Report No. 23390-KOS. Washington DC: World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit.
(http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/02/02//000094946_0201230401191/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf) 20 December.

Appendix I

Field research question guides
Marc Sommers and Hasnije Ilazi

Main theme:

Describing the social and political issues related to educational planning and management in Kosovo.

Chronology

What role did you play in education before June 1999?
What role have you played since June 1999?

Who is providing education now?
Who provided education before the crisis?
Who provided education since June 1999?
How did education processes change over time? [what happened first, second, etc.]

What role did different groups play?
[such as: UNMIK,
    internationals,
    local education officials,
    officials from the former system,
    officials in Belgrade,
    municipal officials,
    education officers,
    school directors,
    teachers,
    communities,
    and so on.]
Did these roles change over time?

Has your area raised its own money for education?
    Soon after June 1999?

Since that time?
If so, please explain.

Responsibility

[Who makes decisions about education?
Has your community or group been involved? If so, how?
What about other groups? Which community or group? How have they
been involved?

Who is responsible for the education of other communities or groups?
Which different groups do you mean?]

[*Note:* these questions may already have been addressed in the
Chronology section above]

Who should make decisions about education?
Should different groups work together to make decisions about education?
If so, how?
If not, why not?

Relevance

Why should children go to school?
After they get education, what should they do with it?
[farm? get married? work in the city? work in another country? and
so on]

Does the education provided meet the needs of:
children?
young people?
families?

your group?
other groups?
in each case, explain which group:
[UNMIK,
internationals,
locals,
political parties,

Albanians,
Serbs,
Gorani,
Turks,
Muslims,
Orthodox Christians,
and so on.]

How are the cultural and political issues of each population group reflected in schools and the education system?
[may be explained by who wins, and who loses]

Are there important psychological needs of students and teachers that need to be addressed,
like trauma?
Or are they already being addressed?

For students?
For teachers?

What about social needs, like exclusion?
How are these needs addressed?
Or are they not addressed?

For students?
For teachers?

What does it mean to have an education to preserve ethnic and political identity?
What does it mean to have an education that includes everyone?
Are these the same ideas, or are they different? [explain what you mean]

Curriculum

What is a curriculum?
What parts of the curriculum do they disagree on?
Explain, with examples [language, culture, history, geography, religion, etc.]
What parts of the curriculum do people agree on?

Who made the decisions about the curricula for different groups?
Did the process of making the curricula change over time?
What do you think of the process?

What do you think of the curriculum for your school/children/ethnic group?
What is good about it?
What would you like to change?

Does the curriculum promote mutual respect?
Does the curriculum promote possible conflict?
> Explain, with examples [language, culture, history, geography, religion, etc.]

Access and inclusion

Who goes to school?

Who does not go to school?
> [boys,
> girls,
> ethnic groups,
> political groups,
> religious groups,
> people in cities,
> people in villages,
> children with special needs, e.g. handicapped,
> former soldiers,
> etc.]

What explains why some get access and why some do not?
[answer with reference to each group, such as girls, ethnic groups, and so on.]

Appendix II

Field research question guides
Peter Buckland

Two general research themes:

1. Who is formulating policy?
2. What was the policy development process?

Specific issues

A. Transitional mechanisms
    from DESK
    to Lead Agency
    to Ministry of Education

B. Curriculum
    Examining the process of decision-making over time

C. Teachers
    Including: appointing, training and paying teachers, etc.

D. Access
    Who is getting access to schools?
    Who is getting access to learning?

IIEP publications and documents

More than 1,200 titles on all aspects of educational planning have been published by the International Institute for Educational Planning. A comprehensive catalogue is available in the following subject categories:

Educational planning and global issues
    General studies – global/developmental issues

Administration and management of education
    Decentralization – participation – distance education – school mapping – teachers

Economics of education
    Costs and financing – employment – international co-operation

Quality of education
    Evaluation – innovation – supervision

Different levels of formal education
    Primary to higher education

Alternative strategies for education
    Lifelong education – non-formal education – disadvantaged groups – gender education

Copies of the Catalogue may be obtained on request from:
IIEP, Communication and Publications Unit
information@iiep.unesco.org
Titles of new publications and abstracts may be consulted at the following web site: *www.unesco.org/iiep*

The International Institute for Educational Planning

The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is an international centre for advanced training and research in the field of educational planning. It was established by UNESCO in 1963 and is financed by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions from Member States. In recent years the following Member States have provided voluntary contributions to the Institute: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Institute's aim is to contribute to the development of education throughout the world, by expanding both knowledge and the supply of competent professionals in the field of educational planning. In this endeavour the Institute co-operates with interested training and research organizations in Member States. The Governing Board of the IIEP, which approves the Institute's programme and budget, consists of a maximum of eight elected members and four members designated by the United Nations Organization and certain of its specialized agencies and institutes.

Inquiries about the Institute should be addressed to:
The Office of the Director, International Institute for Educational Planning,
7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris, France